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Abstract 
This thesis provides an exploration of urban regeneration in the City of Salford, Greater 
Manchester. It is a detailed empirical case study drawing on interviews with 
regeneration policy makers in Salford to provide an understanding of the decisions that 
were taken and the results that emerged. In particular this thesis highlights the 
entrepreneurial forms of governance enacted by Salford City Council to acquire private 
investment and development opportunities, and explores the Council’s method of 
reducing its statutory requirements and democratic controls and increasing its financial 
risk-taking in order to secure these opportunities. Drawing on the post-political 
literature, this thesis questions the ‘no alternative’ discourse that accompanies these 
measures.  
This thesis also explores the wider changes to urban regeneration policy by the Coalition 
Government under conditions of economic austerity, considering the ways in which 
regeneration can be said to have moved from attempting to alleviate social problems 
via focused policies targeted at spaces of deprivation towards an urban policy based on 
delivering incentivised economic growth. It raises questions about the potential impact 
of this change for those places in Salford that continue to suffer from high levels of 
deprivation and are therefore less likely to secure financial investment under the new 
policy regime.   
This thesis contributes to the urban studies literature through a discussion of the 
concept of foreclosure. Principally the thesis considers how the re-envisioning and 
reordering of the City forecloses it as a space of engagement for those residents who 
are ‘out of place’ within this newly designed space. It highlights how the designated 
vision for Salford’s future forecloses alternative ways of progressing, setting it on a 
singular linear trajectory. It also considers how the Council’s quest to regenerate means 
that it commits in the present to something which forecloses its ability to exercise 
change in the future.    
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1. Introduction 
Salford is Schizophrenic.  
Or so I was told by a public sector policy maker involved in Salford’s urban regeneration. 
This person was using the term to convey its commonly assumed definition of a split 
personality. He was suggesting that there was a split in Salford. A dichotomy of two 
contrasting parts. In particular, this participant was comparing areas that had been 
‘successfully’ regenerated like Salford Quays – a mixed use waterfront development - to 
those spaces that were still suffering from high levels of deprivation. The differences 
referred to were social, economic and cultural. For this participant, the idea of Salford 
(in particular he was referring to inner city Central Salford) as a duality had positive 
connotations as it represented to him not the unevenness between the two parts or the 
growing separation this might bring, but a tangible demonstration that improvements 
in some parts of the city were being made.  
This was not the only time during my research that somebody proposed that Salford was 
split, or consisted of separate, oppositional parts. Participants referred to Central 
Salford as “split in half”, with Salford Quays consisting of one (much smaller, in 
geographical terms) ‘half’, and the rest of Central Salford making up the other (much 
smaller, in economic terms) ‘half’. Central Salford is the inner city part of the city nearest 
to Manchester. It contains the most deprived wards in the city and has been subject to 
the majority of the urban regeneration that has taken place, including Salford Quays. 
Another participant described Salford as a “chameleon”. It could appear to be different 
things to different people, depending on their wants and needs. The disjuncture was 
conceived of as so profound that the short physical distance between Salford Quays and 
the rest of Central Salford (four miles as the crow flies) was described as “unbelievable”, 
as “mind boggling”, that it “beggars belief”. Some of these descriptions were conveying 
excitement at the possibility of what this might all mean for the future of Salford. For 
others, there was an element of uncertainty and wariness about the scale of 
transformation and their own changing relationships to it. There were also those who 
expressed their anger and frustration about what was perceived as unfavourable 
 13 
 
treatment for some parts of the inner city over others. To one participant, this difference 
in treatment was “a disgrace”.  
It is not hard to see, when spending time in the inner city of Salford, why it incites people 
to describe it in these ways. Parts of the city have been redeveloped to a point where 
there are no remaining features identifying its not-so-distant past. Salford Quays 
demonstrates this well. In Salford Quays, we find MediaCityUK, home to parts of the 
BBC. I can barely imagine, standing in Salford Quays, that it was once Salford Docks, an 
active port for cargo and passengers into Manchester (see figure 1). Salford Quays (see 
figure2) is now a ‘unique waterfront destination’ boasting world-class cultural and 
leisure attractions along with waterfront apartments and office complexes. ‘The Quays’ 
as it has been remarketed has dropped the ‘Salford’ label and is now pitched as ‘Greater 
Manchester’s waterfront’. The identity of the site as Salford’s working docks has been 
wholly replaced by one of affluent modern urban living under a quest to rebrand the city 
in this image. But it is important to consider what the effects of this large scale 
redevelopment have been. 
 
Figure 1: Salford Docks. Source - Unlocking Salford Quays 
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Figure 2: Salford Quays. Source - Manchester Gazette 
Within a few miles of the Quays are inner city neighbourhoods with severe levels of 
deprivation and unemployment. Many of them have experienced state-led regeneration 
and renewal which, whilst positive for some, has stood accused of causing displacement 
and gentrification for others (Jeffery & Jackson 2012). Since the economic crash in 2008 
funding opportunities for urban development have collapsed and many investments 
have failed to deliver on initial promises. The result in Salford is a stark departure from 
the designer buildings of the Quays. There is only empty space where streets of houses 
once were. These dwellings were demolished to give way for replacements that were 
not built (see, for example, figure 3). In some cases, the spaces are not empty. Rather, 
houses and shops stand boarded up waiting as if in limbo for something that may no 
longer happen, something which Wallace (2015) has referred to as ‘gentrification 
interrupted’.     
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Figure 3: Housing clearance site – Author’s own photo 
The sense of unevenness in Salford is exacerbated by the close proximity of these 
different spaces. Jeffrey and Jackson note, for example, that in Salford ‘islands of 
gentrified affluence exist in a sea of relative poverty’ (2012: 18). And whilst ‘islands’ like 
the Quays and MediaCityUK receive continual public and private financial investment, 
the economic impact of the financial collapse has seen not only financial investment 
withdrawn from the deprived areas but the curtailment of crucial welfare and public 
service support too. The election of a Conservative-led coalition government in 2010 
followed by a wholly Conservative government in 2015 has amplified these differences. 
There is now what Peck (2012) has termed ‘Austerity Urbanism’ in which urban policy 
incorporates significant cuts to public services. It has been suggested that under 
austerity urbanism, regeneration is no longer aimed at ameliorating spatially 
concentrated levels of deprivation but is solely about targeting sites already expected 
to deliver economic growth (Goodchild & Hammond 2013). For writers such as 
Southern, these changes signify a ‘terminal prognosis for regeneration’ wherein any 
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attempts at reducing structural inequalities have been removed from the process (2013: 
400).   
In this thesis I unpack how Salford has come to exhibit such spatial unevenness through 
its experience of urban regeneration. By analysing policy and planning documents and 
interviewing decision makers I explore the design, implementation, negotiation and 
legitimisation of regeneration and its outcomes. Ultimately I seek to uncover the journey 
that Salford has taken already and where it intends to go next under conditions of 
austerity and a political commitment to economic growth. I will explore what future is 
being created for Salford, who is included in that future and who will benefit from it.    
1.1 Situating Salford 
People may not know the City of Salford but for many of those who do their impression 
has been shaped by the many representations of the city in popular media. These 
popular representations that I shall highlight below have helped to created one of 
Salford’s more dominant images, that of working class culture and poverty. It is these 
images that Salford Council has attempted to move away from through a period of urban 
redevelopment. Perhaps one of Salford’s most famous historical depictions is in 
Friedrich Engels’ The Conditions of the Working Class in England. In this 1845 book, 
written during his two year visit to Manchester, he described Salford as being so dirty, 
overcrowded and unsanitary that ‘only inhuman, degraded and unhealthy creatures 
would feel at home’ (1971: 75). Walter Greenwood’s Love on the Dole written in the 
1930s continued to chart the poverty of Salford’s working classes, highlighting the 
struggles of one family suffering unemployment during the great depression. Robert 
Roberts’ 1974 The Classic Slum provided greater insight to one of the districts Engels had 
initially written about. Roberts described working class Salford life during the first 
quarter of the twentieth century from his perspective as the son of a shopkeeper living 
in a Salford slum. Reflecting on Engels’ visit back in the 1840s, Roberts wrote, 
He died in 1895 having seen that little world change, develop, ‘prosper’ 
even, yet stay in essence the same awful paradigm of what a free 
capitalist society could produce. By 1900 the area showed some 
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improvement; his ‘cow-stable’ had doubtless been demolished together 
with many another noisome den, but much that was vile remained 
(1973: 14).  
Visually, industrial Salford life features heavily in the mid-twentieth century work of 
artist L. S. Lowry. Lowry’s famous ‘matchstick people’ were intended to represent the 
worn-out workers of the Salford poor at that time (Thompson 2013). Lowry presented 
Salford people as thin, malnourished and barefoot against the smoky industrial 
landscape. From Manchester, the band Oasis entered in to a Lowryesque world for their 
1995 Masterplan music video in which they reaffirmed Lowry as the go-to depiction of 
Northern working class culture. Similar scenes are created in Ewan MacColl’s song Dirty 
Old Town in 1949 in which he described his home town of Salford as in need of 
demolition to solve the problems of poverty and decay. In more popular culture, this 
iconography of industrial Northern Britain has been played out in Britain’s longest 
running soap opera Coronation Street which began life in the 1960s. Set in a fictional 
street in Salford, Coronation Street portrays northern working class existence through 
the lives of the street’s residents, living in traditional terraced housing with smoky 
chimneys, working in the local factories and attending the local pub. The dominating 
image of Salford incorporates many of these old class tropes.  
As part of a tongue-in-cheek marketing campaign which recognised and aimed to tackle 
these images, Salford Council’s One Shocking City advertising campaign attempted to 
challenge the stereotypes associated with Salford by promoting its positive assets 
instead. For example, the poster stating “Public hangings are back” was used to highlight 
the local art exhibitions. “There’s tons of grass in Salford” and “Salford’s full of pond life” 
were not intended to promote provision of cannabis and offend local residents, but to 
highlight their green space and natural parks.  
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Most recently there has been a high profile focus on inner city Salford due to the 
relocation of parts of the BBC to the regenerated Salford Quays area. Initial media 
reports claimed that staff was concerned to move to the area for fear of crime. It was 
reported that the BBC were spending large sums of money so that staff could commute 
from London instead of moving to Salford. There were claims that additional security 
was being hired to escort staff members around the area (Carter 2012). Most famously 
the presenter and columnist Jeremy Clarkson claimed he would “resign in a heartbeat” 
if he were expected to move to Salford (BBC News 2011b). But whilst these stories added 
to the negative imagery of crime-ridden Salford, the BBC move more broadly 
represented the other side of the split inner city; the new ambition and vision of 
becoming a “modern global city” that Salford City Council is now striving to achieve.  
I should pause here to clarify a few terms for those unfamiliar with Salford. It is a city in 
the North West of England, situated immediately to the West of Manchester City Centre 
and contains about half of the population of neighbouring Manchester (ONS, 2011). The 
two cities are separated by the River Irwell that runs between them, creating a natural 
Figure 4: One Shocking City advertising campaign. Source – BBC News 2005 
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boundary. The city forms part of the wider Greater Manchester Conurbation along with 
nine other Local Authorities. Along with this, Salford is a post-industrial city. It has 
experienced both the boom and bust of the industrial revolution that took Salford from 
a rural hinterland to a fully industrial city and on again to post-industrial decline (Catalani 
& Panas 2012). It received city status in 1926, not long after the opening of the ship 
canal, which at its height was the third busiest port in England. The Borough of Salford 
comprised the inner city wards until 1974 when administrative changes saw it 
incorporate the westerly areas. Still today the west and east of Salford are often treated 
separately, particularly in planning terms. One side is referred to as West Salford whilst 
the inner city eastern areas are referred to as Central Salford or ‘Old Salford’ by its 
inhabitants (Walklate & Evans 1999).  
 
 
Figure 5: Salford Docks 1981. Source - Matthew Wilkinson 
Salford itself is not a ‘World City’ or ‘Global City’ (Massey 2007) and has not reached the 
same status as Manchester has, having most often been cast in its shadow. The two 
cities have a reportedly long historic rivalry which has prevented early cross boundary 
working because of  a level of scepticism and mistrust between the two (Carley et al. 
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2000). When the ship canal at Salford declined, it did so rapidly. Within ten years it went 
from moving an annual two million tons of cargo to moving almost nothing (Struthers 
2003). What followed in the 1980s is a familiar pattern of industrial decline, 
unemployment and entrenched poverty. After the closure of the docks, deprivation 
levels were high as was unemployment. The areas within Central Salford suffered the 
most with unemployment levels up at 32% (Henderson et al. 2007). However, whilst the 
Labour-run Council of neighbouring Manchester was initially rejecting the neoliberal 
reforms of the Thatcher government that were emerging at that time, Salford’s Labour 
Council were reportedly much more ready to work with them on their urban reforms. 
Particularly they were keen to acquire the government grants necessary to deliver the 
regeneration of the Salford Docks, a source of tension between the two cities (Robson 
2002).    
1.2 Governance and Regeneration in Salford 
What has occurred in Salford since this time has been the gradual urban transformation 
of the inner city, one in which Salford Council has adopted and embraced many of the 
neoliberal reforms that have attempted to place cities as the driving force of the national 
economy. Across the globe over the last four decades has been a radical transformation 
of cities all following roughly the same trajectory: namely, deprived inner cities being 
reimagined and reshaped; consumer and luxury centres of apartment blocks, office 
buildings, city plazas and leisure spaces; large scale flagship developments of stadiums 
and arenas in which to host national and international mega events; the ‘renaissance’ 
of deindustrialised places like docklands and old industrial spaces in to mixed-use tourist 
attractions, heritage centres, cultural quarters and gentrified living spaces (MacLeod 
2011). Creating these ‘spaces of spectacle’ has been key to regenerating cities since the 
1980s in the quest to bring back investment, economy and interest to deindustrialised 
inner cities through a market led approach (Raco 2003: 1869). In an increasingly 
globalised world where government funding is restricted, cities are expected to compete 
with one another to attract investment opportunities and reverse the decline 
experienced by the loss of manufacturing and industry. These flagship spectacles, then, 
are crucial to attracting and retaining fleetingly mobile capital.  
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Salford has followed these patterns of urban restructuring which have been referred to 
as the ‘new urban politics’ (MacLeod 2011). These are distinguishable from the old 
urban politics by drawing on a wider range of private actors to deliver public services 
and urban infrastructure, in particular private developers and non-governmental elites 
into public private partnerships and growth coalitions. The transition to new urban 
politics is also marked by the transformation of the public state in to a more business-
like entrepreneurial form of governance which includes speculative risk taking with 
public finances, a practice that is no longer undertaken solely by private organisations, 
and a retreat away from more Keynesian commitments to redistribution and welfare 
towards a neo-liberal commitment to generating economic growth (MacLeod 2011). 
This shift has been most famously characterised by David Harvey (1989) as a move from 
managerial to entrepreneurial governance, a shift that Peck argues has today become 
so normalised into ‘“everyday” entrepreneurialisms’ that the ubiquity of these 
competitive city redesigns have lost their uniqueness: ‘the spectacles,’ he writes, ‘no 
longer seem that spectacular’ (2014: 397). 
Many cities have taken on this familiar spectacular approach to urban renewal, for 
example the transformation of Liverpool’s docklands, London’s Tate Modern, the 
NewcastleGateshead quayside and Cardiff bay, to the extent that they have been noted 
to exhibit a strong similarity (Swyngedouw 2010). In Salford, the most ‘spectacular’ of 
developments has been the transformation of the dockland area. As I have already 
begun to touch upon, capitalising on the waterfront location and its immediate 
proximity to Manchester city centre, Salford Quays has seen considerable investment 
and regeneration. It is now a modern mixed-use development of waterside apartments, 
a cultural arts centre called The Lowry, a shopping centre, a water sports centre, office 
blocks and the aforementioned MediaCityUK housing the BBC and ITV amongst others. 
Just across the bridge is the Trafford side of the Quays, which also includes the Imperial 
War Museum and is a walk away from Manchester United’s Old Trafford football 
stadium.  
Salford Quays forms part of a new spatialisation in Salford called the Regional Centre. 
The Regional Centre consists of parts of Salford and the Manchester City Centre and is 
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Greater Manchester’s focal point for investment, economic growth, leisure and tourism 
now and in the future. The Regional Centre is of “European-wide importance” and will 
be subject to significant continual development (Salford City Council 2004). The figure 
below (figure 6) depicts Salford and its compartmentalised spatialities; West Salford (in 
Green circles), Central Salford (in red circles) and the Regional Centre (in the blue 
circles). As can be seen, the Regional Centre includes Salford Quays, the Ordsall riverside 
that runs from the Quays alongside Manchester City Centre and up to Chapel Street, one 
of Salford’s other strategic regeneration sites. What we have in this instance is the 
‘summoning up’ of a newly defined space which is then fed back into the imaginations 
of those who experience this place and which does not align to previous administrative 
boundaries but is defined instead by its competitive assets (Healey 2009). The Regional 
Centre in Salford includes all waterfront development opportunities, Salford’s Grade 1 
listed Tudor manor house Ordsall Hall, the University of Salford, the museums on Chapel 
Street and the majority of new apartment and leisure opportunities. All of these are also 
within walking distance of Manchester city centre.   
 
Figure 6: Salford Spatial Framework. Source - Salford City Council 
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As these spaces are being reimagined, it is crucial to consider the impact of this that is 
experienced by the people who reside within this changing landscape. One of the core 
features of regeneration is intended to be the amelioration of economic and social 
problems that an area and its inhabitants face. According to Roberts, regeneration is a 
‘comprehensive and integrated vision and action which leads to the resolution of urban 
problems and which seeks to bring about a lasting improvement in the economic, 
physical, social and environmental condition of an area that has been subject to change’ 
(in Pugalis & McGuinness 2013: 342). The term regeneration itself is a loaded and 
contested term which draws on discourses of revival and regrowth in the physical and 
moral fabric of deprived and low-income areas (Southern 2013). For writers such as Lees 
(2014) regeneration – particularly the form taken under New Labour’s Urban 
Renaissance which I will explore shortly – is state-led gentrification initiated as a 
response to government policy-making which caused deprived inner city areas and 
concentrated spaces of poverty to occur in the first instance.  
New Labour’s Urban Renaissance continued the efforts created under the preceding 
Conservative Government of tackling area-based decline. However, instead of focusing 
purely on economic interventions they also attempted to incorporate issues of social 
welfare in their efforts (Ginsburg 1999). For New Labour, these areas had become 
economically and also socially excluded from the mainstream, a diagnosis that ushered 
in a moralising and responsibilising discourse aimed at placing the majority of the blame 
for decline on those who resided within the areas themselves (Atkinson 2003b). The 
solution proffered by the government was to bring people and thus capital (both 
economic and social) back to the city. However, doing so required the physical 
transformation, securitisation and increasing privatisation of previously rundown high 
crime areas. Changing the image and perception of a place through regeneration 
programmes and extensive safety measures to protect those returning was crucial to 
the renewal of an area (Raco 2003). But it has been argued that this process has served 
to create further exclusion of those who are considered out of place or disorderly within 
these newly designed and sanitised spaces. In these transitions, then, both physical and 
symbolic boundaries are erected that define who is (and is not) included in that space 
(Coleman 2003).  
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1.3 Framing Foreclosure in Salford 
Since the regeneration of Salford Quays, there have been publicised stories of local 
residents expressing a sense of exclusion from the area. Perhaps Salford Council’s 
harshest critic is the Salford Star that cited an instance in which local children has been 
turned away from The Lowry centre as a form of discrimination against local residents 
(The Salford Star n.d.). For numerous years, Salford Quays was subject to a dispersal 
order, meaning that anyone suspected of causing anti-social behaviour could be 
removed from the site. It has been reported that the majority of the visitors to the 
tourist sites like The Lowry are mostly from outside of Salford (New Economy 2013). It 
has also been reported that local people have not benefited from the employment 
opportunities created by MediaCityUK. A report on the success of the BBC stated that 
of the 1,800 jobs created there only 24 of them went to residents of Salford, indicating 
the lack of Salford residents within the economic base of this space (Carter 2012). In 
2013, two original cargo cranes that had been on the docks since 1966 were removed. 
These landmarks were the last remaining physical feature on the Quays that betrayed 
its history as a working dock (Brooks-Pollock 2013a). Their removal was fiercely 
contested by local residents who argued that the destruction of the cranes constituted 
the destruction of their local heritage (The Salford Star 2013).  
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Figure 7: Cargo Cranes, Salford Quays. Source - The Salford Star, 2013 
It is important to consider how the redevelopment of spaces like Salford Quays redefines 
the boundaries of what histories and which people are permitted. In other words, it can 
be useful to think around the question of who a space is being redesigned for. One of 
the ways that we can think about this is by taking account of the identity that is at one 
point being changed and at another point being created. For Amin et al (2000), cities are 
full of multiplicity and dynamism. They are not consensual and harmonious places. They 
are constantly changing through the various networks that govern them and exist within 
them. For these authors, there needs to be place for democratic engagement and 
contestation of what a city will look like and what it will become. Having a future which 
is open to debate is the crux of democratic politics. For Lefebvre, this entails being able 
to ‘multiply the readings of the city’ (in Edensor 2005a: 4) creating the space for it to 
mean different things to different people. However, in the reordering of a city these 
multiple readings can be foreclosed so that only one particular narrative of that place 
becomes dominant. It is in this reordering that some groups are included and others are 
not.  
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This process of foreclosure serves to limit the democratic engagement of those who 
advocate for a future that is at odds with the one designated by the people in a position 
to do so. As Massey (2001) has argued, space is the dimension in which there are 
multiple coexistences of difference. However, when we think of space as temporal, i.e. 
as being on a trajectory of development and change, as becoming a ‘modern global city’, 
then all space is forced onto a single linear timeline. Places are then viewed as in 
‘decline’, needing to be ‘modernised’ and ‘developed’ towards the same progressive 
future. So how much can it be argued that Salford is following this trajectory of progress 
which forecloses other alternatives? How much of Salford’s future is open to democratic 
engagement and contestation? Is Salford being reordered in a way that reduces this 
multiplicity to the point of the exclusion of some residents and their histories and 
identities? These are all questions that are important to consider throughout this thesis. 
This notion of foreclosure speaks to accounts of urban policy which highlight that 
regeneration programmes and redevelopment projects claiming to improve ‘the city’ 
are actually normalising processes that are working to privilege particular groups’ 
interests over others. ‘Common sense’ assumptions which assert that cities need to be 
competitive and secure in order to attract mobile investment in a globalised economy 
exemplify these normalising processes (Davidson & Iveson 2014).  
Many writers are equating these changes with the move to a post-political consensus 
where democratic decision-making is foreclosed (see Swyngedouw 2010, Dikeç 2006, 
Deas 2013, Allmendinger and Houghton 2012). As private organisations take over public 
welfare contracts more and more of the governance of these services is undertaken by 
private professionals. The public sector is entering into financial contracts for public 
services delivered by the private sector for long periods of time. It has been argued that 
these long-term contracts limit the choices and responsiveness of the public sector. They 
also transfer public funds to private organisations but also transfer the risks from the 
private sector onto the public (Raco 2015b). These ‘everyday entrepreuneurialisms’ 
enforce financial risk-taking by public sectors to smooth the way for private investors 
(Peck 2014). They usher in what Zizek (2009)calls ‘borrowing from the future’, a process 
of committing in the present what will hopefully pay off at a future date. Raco (2014) 
 27 
 
calls this a ‘post-political rigidity’ which narrows the scope for alternative actions and 
serves to ‘take the politics out of welfare’ (2014: 35).    
This foreclosure of alternatives is said to have intensified under the Coalition 
government elected in 2010 and the subsequent Conservative government elected in 
2015. Pessimistically, Southern has claimed that ‘We may well look back and lament the 
golden years of regeneration under New Labour’ (2013: 400). Deas (2013) has argued 
that a consensus has been reached around urban regeneration as a method of delivering 
economic growth over anything more socially redistributive. Policy programmes aimed 
at fuelling economic growth have been implemented, for example the Regional Growth 
Fund, Enterprise Zones, Local Economic Partnerships and City Deals. However, there 
seem to be no policies created that focus specifically on areas of deprivation or need. As 
Pugalis and McGuinness state, under the Coalition government ‘for the first time in 
several decades, England was left bereft of a genuine regeneration strategy and 
accompanying dedicated resources’ (2013: 347). They argue that in its place is a toolkit 
of incentives that encourage and reward economic growth, or a ‘growth at any cost’ 
mantra. Accompanying this toolkit is an austerity agenda that is concurrently eroding 
the supports for those neighbourhoods that are still suffering from deprivation and 
inequality (Levitas 2012). This fundamental change to the role of regeneration and its 
associated funding mechanisms raises important questions about the responsibility of 
the local state to their publics and those publics’ associated needs. What will the local 
Council prioritise within a curtailed financial landscape? And what will happen to the 
gap between the ‘Islands of affluence’ and the ‘seas of poverty’ if investment is 
concentrated in the economic growth areas rather than those experiencing decline?  
1.4 Contextualising the private/public landscape of Salford 
In Salford, we can see elements of this post-political consensus and the increasing 
involvement of private actors in political decision-making. We can also see expressions 
of a move to a growth agenda. There are examples that suggest that on this trajectory, 
alternatives and democratic engagement are being foreclosed in an attempt to become 
a ‘modern global city’. But how far can we argue that this is occurring and to what extent 
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is Salford an exemplification of this process? One recent situation highlights some of 
these issues for consideration. In 2012, Salford Council presented its Core Strategy to 
the Secretary of State for approval. This strategy had been five years in the making and 
consolidated all previous planning documents to create one core spatial vision and 
framework for planning and land use in Salford over the next 15 years. The Secretary of 
State provided an independent Inspectorate to determine whether or not the strategy 
was ‘sound’, meaning that it complied with the requirements of the National Planning 
Policy Framework (NPPF) established under the Coalition government.  
Over 200 documents were submitted for consideration and, after three weeks of 
hearings, the Inspectorate failed to approve the strategy (Salford City Council 2012b). 
The main concern the Inspectorate had was that Salford Council was not planning for 
enough growth in the city. The main points of contention were that the Council had not 
planned to build enough houses to meet the requirement as set out in the NPPF. There 
was, according to the Inspectorate, a shortfall of at least 300 houses a year. Nor had the 
Council allocated enough land within Central Salford to be developed. There was 
suggestion that the Council’s requirements for dwelling size and specification might be 
overly prescriptive, acting as a barrier to house builders, for which they were advised to 
liaise with the building industry for guidance (Hollox 2012). In response, Salford Council 
withdrew the strategy indefinitely (Salford City Council 2012e).  
This Core Strategy story highlights the prescription of a growth agenda that a local 
Council is expected to adhere to. The NPPF sets out the governments agenda for 
sustainable development. Sustainable, as defined in the NPPF, means ‘ensuring that 
better lives for ourselves don’t mean worse lives for future generations’ (Department 
for Communities and Local Government 2012b). Development in the NPPF is 
synonymous with “growth”. Without growth the consequence will be to “stagnate” 
(ibid: pi). The discourse here reflects Massey’s (2001) singular timeline of development 
as described above, promoting stagnation as the opposite to development. “Sustainable 
development” as employed by the NPPF is about positive economic growth. The strategy 
created by Salford Council was thus thought to be not positive enough in growth terms. 
What we can see here is a challenge to Salford Council’s ability to either retain publicly 
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owned assets or to determine how they are used. What the Council’s Core Strategy 
posited as the appropriate scale of developments was, for the inspectorate, insufficient 
to satisfy the requirements of the pro-growth NPPF. This speaks to a point made by Raco 
(2014) that when growth is taken as the default, planners are in a position of having to 
justify instances in which growth should not occur, defending their ability to decide. 
What authority, then, does the Council have of being able to determine its own 
acceptable levels of growth? What powers do they retain to be able to resist the 
prescription of the NPPF as a legally binding policy? More broadly, it is important to 
consider whether this is a demonstration of the post-political logic that forecloses any 
options other than market growth. 
Salford Council’s Core Strategy story also highlights the increasing prominence of private 
actors within the planning and decision-making forum. Throughout the hearings for the 
Core Strategy there was considerable involvement from the representatives of Peel 
Holdings, a major landowner in Salford. Peel’s developments across the region include 
MediaCityUK, The Lowry Outlet (a shopping centre, not to be confused with The Lowry 
arts centre), Salford City Stadium, and The Trafford Centre to name a few. One of Peel’s 
biggest developments is Port Salford, a National Logistics Hub situated in the west of 
Salford. Phase one of Port Salford has been planned and approved but Peel is seeking to 
treble the size of the port, arguing that it will deliver economic competitiveness, growth 
and upwards of 10,000 jobs (The Peel Group 2012a). Peel argues that without this 
expansion there will be a missed opportunity to meet long-term economic need and to 
make a return on private and public investors’ capital expenditure (ibid). Salford Council 
itself granted Peel £4 million to supplement a loan of £11 million to the private 
corporation (Salford City Council 2012c). However, the expansion would require the 
release of 100 acres of greenbelt land, something only to be considered under 
exceptional circumstances, which Peel determined this to be.  
One of Peel’s main requirements was that this land release be written into the Core 
Strategy (The Peel Group 2012a). Without this, Peel argued, the Council was acting 
against the positive growth position of the NPPF. Peel provided what they referred to as 
a ‘suite of documents’ on their response to the Core Strategy. Before the hearings 
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commenced, Peel requested that the Core Strategy be withdrawn. They also requested 
a separate hearing just to discuss the issue of Port Salford, which was granted. In 
attendance at the hearing on that day the Core Strategy aide-memoire identifies three 
Salford Council representatives, two local residents and eleven representatives of Peel 
Holdings (Salford City Council 2012d). The Peel-dominated discussion revolved around 
the perception that Salford Council was not simply insufficiently pro-growth but that 
they were hindering growth, thus acting against the requirements of the NPPF. Salford 
Council’s response was that it was pro-growth, as evidenced by its track record of 
supporting Peel’s developments across Salford. The Council’s argument here was that 
the situation was not exceptional enough to require the release of greenbelt land (ibid).   
The purpose of highlighting the Core Strategy story is not to assert that it was Peel’s 
involvement in the process that caused the withdrawal of the strategy. However, it is 
important to consider how much of a presence Peel has in discussions such as these, 
what influence such private actors are able to exert during these processes, and what 
that may represent more broadly. Peel set out fundamental challenges to Salford 
Council’s planning, challenges that required substantial resources to make. Arguably, 
this could have only been done by an organisation of Peel’s size and wealth. Peel’s 
considerable land ownership in Salford places it in a strategically prominent position to 
be able to question and shape the direction that those assets take. As Harrison has 
argued, 
The extent of Peel’s existing portfolio, which sees them control many of 
the region’s prime economic assets (across the real estate, transport and 
infrastructure, leisure, retail, media and energy sectors), the fact they 
are now one of the major landowners in the area and the proposed level 
of investment into this urban area have all made Peel one of the most 
powerful political voices in the region (2014: 2322) 
Thus, by the very nature of its asset portfolio which includes many of the developments 
that are crucial to Salford’s growth plans, Peel is politically as well as financially invested 
in the decision-making process. As the Council has become more closely aligned and 
more reliant on Peel to deliver growth, jobs and regeneration, to what extent is the 
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Council able to make decisions outside of Peel’s influence? This speaks not only to the 
land acquisition that has already been made by Peel but also the increasing 
encouragement for local authorities to sell more of their land and thus open up the 
possibility of this situation manifesting further. Put differently, what happens to the 
decision-making process when the majority of land and asset ownership is in the hands 
of private institutions?   
With the Council providing funding for Peel ventures and also placing them as 
strategically central to the delivery of Salford’s regeneration strategies in delivering jobs 
and growth, the Council become (as Peel knowingly demonstrated during the hearings 
described above) both reliant on and compliant in ensuring the positive outcome of 
private development, making it difficult to make choices that work against these 
outcomes. Both parties thus have an interest in the successful delivery of these 
programmes and the Council is required to facilitate their successful realisation. This 
represents, to use Raco’s term from earlier in the chapter, a ‘post-political rigidity’ 
(2014). The financial commitment to certain strategic development projects means that 
the Council is locked into a process which makes it difficult for it to respond in a 
dissenting manner. The language used by Peel to encourage Salford Council to extend 
the greenbelt invokes a discourse of necessity. Whilst Salford Council did not acquiesce 
to Peel’s discourse in the case of the Core Strategy, an issue is raised regarding Salford 
Council’s ability to act with democratic accountability when it relies upon such 
companies to deliver regeneration objectives and growth. 
Could it be, then, that we are witnessing the emergence of a post-political condition in 
Salford? It may be that Salford Council’s resistance to Peel’s demands suggest not. 
However, we might argue that what the Council is resisting is the method of delivery, 
not the delivery itself. As Baeten (2009) argues, it does not follow that there has been 
an exercise of politics just because conflicting powerful interests have had to negotiate. 
Rather, something is post-political when an overall consensus has been reached, within 
which details are debated. For Salford Council, then, its argument was that it did not 
want to extend into the greenbelt, but the Council was adamant that it was committed 
to a pro-growth agenda, something it was keen to reinforce to the NPPF’s independent 
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Inspectorate (Salford City Council 2012d). One of the objectives of this thesis then will 
be to explore some of the themes arising from this incident in more detail. It will aim to 
identify the relations between Salford Council and the private developers that it is 
increasingly reliant upon to deliver regeneration objectives. It will explore the 
implications of this for democratic decision-making and accountability and the 
possibility that what results is a post-political condition in which a growth consensus is 
enforced whilst other possible alternatives are foreclosed.     
1.5 The aims and objectives of the thesis 
The overarching aim of this thesis is to understand, from the experiences of those 
involved in making the decisions, how Salford has developed in the way that is has and 
how the uneven spatialities have been created. I am interested in the purpose of 
regeneration in Salford according to those responsible for making the decisions and who 
it is intended to benefit. I am also keen to explore the discourses used to legitimise such 
regeneration outcomes. In particular, I am interested in the role of the local government 
and its relationship with non-state actors in urban regeneration. From this, I explore the 
impact on democratic accountability and engagement and consider the implication of 
changes in urban policy for delivering urban improvements and ameliorating urban 
problems. 
The overall aims of the research project were to; 
 Understand, from the experiences of those involved in making the decisions, 
how the regeneration in Salford had come to be materially manifest in the ways 
that it had, and to explore the ways in which the regeneration outcomes were 
designed, implemented, negotiated and legitimised by those same people. 
 To draw on this case study to develop an understanding of the wider changes 
taking place within the politics of urban economic development   
The specific research questions that underpinned these aims are as follows: 
 What is the purpose of regeneration in Salford according to those responsible 
for making the decisions? 
 What role does the local government play in urban regeneration and what does 
it tell us about its priorities? 
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 How do state and non-state actors engage to deliver regeneration at a local level 
and what is the impact of this for democratic accountability? 
 In what ways can we see regeneration moving away from a process based on 
spatially targeted need towards the delivery of economic growth? 
 Does a growth consensus within the urban political landscape foreclose 
alternative options for development? 
 How can we conceptualise the politics that take place behind urban economic 
development? 
 
1.6 Chapter outlines 
The next chapter in this thesis is a history of urban policy and an exploration of the 
academic literature that discusses the changes that have taken place since the Second 
World War. This chapter outlines the major urban policy initiatives that have been put 
in place and the reasoning behind them. Most importantly, it traces the changes that 
have transformed regeneration from having a primary focus on areas of concentrated 
poverty and deprivation, to an explicit focus on economic growth. It considers the 
emergence of a neoliberal ideology that has taken shape in urban policy, and the 
broader political project articulated by Thatcher’s Conservative Government in which 
the deregulation of markets, increasing privatisation of public services and competition 
for resources began to replace Keynesian welfare provision and notions of redistribution 
and equality. In this discussion, I highlight the governmental changes that were enacted 
and which caused local government to take on entrepreneurial forms in which they were 
increasingly expected to act in a more business-minded manner alongside private 
organisations. Ultimately it considers the suggestion that there is no longer a 
regeneration policy under the Coalition and Conservative governments that were 
elected after the economic crash. It explores the post-political literature that has 
emerged from this and the implication that we are now experience an urban policy 
characterised by a post-political consensus.   
The third chapter is a case study of Salford where I outline Salford as a city and the urban 
regeneration that had taken place there up until the point at which I began my research. 
This chapter can be considered as ‘desk research’ or preliminary research based on the 
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analysis of prior academic research, media outlets and secondary sources of publicly 
accessible documentation. In it, I outline how the national policies discussed in chapter 
two have been enacted and experienced in Salford. I focus particularly on Central Salford 
as the site that has experienced the majority of the national regeneration programmes 
and as the area identified as the most deprived and thus most in need of regeneration. 
I explain the demographics of Salford and the urban problems that regeneration is 
intended to relieve. The chapter describes the role of the Local Authority in Salford and 
their initial engagement with private actors in delivering regeneration, tracing the 
transition from a managerial to entrepreneurial governance through the partnerships 
that were made and the investment strategies taken. In particular, I argue that the 
regeneration that had so far been carried out had increased the divide between existing 
Salford residents and incoming residents to Salford which has created tensions in the 
area. Further to this, I argue that the increasing popularity of Salford has led to a spatial 
reorganising of Salford in which successes are increasingly being thought of as for the 
region rather than for the residents.  
The fourth chapter of this thesis outlines the methodology undertaken to deliver the 
empirical part of the thesis, detailing more explicitly what the research aims are and the 
research questions that underpin them. It then documents the process through which 
the data were collected to answer these research questions. It takes a reflexive 
approach to this method, considering why this approach was taken and its implications. 
In this chapter I explain why I chose to focus on Salford as a case study area, highlighting 
what makes the city of particular importance. I will also explain why I chose to focus 
primarily on urban policy decision makers and practitioners. The methodology chapter 
discusses who was interviewed, why they were chosen, how access was gained and how 
the interviews were conducted. I will also discuss the method I used to analyse my data 
including drawing on both thematic analysis and discourse analysis. Ultimately it 
identifies how I approached my data and how this led to the themes that I located in the 
interviews conducted and the documentation analysed. I conclude by discussing 
limitations to my methodology and the ethical considerations of my study. 
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In chapter five, I begin the exploration of my empirical data. This chapter is mostly 
focused on the vision for Central Salford as designed by the local Council. It highlights 
the direction that Salford is intended to take and the transition it is expected to make 
through the urban regeneration that has been taking place and will continue to take 
place. This chapter explores the expectation that decision makers have for Salford and 
the residents of Salford as the city is modernised. It focuses on the way in which local 
residents are described and positioned in relation to these changes and highlights the 
discursive frames that are used to construct Salford as stagnating and in decline, to 
which modernisation and development is then posited as the solution. It also draws out 
the way in which the regeneration is legitimised as something local residents can aspire 
to in the future as opposed to something they are actually benefiting from in the 
present. Importantly, I argue here that the shifting focus on economic growth as a 
measure of success challenges local residents’ ‘right to dwell’ in the city (Davidson 2009), 
challenging their right to experience living in Central Salford without contributing to its 
economic base. It argues that the reordering and redesigning of the city requires an 
influx of people to the city who are financially able to sustain its regeneration efforts, 
the result of which are a growing group of residents who are increasingly seen to be ‘out 
of place’.  
The sixth chapter focuses directly on the decision making and partnership working that 
has regenerated Salford Quays. In this chapter the regeneration of Salford Quays is 
analysed from its initial closure as a working dockland. It traces the emerging visions of 
the area and the need to secure investment and private developers to allow those 
visions to materialise. It explores the entrepreneurial strategies Salford Council took by 
highlighting the narratives of those responsible for its development, both from the 
public and private sector. Whilst Salford Quays could be seen to have a strategy of sorts, 
it is argued that there was no master plan. The effects of this is the creation of a space 
that has moved further and further away from the necessities of the residents that are 
intended to benefit from the opportunities created there. The chapter also highlights 
the increasing influence of the private sector within urban redevelopment and the role 
of Salford Council in working with these developers. The chapter argues that is through 
the construction of a discourse that sees investment as being difficult to obtain that a 
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situation is created in which the Council is forced to waive its rights and statutory 
controls in order to secure investors. This is done by drawing on Davidson and Iveson’s 
(2014) notion of the ‘invocation of necessity’ in which action has to be taken over 
deliberation. Post-political sentiments begin to emerge through these invocations of 
investment as a necessity.  
The final empirical chapter focuses on interviews but also planning documentation and 
meeting minutes to consider the form that regeneration is taking and will take in Salford 
under conditions of ‘austerity urbanism’ (Peck 2012). In this chapter, issues of growth 
and post-politics are central. Here, I am keen to highlight the changes to urban 
regeneration under the Coalition and the Conservative government that followed it, and 
how Salford has responded to these. It argues that Salford Council is normalising a 
process of financial risk-taking in which urban development projects undertaken by 
private developers are being partially financed by the Council in order to secure their 
investments. This finance is occurring through unsupported borrowing and financial 
commitments in which decisions are made in the present that will inevitably have to be 
repaid in the future. Drawing on Zizek’s (2009) concept of ‘borrowing from the future’ 
and Raco’s (2014) idea of ‘post-political rigidity’ the chapter argues that the Council is 
undertaking risky forms of capital development in order to secure additional growth to 
the area that at once places them at increasing financial risk and narrows their ability to 
conduct democratic politics in the future. It is a strategy, I argue here, that forecloses 
their ability to divert from this course if they should choose to.  
The chapter also argues that the grants offered for urban regeneration under the 
Conservative government are based on a ‘payment by results’ system (O’Brien & Pike 
2015) that incentivises growth by making funding conditional on the creation of 
economic returns. This encourages investment into those areas that are most likely to 
deliver returns rather than those that are most in need. This fundamentally signifies a 
move away from redistribution and equity and stands to perpetuate the creation of a 
divide between areas of affluence and of deprivation. It argues that the Council is 
actively managing the redevelopment of some spaces whilst actively not managing 
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others. These spaces, then, are continually undeveloped as sites where gentrification 
has been interrupted, indefinitely.   
The final chapter will be a discussion of the arguments made in the previous empirical 
chapters. It will consolidate the final arguments, drawing out some of the key themes 
that emerge out of the analysis chapters. Primarily it will engage with the concept of 
foreclosure, considering how the regeneration strategies and entrepreneurial forms of 
governance have foreclosed the space for local residents to engage in, have foreclosed 
the future in which some are now left out of and foreclosed the potential for the Council 
to exercise proper politics; that being the ability to contest and disagree with dominant 
political consensus (Swyngedouw 2009). It will also highlight the change that urban 
regeneration has undergone and the changing role that the Council now operates within 
the financial market and urbanisation. It will also discuss limitations of the thesis and 
areas for future research.    
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2. Urban policy: a socio-historical account  
In this chapter I want to outline and document the implementation and subsequent 
changes to urban policy since the Second World War. The chapter will set out the main 
policies created at a national level and consider its impacts at a local level. Urban spaces 
have changed dramatically over the last few decades. This change has meant that our 
understandings of and relation to cities, especially in the Global North, are 
fundamentally different to what they once were. Cities have long been the drivers of a 
nation’s wealth and capital accumulation. But they have become particularly significant 
in a globalised world economy. The changes in urban environments over the last 3-4 
decades have seen incredible differences develop between cities at a global scale and 
also within cities at a local scale. This is due to the changing expectations of the roles 
cities should play in an increasingly global political economy (MacLeod et al. 2003). The 
redesigning of space is not a new phenomenon. Urban space is characterized by a long 
standing history of development and redevelopment, but as Smith states, 
“What is new today is the degree to which this restructuring of space is 
an immediate and systematic component of a larger economic and 
social restructuring of advanced capitalist economies” (Smith 1986, 
p21).  
The changes that have taken place comprise the 'new urban politics' of competitive 
urbanisation in which the aim is competition and social cohesion, but the reality is 
increased polarization of wealth and power. This chapter will trace the history of UK 
urban policy after the Second World War up until present day. It will aim to identify how 
the economic imperative to revalue cities and tackle issues of deprivation has resulted 
in the increased privatisation of public assets through the utilizing of private finance and 
the redirecting of state power. The converse of this process has been the 
marginalisation, increased management and increasing control of the populations who 
have long inhabited these city spaces. Moving beyond simply deregulation and the 
withdrawal of welfare, there has begun the construction of new forms of governance 
which work to actively support the creation and extension of new markets and 
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increasingly punitive forms of governance to manage this process and the people who 
challenge its success (Peck 2003). What this chapter will show to be emerging through 
urban policy is a fundamental shift away from spatially targeted attempts at 
redistribution and a commitment from Keynesianism towards a growth agenda.    
2.1 Post-war policy 
Following the Second World War, the Labour Government under Clement Attlee took 
great efforts to ensure they were the driving force behind urban development (Hill 
2000). Following on from several years of poor quality private house-building and Local 
Government decision making, the government centralised urban planning power and 
housing development. The intention was that house building after 1945 was to be 
dominated by Council owned properties. It was envisioned that these homes would 
provide a better quality of accommodation than previous privately built houses and that 
the majority of people would rent from the local state, rather than own their own homes 
(Lund 2006). What followed was the largest concentrated building of Council homes in 
British history. However, the production of private build houses in suburban landscapes 
was challenging the government’s dreams of a Council renting citizenry.  
The movement of people to the suburbs, the failing ability of Councils to meet housing 
need and the onset of deindustrialisation with its associtaed job losses soon drew 
attention to the increasing problems the British inner cities were facing (Schoon, 2001).  
In 1968, the government initiated attempts to tackle the growing deprivation of the 
inner cities through the Urban Aid Program offering funding to Councils to tackle issues 
of decline. The Community Development Project of the following year was intended to 
discover the reasons for area specific deprivation and tailor solutions based on these 
discoveries. However, both these programs were rooted in an assumption that poverty 
in deprived areas was the result of social pathology; that individual people’s failings 
were somehow self-inflicted, rather than structurally generated (Badcock 1984). Thus 
the assumption was that areas were deprived because particular types of people were 
clustering within these spaces and therefore solutions where targeted at an individual 
level. We will see this assumption maintained and developed through the chapter.  
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Recognition of the effects that changes had had on the declining cities was solidified in 
the 1977 White Paper Policy for the Inner Cities. The paper showed unemployment as a 
cause of: economic decline which it argued stemmed from the loss of the mass 
employment industries which were subsequently replaced by a much smaller in 
employment terms service sector; and a lack of jobs to match the existing skills of people 
and a lack of skills to match the emerging jobs (Burton & Boddy 1995). Reinvigorating 
the city’s economy, coupled with a strong welfare base was identified as the key to 
reversing the inner city problem, led primarily by the Councils (Watson & Niner 2010). 
Specific areas were identified for the targeting of directed funding (Badcock 1984). What 
began here was a process of specifically spatially targeted initiatives which continued to 
be the focus of urban policy over the successive decades.    
2.2 Thatcher era 
During the 1970s Britain faced the ‘winter of discontent’, an economic recession 
stemming from the oil crisis, the weakening of the sterling in 1976 and increasing 
inflation (Malpass & Rowlands 2010). In 1979 the Conservative Government led by 
Margaret Thatcher won the general election and began tackling these inherited 
economic problems with neoliberal reforms of free market competition, privitisation 
and welfare cutbacks. The problem of the declining inner cities was expressed by the 
government as being a cause of the existing government controls on planning and 
development. These controls were articulated as prohibiting private enterprise and 
investment which were described as the solution to reinvigorating these inner city areas 
(Badcock 1984). A lack of faith from the centre in Local Governments ability to improve 
urban areas led to dramatic changes in local democratic power. Ultimately, the changes 
enacted in urban policy were intended to consolidate a broader ideological change in 
the relationship between central and local government (Oatley 1998).  
These changes were not specific to urban policy, but applied to all Conservative 
Government changes being undertaken and embodied the main conservative neoliberal 
ideology emerging at that time. Defining neoliberalism has been a challenging task for 
scholars due to its complexity but also its uneven variations as it is applied throughout 
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different arenas. For Dikeç (2006) then, defining neoliberalism is “neither an easy task 
nor a particularly desirable endeavour” (p61). For Peck & Tickell (1994), neoliberalism is 
a political project which rejects social welfare provision in favour of market regulation 
and competition generated by supply-side rather than demand-side measures. For these 
authors, neoliberalism did not occur as a solution to the decline of Fordist-Keynesianism, 
but emerged at this time of crisis as its symptom. It is thus a ‘jungle law’ that has broken 
out in which the competition for scare investment and resources generates a ‘begger-
thy-neighbour’ strategy (319).  
It is under cover of this neoliberal doctrine that Brenner & Theodore (2002) argue the 
state was able to deregulate control over major industry, reduce the power of organised 
labour, scale back and privatise public services, encourage capital mobility at an 
international level, reduce corporate tax whilst simultaneously gradually withdrawing 
welfare services, increase competition between places, and increase the punitive 
treatment of the urban poor (p350). Again, these authors highlight the inconsistent 
application of the neoliberal project, which challenges its utopic ideology of free market 
rule; as in reality neoliberalism has served to generate market failures, social 
polarisation and an uneven spatiality. Thus neoliberalism could be thought of as an 
ongoing process of ‘neoliberalization’ rather than as an end-product (Brenner & 
Theodore 2002, p353). What also needs to be considered when discussing neoliberalism 
is how it moves beyond a purely policy framework towards the way that it also serves 
to shape and govern individuals. Larner (2000) highlights how neoliberalism is both a 
‘political discourse’ which dictates the rule of governance and also a ‘set of practices’ 
which enacts governance at a distance (p6). Dikeç (2006) takes in to account all these 
elements and defines neoliberalism as “a political rationality”, and defines 
neoliberalization as “a particular form of restructuring guided by this political rationality 
premised on the extension of market relations that privilege competition, efficiency, and 
economic success” (p62). It is this definition that shall be utilised throughout this thesis.   
The Thatcher led Conservative government, along with the Reagan Government in the 
US, restructured urban policy within this political neoliberal rationality. The first main 
urban policy was the 1980 Local Government, Planning and land Act which set out the 
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provision of Enterprise Zones (EZ) and Urban Development Corporations (UDC) (Badcock 
1984). UDCs were given the power to acquire land and control over planning 
applications, including those it submitted itself. The UDCs were only accountable to 
central government, sidelining local government control. The corporations themselves 
were comprised of business professionals and planning experts, ushering in their 
involvement in social projects (Cullingworth & Nadin 2006). EZs acted in a similar 
manner to UDCs. These were designated areas of land, usually derelict spaces in 
deprived inner cities with deregulated planning controls. The rationale underlining EZs 
was economic growth (Hall 1991). The selling point for Enterprise Zones was that 
businesses which moved in to the designated areas would be exempt from certain taxes. 
The success of these two policy initiatives is uncertain. Evaluation has shown it to be 
unclear whether the new businesses established in the EZs created new jobs or just 
caused the relocating of existing businesses to more affordable areas. More critically, 
EZs and UDCs stood accused of having primarily economic rather than social objectives 
as its end point (Hill 2000).   
2.3 Housing and the Right to Buy 
The Conservative’s neoliberal reforms were also transforming the housing market with 
the same political rationale, through a chain of policy reforms which would serve to 
fundamentally change the face of Council housing forever (Hodkinson et al. 2013: 4).  
This Conservative Government came to power with 4 main housing objectives: prioritise 
owner occupancy as the main tenancy of choice; reduce the position of local Councils as 
the main housing providers; diversify tenure options by assisting the private rented 
sector in improving its stock base; and restrict government resources to areas with the 
most chronic housing needs (Atkinson & Durden 1994).  It has also been argued that this 
policy goal of reducing the number of Council housing and its tenants was a political 
tactic to weaken the Labour Party’s electoral base of Council tenants (Hodkinson et al. 
2013), the assumption being that by dismantling the social provisions that Labour had 
created, there would be less people dependent on it and thus less people inclined to put 
Labour in power (Kemp 1990).  Privatisation of Council housing was already under way 
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when Thatcher came to power, but it was solidified by one of the most significant 
privatisation programs in social housing; the Right to Buy (Watson & Niner 2010). The 
Right to Buy was encouraged by increasing the rent paid by Council housing tenants, 
offering large subsidies for tenants to purchase their Council home (up to 50% discount), 
and an increasing stigmatisation of people in Council housing (Jones 2010).  
In the years following the Right to Buy the take up of tenants exercising their rights saw 
home ownership increase by 40% between 1981 – 2001 (Bramley et al. 2004). 
Correspondingly, Councils were only allowed to keep 25% of the revenue generated by 
the sale of Council houses. This was for repair and maintenance purposes. Any additional 
money was to be used to pay off debts. This financial restriction prevented the Councils 
from being able to build any new Council homes to replace those lost (Durden 2001). 
Financially, this constrained local Councils’ ability to continue as sole providers of 
housing. The social and economic consequence of the Right to Buy was that the larger 
houses of better quality were bought up by those middle and upper lower class workers 
who had the required income to gain a mortgage. The result of this was that the lower 
quality houses in the least desirable areas were the ones left for those who could not 
afford to buy but still required a Council property (Jones 2010). This served to residualise 
low quality housing for people who were in specific need of assistance within what 
became monolithic Council estates, further adding stigma to Council house occupiers. 
The government’s next move in diversifying tenure was to increase housing 
management and provision through the private renting sector (Lund 2006). The Housing 
Act 1988 and the Local Government Act 1989 were the government’s final attempts to 
halt local Council involvement in housing (Durden 2001). The move was to see Councils 
primarily in an ‘enabling role’ rather than as providers of housing (Lambert & Malpass 
1998: 98). This is congruent of the political rationality of neoliberalisation; placing public 
authorities as enabler rather than provider, a job which then moves to the private sector 
(Peck & Tickell 2002). It also ushered in an ideological transformation with the dominant 
narrative being that state interference encouraged dependency rather than individual 
choice and responsibility; a discourse that we will see become much more entrenched 
under neoliberalism (Jacobs & Manzi 1996).  
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2.4 Introducing Competition 
Under John Major’s new leadership for the conservative government, Michael 
Heseltine, the then Secretary of State for the Environment, set out to redesign urban 
policy to tackle issues of urban decline. After visiting problem areas his determining was 
that a ‘dependency culture’ had occurred within local government on central 
government funding. This dependency culture, it was argued, prevented local Councils 
from developing more innovative ways of working. Heseltine’s suggestion was to 
introduce competition between Councils for government funding. This, it was stated, 
would unleash creativity and drive in urban regeneration (Oatley 1998). These ideas 
came together under the 1991 City Challenge. This model was to experiment with the 
ideas of competitive bidding between Councils and the emergence of partnerships 
between Councils and other agencies. The significance of this encouragement of inter 
area competition was that it began to shift the focus of funding under previous policies 
away from areas displaying the most need, to areas that could demonstrate the most 
effective use of resources. This represented a serious departure in urban policy from a 
more welfare based criteria.  
The City Challenge experiment solidified the move to competition dependent funding 
when it was integrated in to the 1994 Single Regeneration Budget (SRB). The SRB 
introduced a corporate and entrepreneurial way for Councils to work. The focus within 
bids was to be more business-like, prioritising an area’s economic potential and 
subordinating their social needs. The effect of this was that successful bids were quite 
often in the more affluent areas that could demonstrate private investment potential. 
The most deprived areas on the other hand were not often as successful. Thus 
competition based on these criteria began to widen rather than ameliorate the 
economic and social unevenness of different geographical areas (Oatley 1998).  
The features of the Conservative government under John Major are characteristic of the 
ideological transformation in the urban governance of late capitalist countries that 
David Harvey (1989) called a shift from Managerial to Entrepreneurial governance. This 
has taken place, Harvey argues, as a consequence of the declining economies within the 
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inner city and the requirement of local governments to be instrumental in reversing this 
decline through innovative and entrepreneurial methods. What was interesting during 
this shift, Harvey notes, was the consensus over the need for this change, with 
disagreements emerging only over how it should be done.  
There are 3 main features that Harvey has identified that are indicators of this shift. 
Firstly, local government ‘public-private partnerships’ have been created in an attempt 
to unlock private funding and investment to instigate development and generate 
employment opportunities. These partnerships, like the Urban Development 
Corporation described earlier, involve the public sector as a facilitator of private 
capitalist development. Secondly, these partnerships are inherently entrepreneurial 
because they act speculatively in its design and implementation. As the public sector is 
facilitating this speculation then it is the public sector that will most often (but not 
always) be assuming the risks associated with speculative investment whilst the private 
sector takes the financial benefits. Thirdly, there is a greater focus on the political 
economy of place over territory. Here territory refers to specifically designated areas of 
jurisdiction. When a development project has a territorial focus, for example education 
or housing, the people within that territory will be intended to benefit. However, 
focusing on place instead means that benefits can be felt at different levels. They are 
not constrained to the level of territory. For example creating new cultural centres or 
industrial parks may positively illuminate an entire region. However, focusing on 
promoting and enhancing place over territory may divert attention away the particular 
social problems an area faces in the quest for economic and urban development (Harvey 
1989). When David Harvey proffered this analysis of urban governance in 1989 he 
argued that this transition was in no way complete. But as we will go on to see 
throughout this thesis, this entrepreuneurial, neoliberal (although Harvey never used 
the term) logic has become structurally entrenched in to our everyday practices. Thus 
Harvey’s article can be considered as a ‘conjunctural moment’ and a ‘historical tipping 
point’ of what was to come (Peck 2014: 396).  
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2.5 New Labour and the Third-Way 
When New Labour was elected in to power in 1997 under the leadership of Tony Blair, 
poverty and inequality within cities was extremely high. The economic developments 
undertaken through previous urban policies had failed to trickle-down to the inhabitants 
of the inner city communities (Imrie & Raco 2003). The Labour government, rather than 
reverse the neoliberal reforms of the previous Conservative government, actually 
served to reinforce and continue many of the existing dominant urban policies. 
However, New Labour’s approach to this was to promise a ‘Third Way’ of governing. This 
‘Third way’ was to be a position occupied between capitalism and social democracy; a 
balancing act of responsibility divided between the state and the free-market. The key 
to achieving success under the third way was to enable people to depend on themselves, 
rather than on the state. This consolidated the move towards individualisation and 
responsibilisation which began under Thatcher’s government. Rather than expecting the 
market to support neighbourhoods or expecting the state to support local economies, 
the government was to assist people in developing their own social capital; the skills and 
the opportunities necessary to assist themselves (Kearns 2003).   
New Labour aimed to address regeneration through 2 primary initiatives. The first was 
to tackle neighbourhood deprivation, including exclusion, poverty, unemployment and 
housing through the newly created Social Exclusion Unit (SEU). The second was to tackle 
the wider issue of declining cities through the ‘Urban Renaissance’, aimed to improve 
the urban environment, increase community cohesion and promote social mixing 
(Punter 2011). 
As Levitas (2004) argues, the term social exclusion had begun to be used critically 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s to denote the multidimensional effects of exclusion, 
poverty and deprivation within social inequality. Redistribution of resources was called 
for as the primary solution to inequality. However in the 1990s, two further social 
exclusion solution discourses took prominence. The first being social integration: that 
paid work would alleviate the problems of poverty and thus exclusion. It saw the labour 
market as the answer, ignoring wider issues of low paid and insecure forms of 
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employment and the devaluing of unpaid work. The second discourse promoted the idea 
of a moral underclass: a culture of welfare dependency and family breakdown leading 
to a lack of values and worklessness. It was these latter two types of social exclusion 
discourses, welfare dependency and the labour market which dominated New Labour 
policies (Levitas 2010).  
The SEU set out its initial aims for neighbourhood renewal in 1998. Broadly speaking, its 
main aims were to improve the management of neighbourhoods and housing, to 
improve access to services in both the public and private sector, to increase employment 
opportunities by providing training and skills, and to improve the chances of young 
people (Kearns 2003). These discourses of social exclusion evoked the image of the 
included (politically, culturally, morally) and the excluded (those who reside in the 
spaces of worklessness and deprivation). This choice of language served to justify 
neighbourhood levels of policy intervention. The rhetoric here was that being 
disadvantaged was a result of individual failure. The government then facilitated 
individual improvements through assistance such as skills training or sanctions such as 
restriction of benefits and increased policing (Atkinson & Jacobs 2010). So whilst Local 
Government was being encouraged to not be reliant on central government for fear it 
inhibited its ability to self-manage, so too were individual citizens encouraged to be self-
sufficient away from the dependency culture on welfare which was posited as 
encouraging, even causing, exclusion.  
2.6 New deal for Communities 
The first main SEU programme to tackle exclusion at the neighbourhood level was the 
New Deal for Communities (NDC). Like the SRB, the NDC neighbourhoods were chosen 
based on their ability to demonstrate to central government that they could develop 
partnership working and deliver specific outcomes. The NDC committed funding over a 
2 year period to the 39 ‘Pathfinder’ areas established (Lee 2010). Wallace (2007) argues 
that the NDC programme expected its success to come from three main factors: a strong 
community base and high levels of social capital; harnessing individual agency amongst 
community members and involving them in decision making and plan formation; and by 
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empowering citizens to actively improve their life chances and reducing the perceived 
‘area effects’ of living in a deprived neighbourhood (Wallace 2007).  
Assessment of NDC initiatives has shown mixed results. Lawless and Beatty (2012) found 
that the place-based objectives improved (crime, community and housing and the 
physical environment) whilst the objectives that aimed to tackle the people-based 
objectives (health, worklessness and education) did not. Thus it was the more physical 
rather than social/economic objectives that were achieved. It was also the NDC areas 
where the amount of social housing declined and the number of owner occupiers 
increased that showed any improvements. This, they argued, reflected the displacement 
of social housing tenants and communities. A review of official NDC evaluation 
documents also concluded that the evidence of success was weak, and where it was said 
to occur, it was difficult to identify why it occurred and who benefitted (Kintrea 2007). 
On a more structural level, the idea of area effects i.e. ‘where you live affects your life 
chances’, Slater (2013) argues, should be inverted so as to proffer the more realistic 
suggestion that instead, ‘your life chances effect where you live’ (p369). In considering 
this we need to bring in to focus those urban policy changes that have been instigated 
at a national level that have created these areas and constrained peoples choices, for 
example the changes in the labour market and subsequent skills shortage and housing 
policies like the Right to Buy. To create solutions then at a neighbourhood level as a 
solution to the problem is a short-sighted and simplistic policy response to a much 
broader structural issue.  Drawing on Marxist urban theory, Slater contends that life 
chances are related explicitly to a history of capital accumulation and class struggle 
shaped by the markets ability to determine land value and thus peoples access to it. For 
Slater then, the inherent problem for people in deprived areas has been created by the 
state facilitation of private market speculation that we have seen occurring through 
neoliberal rationalities.  
2.7 Urban Renaissance 
Whilst the most deprived neighbourhoods were being dealt with through New Labour’s 
NSNR, the fates of the other cities were to be tackled by the Urban Task Force (UTF) 
 49 
 
established in 1998, led by architect Richard Rodgers. The UTF comprised of public and 
private sector experts and local working groups. The task was to identify the causes of 
decline in the urban environment and deliver housing for over 3 million new households; 
60% of which should be built on unused brownfield sites (Punter 2011). The UTF’s first 
publication in 1999 Towards an Urban Renaissance set out the government’s 
renaissance vision for towns and cities. Its mission statement was for the UTF to “… 
identify causes of urban decline in England and recommend practical solutions to bring 
people back into our cities, towns and urban neighbourhoods” (Department for the 
Environment Transport and the Regions 1999).  
Following on from this the government published its urban White Paper Our Towns and 
Cities – The future: Delivering an urban renaissance, setting out the strategy for 
achieving the UTFs recommendations. Whilst social inclusion was to be tackled primarily 
by the SEU, the renaissance agenda had clear socially inclusive aims which again 
centralised the role citizens and communities were intended to play (Punter 2011). The 
underlying goal was to transform cities via expert design and management which would 
create spaces that would provide all the necessary resources for good quality urban 
living. The goal was to reverse the declining populations and increase people’s desire to 
live in inner cities, offering “a high quality of life and opportunity for all, not just the few” 
(Cullingworth & Nadin 2006: 373).  
For critics like Butler and Robson (2001) both the Urban Task Force and the Urban White 
Paper gave the appearance of a ‘gentrifiers’ charter’ (in Lees 2003: 70). Both these 
publications provide a call to bring people (middle-classes) back to the inner cities in 
order to reverse decline and increase affluence via upgrading the physical environment 
that produces exclusionary enclaves that many people cannot engage in on account of 
their lack of disposable income or cultural capital (Lees 2003). The strategies established 
in the UTF and Urban White Paper are less about improving the conditions for those in 
most need but about creating attractive urban spaces for those financially able to use 
them. The underlying logic is that this method and the associated social mixing of 
economically able groups would result in a trickle-down of social and economic benefits.  
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Working alongside this was a commitment to culture as part of a regeneration strategy. 
Culture was identified as a place-making selling point which emphasized the idea of 
creativity and diversity within a city. Securing investment for large-scale cultural 
developments in post-industrial spaces, like the Tate Modern in London, have been held 
up as good examples of entrepreneurial forms of governance (Miles & Paddison 2005). 
Designated cultural-quarters and arts based centres have become common features of 
urban regeneration, leading Dungey to argue that no city’s regeneration plan is 
complete without one (in McCarthy 2005: 299).  
However, whilst the ‘cultural turn’ in urban regeneration has been adopted fairly 
wholesale across redeveloping cities as a standardized regeneration tool, the success of 
such initiatives has been challenged, not only because the adoption of this as a strategy 
reduces its uniqueness as a cities selling point (McCarthy 2005). It has also been 
criticised for causing displacement of local residents from certain regenerated spaces 
and gentrifying inner city neighbourhoods. There have also been criticisms levelled at 
the eradication of local history within what can at times be quite sanitized and managed 
spaces (Evans 2009). Peck (2005) also argues that these developments generally rely on 
the ‘trickle-down’ mentality which very rarely materialises. He also argues that creative 
cities generate a division of labour through which local residents, if they achieve 
employment within these areas, are most likely to be employed in the service industry, 
servicing the ‘creatives’ and skilled sector workers.   
2.8 Increasing Privatisation     
Housing continued to be a focal point for urban policy under New Labour which 
continued the reduction of Council housing by committing to transfer to housing 
associations 200,000 Council homes a year (Hodkinson et al. 2013). The Spending 
Review in 2000 set the Decent Homes standard; criteria for which all social housing had 
to meet by 2010. Local Councils were offered 4 options to help them achieve this target: 
existing Housing Revenue Account budget; stock transfer to registered social 
landlords/housing associations; the Private Finance Initiative, in which effectively a 
private company make all the improvements and manage the stock for which the 
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Council pays a monthly fee; or Arms-Length Management Organisations (ALMO), which 
means additional resources are given to the Councils by the government if their services 
receive a good rating and if the management of the houses is delivered not by the 
Council but by a non-profit organisation (Lund 2006). All options reduced the Council 
ability to continue the ownership and management of Council housing itself and 
demonstrate a continued commitment to the increased private sector involvement to 
deliver public services. This was done most significantly through the Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI). PFIs allow the Council to retain ownership of housing stock, but enter in 
to a contract of between 25-30 years with a private firm who is responsible for the 
building and maintenance cost of that stock. The private partner agency funds the initial 
costs and receive monthly payments from the Council for services provided (Hodkinson 
2011).  
Whilst PFI schemes were intended to balance private investment intentions with the 
needs of local tenants, what materialised was the privileging of private investor desires 
(Hodkinson 2011). It also puts a large amount of publicly owned assets in to private 
hands and offers them the benefit of generating large amounts of profit from that public 
sector. The use of PFI is not constrained to housing but has been used in all areas of 
public policy including health, schools, infrastructure, prisons and fire stations to name 
a few. The PFI is effectively a public-private partnership in which swathes of public assets 
are contracted to the private sector who then charges the public sector to manage them. 
It locks the public sector in to long-term binding contracts which is beneficial to the 
private investor. But it is also a more secure development for the investor as the public 
sector still bears the risks as what is being produced is a public service (Raco 2015b).    
2.9 Creating a market for housing 
Low demand housing was identified under New Labour as a key driver in the decline of 
certain northern neighbourhoods. It was determined that both local and regional factors 
had affected housing demand, and thus it needed to be through locally driven efforts, 
rather than nationally prescribed interventions that would increase demand (Lee 2010). 
Nine areas were designated as pathfinders and were chosen due to low housing 
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demand, decreasing house prices and high vacancy rates. They contained nearly half of 
the 1% most disadvantaged neighbourhoods in England (Leather & Nevin 2013). The 
idea was to link the pathfinder area to the local market and city to create a flow of capital 
between the two, regenerating the pathfinder area and creating a housing market.  
Housing Market Renewal (HMR) was a massive programme of house building. By 2010, 
the HMR programme had refurbished 82,000 homes, built 12,000 new homes, with land 
ready for a further 28,000 new builds and demolished 23,000 (Macleod & Johnstone 
2012). Assessment of the success of HMR has been mixed. Whilst there have been 
evidence of success in HMR terms, for example better quality of housing stock, increased 
house prices in designated areas, evidence of greater community involvement, greater 
social mixing in neighbourhoods, job creation and better transport links to the city 
centres (Turcu 2012; Leather & Nevin 2013), there has also been severe criticism leveled 
at HMR. The predominant criticism is that HMR rebuilds areas of low demand for new 
incoming groups of people who could improve the identity and economy of a failing 
area, at the expense of existing groups whose needs were arguably marginalised. 
Cameron (2006) in his study of HMR in the North East of England concluded that the 
intention, rhetoric and discourse of HMR had shifted the goal away from improving the 
deprivation of existing residents to replacing the existing communities with those on 
higher incomes. Mass demolitions, it was argued, displaced the long term existing 
communities in favour of bringing in new, more affluent citizens (Atkinson 2008). This 
process challenged the government’s plans of creating sustainable communities.  
HMR relied heavily on compulsory purchase orders and demolitions. This, according to 
Macleod and Johnstone (2012) was ‘…a mode of governmentally choreographed 
displacement and ‘symbolic violence’ designed to remake the landscape in accordance 
with a privitized middle-class habitus’ (p11). In their view, this symbolic violence comes 
from the dismantling of working class communities and their informal networks of 
support in order to create an economic market for, potentially, other groups of people 
to benefit from. Allen (2008), in his study of HMR in Liverpool, reiterates this class 
distinction. He states that working class residents are more likely to relate to houses as 
places to live, a practical solution to a life necessity; whereas middle class people may 
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be more likely to view houses as wealth accumulators and as a demonstration of social 
position. Allen argued that HMR has in effect consisted of the mass demolition of 
working class housing that is then sold to private developers who build new housing 
suited to the middle class house buyers who desire to live in the city. Housing markets 
thus become a mechanism through which certain social groups can be dominated by 
others (ibid).  
This is further supported again by Macleod and Johnstone (2012), who argue that HMR 
is ‘accumulation by dispossession’, taking the term from David Harvey, who argues that 
“‘accumulation by dispossession’ lies at the core of urbanization under capitalism” 
(Harvey 2009: 326). It is the concentrating of wealth and power for the upper sections 
of society away from the lower and middle sections. It is the privatising of public assets 
by the powerful, which utilise them, once bought at low values, to redevelop and then 
profit from. Privatisation and deregulation opened up new markets for capital 
accumulation through speculative private finance, whilst at the same time the state 
redistributed wealth to these sections through reducing welfare and citizen rights 
(Harvey 2007). Macleod and Johnstone (2012) argue that this process is exemplified via 
the HMR. Here low demand areas were created through the absence of investment and 
declining economies. They were thus left to be devalued and then compulsorily bought 
by private agencies at low cost who then rebuild, reshape and rebrand the area in the 
interests of attracting new residents whilst simultaneously displacing the old residents.  
2.10 Gentrification? 
What the above criticisms allude to is the process of gentrification. Lees (2003) argues 
that the terms used by New Labour like ‘Urban Renaissance’, and similarly terms like 
‘urban regeneration’ and ‘urban sustainability’ are all just other names for gentrification.  
The promotion of 'place' has become crucial in a global competitive economy, where 
cities are reconstructed to sell their economic and consumer functions to investors and 
potential residents (Macleod 2011). This can involve completely reinventing the identity 
of a particular city, specifically for those areas that are seen as notoriously bad areas 
which suffer from what Wacquant (2007) calls 'territorial stigma'. The spaces are 
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transformed in to 'centres of spectacle' as their histories are recreated as places of 
entertainment. The image being promoted does not always correlate with the lived 
experience of most residents; however, the reimaging is not intended for the local 
communities, but for the potential incoming groups (Griffiths 1998). As Smith (2002) 
argues, 
“…it is not “people” in general who are to be brought “back into our 
cities”; this appeal is not aimed at Welsh coal miners, Bavarian farm 
workers, or Breton fisher folk. Rather, this appeal to bring people back 
into the city is always a self-interested appeal that the white middle and 
upper-middle classes retake control of the political and cultural 
economies as well as the geography of the largest cities” (p445). 
Whether or not gentrification is a negative process has been widely debated. When Ruth 
Glass first coined the term gentrification in the 1960s it was to refer to the small scale 
process of middle class people buying houses in traditionally deprived working class 
areas and turning them in to middle class neighbourhoods (Atkinson 2003b). After this, 
critical analysis of the process highlighted the negative class implications of 
displacement of working class communities (Slater 2006). More recently, gentrification 
processes have been adopted into normalized urban policy processes that promote this 
style of regeneration as a positive. Under what Lees (2008) calls the ‘emancipatory city 
thesis’, the positives of gentrification lie in the social mixing of people from different 
backgrounds in cities that are seen as diverse and tolerant and share different cultural 
practices. This image of gentrification and the language used to promote it through 
policy, however, ignores the negative effects this creates.  
Slater (2006) has asked why there are so few recent critical perspectives on 
gentrification, and identifies three main reasons. Firstly he argues that commentators 
have spent too long arguing over the precise definitions of gentrification and how they 
originated (e.g. economic or cultural demands) rather than analysing their affects. 
Secondly, he says that the issue of displacement has been removed from recent 
literature due to its difficulty in measurement. Where people have attempted to 
quantify displacement and found none, the conclusion is that it does not exist. However, 
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this ignores the possibility that people are not leaving the area because there are few 
reasonable alternatives and that some people are ‘exclusionarily displaced’ in that they 
may not be able to move in to the area due to increased prices. Thirdly, Slater reiterates 
the issue of language and terminology. Gentrification is dressed up as ‘social mix’, which 
has far less negative connotations attached to it. For Slater (2014) then, gentrification is 
a feature of false-choice urbanism, whereby councils are forced to choose between 
investments (gentrification) or continuing levels of decline. However, for Slater, in 
seeing gentrification as the alternative to decline we ignore the structural neoliberal 
capitalist logic that creates such declining spaces in the first place.   
As the New Labour gvernment came to the end of its term it had left a legacy of spatially 
targeted regeneration strategies that had increased unevenness and disparity in 
equality. It had maintained a commitment to the neoliberal rationality which had begun 
under Thatcher’s Conservative government. Whilst the government developed an 
approach to social inclusion, this approach reinforced a view of individual pathology 
which increased responsibility and self-reliance and reduced the notion of ‘rights’ as 
contingent on certain conditions. The physical landscape also changed massively. The 
inner cities continued to be transformed into leisure spaces of consumption attractive 
to creative types and affluent workers. Increased privatisation also saw the wholesale 
involvement of private capital within public services, reducing the public sector’s 
financial ability to deliver these services otherwise. This increased the reliance on 
private professionals and practitioners to deliver regeneration. Whilst there were many 
criticisms levelled against New Labour’s approach to regeneration, given the economic 
crisis of 2007 and the subsequent election of a Conservative and Liberal Democrat 
coalition government, we may actually, as Southern (2013) suggests “look back and 
lament the golden years of regeneration under New Labour” (p400).      
2.12 ConDem Government and the end of regeneration? 
In 2010, the Conservative party and the Liberal Democrat party formed a coalition 
government, with a Conservative party majority led by David Cameron. Entering 
government after the global economic crisis of 2007-2008 and continuing the 
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conservative neoliberal ideology of reducing big government, the coalition set out to 
tackle the national deficit and decentralise power away from local government. They 
dismantled many of the programmes running under New Labour’s Urban Renaissance 
banner through huge cuts to the Communities and Local Government Department, 
including the abolition of the HMR and Regional Development Agencies (Punter 2011). 
Primarily, the two main aims under the coalition government were localism and 
economic growth. The Coalition fundamentally changed the landscape of urban 
regeneration as a spatially targeted set of urban policies. There has been no specific 
regeneration policies created.  
Under the coalition, the focus was on attracting and encouraging what had seen to 
become, post-economic crash, nervous private investors. Regeneration funding was 
reduced by two-thirds and as Pugalis and McGuinness (2013) declare under the 
coalition, “‘for the first time in over forty years there are no area based initiatives 
targeted at the most deprived parts of England’” (p341). Investment and government, 
both local and central, were to be directed at places of growth; areas that were not 
necessarily territorially bounded but could display coherent economic potential. Under 
this, new spaces could be created that do not map on to any specific democratic 
jurisdiction. There was a wholesale shift from sites of need to sites of growth potential. 
This refocusing of regeneration funding was coupled with intense welfare cutbacks to 
local councils and government departments. Thus what we have seen emerging is what 
Peck (2012) has termed ‘austerity urbanism’; urban policy under the conditions of 
extreme cuts to public spending. Under austerity urbanism, regeneration as the 
amelioration of deprivation at local spatial scales arguably no longer occurs (Goodchild 
& Hammond 2013). 
The Localism Act 2011 set the policy of the Big Society agenda, the planned policy of 
giving communities and residents more local powers to make necessary decisions 
(Cabinet Office 2010). Within the Localism Act, community groups, private companies, 
third sector voluntary and charity groups and employee cooperatives were able to bid 
to take over the provision of public services, with potential funding from new resources 
such as the Big Society Bank and create Neighbourhood Development Plans through 
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locally created Neighbourhood Forums. One of the outcomes of this was the ability of 
local groups to sideline the role of local government in the process (Buser 2013). It has 
been argued, however, that this turn to localism and locally directed plans will be more 
successful in those areas of high social capital and more vulnerable areas may suffer as 
a result. The consequence of this is likely to be uneven policies which create uneven 
spatialities (Pugalis & Townsend 2013).    
With regards to growth, the main developments have been a removal of grants and 
central government funding towards financial incentives that encourage local councils 
to deliver growth (Bailey et al. 2015). The Regional Growth Fund, Tax Increment 
Financing and Earn back models like City Deals all work on the basis that a local council 
will receive funding proportionate to the amount of growth that has been proven to be 
delivered. This growth funding is also dependent on the amount of private investment 
a local council can obtain. Essentially then what has been created is a ‘payment by 
results’ system of funding which encourages local councils to go after developments that 
are likely to generate the biggest returns (Waite et al. 2013). The implication here then 
is that the areas that will be the subject of investment will be those already most likely 
to deliver, rather than those areas that are underdeveloped or declining (Pugalis & 
McGuinness 2013). It also subjects the councils to increased levels of risk by investing in 
projects that it is hoped will pay off in the future and be making funding contingent on 
increasing growth which, as Longlands (2013) has argued, is not guaranteed to 
materialise and diverts attention away from those immediate social problems. 
Another significant development under the coalition has been the creation of the Local 
Enterprise Partnerships (LEP), which are private business led partnerships with Councils. 
Their remit was to set the economic strategy for an economic area of their designation. 
The Regional Growth Fund was developed to allow LEPs and other partnership projects 
to compete for resources. Like previous funding initiatives, the bids had to show how 
the projects would increase the economic potential of an area. It was particularly 
directed towards areas with an over reliance on public sector labour markets (Deas 
2012). The Regional growth Fund has created a direct pool of resources provided by 
central government towards private enterprise, with the last two rounds of funding only 
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being open to private business to apply for. LEPs were created with the intention that 
private business could unlock investment and enterprise that Local Authority planners 
were seen to prevent (Pugalis & Townsend 2013). This increasing involvement of private 
sector agents with planning and regeneration responsibility challenges the role of 
democratically accountable agents. It reduces the extent to which these decisions are 
based in democratic politics rather than technocratic forms of expert management. As 
Raco (2015b) has argued, these transformations are output focused; concerned only 
with delivering in the most efficient manner. Experts outline suggestions from which the 
democratic-elect have to choose. Operating under this framework the logic is often “‘we 
don’t need political debating, we need action!’” (Davidson & Iveson 2014: 4). This is 
characteristic of an ‘austerity urbanism’ in which it is deemed as though there are ‘no 
alternatives’ to the neoliberal growth agenda set out (Pugalis & McGuinness 2013). 
2.13 Post-political policy 
This ‘no alternative’ mantra has been characterised in recent urban policy literature as 
a move towards a post-political consensus. This refers to a process of depoliticising and 
has been the focus of recent academic literature centred around work most notably by 
Jacques Ranciere, Chantal Mouffe and Slavoj Zizek (Wilson & Swyngedouw 2015). The 
concept of depoliticisation is argued to be a consequence of the dominating but 
internally weakening form of democratic political life. Ranciere (2004) identified that 
with the collapse of the Soviet system, in conjunction with economic globalisation and 
the increase of identity politics there were renewed calls for a ‘return of politics’. 
However what emerged was a conflating of democracy with the liberal economy. The 
need to manage the consequences of the global economy united the politics of both the 
right and the left, seeking a consensus over the mitigation of problems that would affect 
all party members equally on all sides. This consensus for Ranciere became ‘the supreme 
democratic value’ (2004:4). Consensus was promoted as the solution to conflict that 
emerged over differing ideologies. Consensus was necessary for the common good.  
Historical battles of ideology that had once taken place over what makes a ‘good’ 
society, Wilson and Swyngedouw (2015) argue, have come to an end through this 
 59 
 
consensual depoliticising. Democracy as a political democratic order has won out over 
other forms of political life. Democracy, for these authors, refers to the space given to 
the debate and consideration of a plurality of issues spanning from lifestyle concerns, 
environmental issues, parliamentary behaviours, people’s rights and so on. All issues of 
public concern are now open to politicisation and discussion, giving rise to the notion 
that democracy as the preferred form of political life has been fully established. But 
what occurs in this consensual democracy is an uncontested politics of efficient 
technocratic managerialism.  
2.14 Problematising consensus 
Why do these authors, amongst others, frame consensus as a challenge to politics 
proper, or a depoliticisation? Metzger et al (2015) identify the emergence of such 
scholarship, loosely termed post-foundationalist, as taking place during the 1990’s in 
response to what was at the time a reoccurring theme of ‘the end of history’ as predicted 
by Francis Fukayama. ‘The end of history’ for Fukayama occurred with the fall of the 
Berlin wall, signalling an end to a long standing battle between differing ideologies 
(Wilson and Swyngedouw 2015). This end of history coincided with the emergence of a 
non-adversarial form of Third Way politics as previously mentioned under Blair, which 
raised new questions about what politics actually is (Metzger et al 2015). It was during 
this redefining of politics that notions of post-politics and post-democracy emerged, 
most notably from Mouffe and Ranciere respectively, but also Zizek.  These theorists 
sought to centralise dissensus, disagreement and antagonism as a fundamental 
necessity for the exercise of politics proper.  
For Mouffe (2005), antagonism is constitutive of politics, and to attempt to remove 
antagonism and the option of conflicting alternatives is to remove proper political 
questions. These questions relate to the political differences that divide groups and offer 
political alternatives. As Mouffe argues, in our consensual approach to democracy 
problems or threats that society faces, which the ‘common good’ must tackle together, 
are treated as technical rather than political issues. They are solved by experts and 
technocrats rather than politically debated by opposing collectives. This, Mouffe 
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identified, is the consequence of a liberalism that is primarily individualising. This 
individualism ‘forecloses acknowledging the nature of collective identities’ (2005:10) 
and fails to recognise that a pluralistic society will harbour conflicting needs and 
interests that can in no way be reconciled under a consensual ensemble. It is because of 
this limitation that liberalism seeks to refute this antagonistic dimension of politics, 
promoting the individual as the central point of engagement.  
Mouffe, drawing on Carl Schmitt, defines what she determines to be the difference 
between politics and the political. Politics, Mouffe argues, is the administrative, 
managerial and organisational role of the state in which order is established in society. 
The political, however, is the ‘dimension of antagonism … constitutive of human 
societies’ (2005:9). The political is a site of disagreement between groups in which a 
‘friend/enemy’ or an ‘us/them’ divide takes place between collective identities. For 
Schmitt, the solution to the antagonism between groups which can erupt in to violent 
oppression is to exclude the other by whatever means. True consensus can only be 
achieved through exclusion and thus can never be truly inclusive (Schmitt in Mouffe 
2005). Mouffe departs from Schmitt here and suggests that the ‘we/they’ relation can 
exist without being antagonistic and threatening. In fact the ‘we/they’ relation can exist 
in an agonistic form, where enemies are replaced with adversaries who have legitimate 
space to offer alternative political positions. This would allow dissenting voices genuine 
space in which to be heard and respected, even if not always agreed upon. For Mouffe, 
this would prevent the repression of difference which when denied emerges via 
alternative means, namely political apathy or violent expression (for example right-wing 
populism). It would also avoid the techno-managerial form of politics which seeks to 
close down the scope for genuine disagreement over necessary and fundamental 
political questions regarding how society should be.  
Ranciere (1998), like Mouffe, identifies there is a difference between politics and the 
political, but adds a third dimension to the structure; the police. For Ranciere the police 
are the institutions that order and govern the social world. Our general understanding 
of politics, that being the procedures that govern our roles and place in society, is not 
politics for Ranciere, but a ‘police order’ that defines our doing, saying and acting as 
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either legitimate or not. It defines who is heard and who is marginalised, who is visible 
and who is invisible. It defines the part we play within the overall whole. Genuine 
politics, for Ranciere, only really emerges once this police order is broken and defined 
roles are transgressed. It is the emergence of true equality that challenges the logic of 
the police order. Politics only emerges when the logic of the police is confronted with 
the logic of equality by those who have no defined part in the overall whole (Wilson and 
Swyngedouw 2015). Power and politics are not the same thing. Power may be exercised 
but it may not in any way challenge the police order and thus is not proper politics. 
Ranciere uses the term post-democracy rather than post-politics. This post-democracy 
operates through disavowal, rather than repression as Mouffe argued (Wilson and 
Swyngedouw 2015). This disavowal allows the police order to acknowledge those who 
have no part, but in a way that allows their political subjectivity to be neutralised, as 
Dikeç (2005) argues, 
“…identifying ‘the excluded’ as the excluded is already to include ‘them’ 
in the whole; nothing escapes the police, especially ‘the excluded’. And, 
once the excluded are identified as such, the possibility of politics is 
cancelled out at the outset; there is room merely for modifications in 
the police order, motivated either by a moral effort to ‘include the 
excluded’, or by a concern with the security of ‘the included’ threatened 
by the outside” (2005:177).  
This disavowal emerges under conditions of a ‘consensus’. Like Mouffe, Ranciere 
acknowledges that this consensus results not in consensus, but in violent expressions 
and identity politics in the form of an inarticulate expression of rage, for example riots.  
For Mouffe, the key to political expression is an agnostic democracy and for Ranciere it 
is the eruption of those with no part. However, Zizek, another prominent post-political 
writer, argues that depoliticisation occurs, not through repression or disavowal but 
through a form of post-political foreclosure, in which ‘old ideological divisions’ are left 
behind in favour of expert knowledge and technocrats (2000: 198). Zizek’s argument is 
that this foreclosure prevents the emergence of political subjects via the accepting and 
legitimising of individual claims by the dominant order, but never actually allowing these 
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claims to become universal; meaning they are never allowed to represent something 
more than themselves. This individualising process legitimises claims and wrongs, giving 
the appearance of democracy, but in reality it prevents groups forming to mount a 
genuine challenge. As Gill et al (2012) argue, “It is precisely by tolerating and 
accommodating each technical and individual demand that a generalised sense of wrong 
is never developed” (2012:4).  For Dean (2009) the notion of post-politics is ‘childishly 
petulant’ (2009:23). She argues that the failure of politics is more a reflection of the 
failure of the Left to engage in politics. Drawing on Zizek, Dean (2015) argues that 
depoliticisation emerges from the inability to take something individual and make it 
stand for something universal. This, however, is something only the Left fail to do. The 
Right on the other hand are adept at taking individual groups and making them stand in 
for larger societal problems. The Left are failing in politicising issues because, as Dean 
claims, they have conceded to the Right in accepting capitalism as the economic 
strategy. 
2.15 Post-political urban planning 
What we might consider then is whether urban planning and the changes in urban 
regeneration can be understood through this post-political framework. Metzger et al 
(2015) suggest that the planning system began to operate under a post-political 
consensus based system during the dominant 1990’s Third Way movement. As has been 
seen it was during this period of time in which the planning system began to draw heavily 
on governance rather than government and partnership as a short hand for the state 
and the market. It also drew on notions of the ‘public interest’ to denote economic 
growth that was promoted to also deliver social and environmental benefits for all 
(Metzger et al 2015). Planning is an inherently political task in that it seeks to develop 
how a territory should exist and develop. However, as these authors argue, it is also a 
form of ‘policing’ in the Ranciere sense, as it is about locking down and designating the 
usability of a space for the interests of a ‘we’. The plans involved in planning restrict 
alternative optional uses of those very spaces and inevitably involve the exclusion of 
some other groups. And it is via these exclusions that we may see the emergence of a 
political subject who rises to challenge this dominate order. For Allmendinger and 
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Haughton (2012), discussions about the direction in which planning should be developed 
and how land should be used represent political spaces for contestations over what 
should be done and how. It is at these points that political democratic decision making 
can be practiced. However, under current commitments to neoliberal growth, dissensus 
and discussion is foreclosed and in its place is a consensus-based politics in which all 
sides of the political spectrum agree on the way forward, as though it is a fait accompli; 
a foreclosed progression. We can see how this has been gradually emerging over the 
course of this chapter. As alternative lines of opportunity and funding have been 
curtailed and local powers have been restricted, there are very few genuinely viable 
alternatives to handing over control to private interests in return for contingent central 
government loans.  
Davidson and Iveson (2014) explain that the normalisation over time of the need for 
cities to be competitive, secure, global and creative result in the deferring to expert 
practitioners in order to attain these goals. There is little room or time to contest these 
internalised assumptions. Promoting consensus over dissensus is the linchpin of the 
post-political city. Being post-political then is about defining the problem and the 
solution. It is about creating replica sanitised and securitised spaces through which only 
certain voices or identities are expressed whilst others are removed. Reconfiguring the 
urban environment through the well-established and well duplicated regeneration 
tactics, Swyngedouw (2010) argues, is not a response to the inevitable neo-liberal 
economic order, but rather a conscious production of it, by creating the very existence 
of those neoliberal urban conditions. Post-political planning, Raco (2015a) argues, is 
about having efficient and ‘output-centred’ policies. The individualising process of 
capitalism and the modernising project of politics has promoted a ‘Good Governance’ 
agenda which operates under a consensus based logic of ‘what matters is what works’. 
For Raco, “Delivery has replaced democracy as the core principle of Good Governance” 
(2015: 156). What this suggests is a form of democracy that assumes outcomes are more 
important to citizens than how decisions about those outcomes are reached.  
Raco (2015) identifies four examples of strategic rationalities that indicate post-political 
governance. Firstly he argues, the decision making structures have become so imbued 
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with a multiplicity of actors and partnerships that it is difficult to ascribe accountability 
to any one body of actors. The structures and decision-making channels are far too 
complex for members of the public or other social groups to understand or challenge. 
Responsibilities are also spread between diverse groups of public and private actors and 
agencies, diffusing overall accountability, which is a deliberate strategy, Raco argues, 
rather than an unfortunate outcome of the process. Secondly, the discursive 
mobilisation of ‘communities’ as co-producers of policy, as seen with the New Deal for 
Communities, are actually structured in ways that limited community engagement in 
any meaningful manner. These communities are allowed to engage if they can do so in 
a professional and business-like way, which supports the strategies of the policy process. 
This can serve to limit any competing views or challenges to established ways of doing 
things. Thirdly, experts are promoted as the ultimate decision makers, highlighting their 
objective non-political nature as a preference to political debate. Fourthly, the political 
dimensions of temporality in relation to decision-making can be utilised to reduce 
dissent and narrow the scope for democratic engagement. Public consultation periods 
can be relatively short, minimising the scope for conflict. On the other hand, long term 
contracts with private organisations to deliver public services can limit the ability of the 
public to make changes to those services.  These long-term contracts may solidify what 
Raco has termed a ‘post-political rigidity’ (2015b: 35). Raco uses this term to describe 
the increasing prominence of contractual governance, in which government 
departments and local authorities enter into long term contracts with private sector 
partners to deliver services. The nature of these contracts results in the public sector 
being unable to change policies or divert from the course of action already set. It is a 
process which serves to ‘lock out’ politics for the duration of its lifecycle (ibid: 35).  
These rationalities speak to what Swyngedouw refers to as a ‘depoliticised urban 
populism’ (2010: 9). Under this condition which is argued to be a symptom of a post-
political consensus, all citizens are expressed as potentially under threat from urban 
problems, for example non-competitiveness or globalisation. It is this populism that 
speaks across ideological differences, promoting a commonality and restricting 
parochial interests. For example, low demand low value housing effects all within that 
geographically located market.  This populism ushers in urgency for immediate action to 
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resolve these commonly shared problems. However, as Davidson and Iveson argued, 
democratic decision making is being reduced to the ‘constant invocation of necessity’ 
(2014: 1). The necessity to act quickly and with urgency to withstand external threats, 
such as the loss of mobile capital, restricts the ability to exercise considered democratic 
decision making. Urgent action always takes precedence. The need to be a competitive 
city in order to attract investment is the paradigmatic case of a ‘post-political’ urban 
governance according to Davidson and Iveson (2014). These ideas are taken as fact and 
reproduced through the cities that accept them. The result is a situation in which 
agreement over these necessities forecloses dissensus or democratic challenges to their 
legitimacy, as Davidson and Iveson argue, 
“To attract developers, land-use controls must be relaxed. To attract 
employers, labour markets must be more flexible. To attract investors, 
infrastructure must be privatized. To attract skilled workers, certain 
facilities must be provided. The corollary is that anyone who complains 
about such measures is putting their own parochial interests ahead of 
the city’s interests” (2014: 3)  
The extent to which most cities in the UK have bought into this neoliberal logic about 
the development of the urban reinforces Margaret Thatcher’s ‘there is no alternative’ 
mantra (Deas 2013). Political debate about how the future should look is being replaced 
by technocratic decision-making around how it will look. Representative democratic 
actors are said to have been replaced by non-representative practitioners and 
consultants who can navigate the best course of action utilising market-led solutions. A 
neoliberal capitalist economic future is thus expressed as an inevitability (Swyngedouw 
2010). Drawing on Rancière, Davidson and Iveson (2014) argue that in the context of 
necessity the power of a democratic institution to govern becomes justified through the 
articulation of its own impotence, in other words, its actions are necessitated by its 
inability to act otherwise,  
“At the end of the day, proof of the right of the state power is identical 
to the evidence that it only ever does the only thing possible, only ever 
what is required by strict necessity in the context of the growing 
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intricacy of economies within the global market. The legitimacy of state 
power is thereby reinforced by the very affirmation of its impotence, of 
its lack of choice faced with the world-wide necessity it is dominated by” 
(Rancière cited in Davidson and Iveson 2014: 2).   
Within urban policy, the contemporary objective is securing economic growth and the 
necessity and commitment to this objective is the most prominent form of post-political 
consensus. This has been made increasingly central to urban development through both 
the Coalition and the subsequent Conservative government policies (Deas, 2012). Under 
urban regeneration, politics proper can only appear when a subject emerges to 
challenge and undermine the singular vision that has been established in planning 
frameworks which determines how regeneration will take place and in whose interest. 
Regeneration is post-political when these challenges are reduced to noise or explained 
away as resistant to change, provincial, and misunderstanding (Baeten 2009). As Deas 
(2012) has argued, policies like the Localism Act introduces the possibility of 
involvement from a range of local actors and third sector groups in the decision making 
process and a devolution of power to the local area. This could give rise to legitimate 
forms of conflict in which different views have space to be heard. However, as he also 
argues, the reduction of available funding for local groups, the entrenched commitment 
to economic growth, and the simultaneous establishment of Local Enterprise 
Partnerships and the governments Growth funds may actually serve to foreclose any 
meaningful form of local intervention (Deas 2012). For Allmendinger and Haughton 
(2015), this localism and Big Society form of urban planning is a ‘divide and rule’ tactic 
that is both simultaneously centralising and decentralising (2015: 34). An ‘illusion’ of 
local choice is maintained so long as those choices operate within a growth agenda, as 
the authors argue, “a neighbourhood can determine where development will go, not 
whether there should be development” (2015: 34).      
However, some authors warn of the danger of utilising the notion of post-politics as a 
consistent and hegemonic form and disregarding its more nuanced appearances 
(Johnstone 2014). Writers such as Davidson and Iveson (2014) argue that we need to be 
aware that in identifying post-political conditions we are not simply reinforcing this 
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view, adding to the notion that there is no alternative. As Bylund (2012) argues, there is 
a potential irony emerging in which ‘the genre of post-political diagnosis is itself at risk 
of attracting a post-political condition” (2012: 3). It may be that our use of the term 
‘post-political’ serves to limit our potential critique of politics within planning. Following 
on from Allmendinger and Haughton (2015) the use of the term post-political within this 
thesis is not to usher in a post-political condition but to draw on its analytical potential 
in which to highlight and critique strategies that serve to challenge or displace the 
existence of politics within planning in Salford. It is to enable a discussion of the 
complexities of spatial planning and urban regeneration within this specific context. As 
Allmendinger and Haughton (2010) argue,  
“…the postpolitical condition and the practices of spatial planning are 
far from being a monolithic force: rather, the practices and discourses of 
spatial planning have evolved over time and taken on different 
complexions in different parts of the country, creating the context for 
diverse understandings and evolving practices” (2010: 804).  
2.16 Conclusion 
The urban changes over time documented in this chapter have led to the formation of a 
new urban policy, in which entrepreneurial forms of governance increasingly prioritise 
the economic goals of development over their social necessities. Public and private 
partnerships work together to target urban development on specific places; marketing 
their competitive potential to regional, international and even global audiences 
(Swyngedouw et al. 2002). Rather than a withdrawal of the state, as pure neoliberalism 
would suggest, the state has restructured itself to actively engage and drive the new 
urban policy. The UK government has implemented policies which force competition 
between cities, has provided incentives for private investment and businesses through 
economic policies and has opened up new markets for capital accumulation. 
Simultaneously the state has been instrumental in defining the ‘problem’ of the city as 
one of dependency and a lack of personal responsibility, which a free market economy 
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would solve. This has allowed for the neglect of the structural causes of the declining 
city and the rolling back of welfare (MacLeod et al. 2003).  
The desire to move people back to the city and the prioritising of economic needs over 
social needs has resulted in issues of gentrification and displacement. Gentrification, 
whilst never explicitly called such within policies, can now be seen as an urban strategy 
undertaken by most, if not all, city leaders (Smith 2002). This neoliberal blueprint of 
regeneration can be seen occurring in replica fashion in most postindustrial cities; 
ubiquitous and similar despite their respective differences. Waterfront developments, 
cultural quarters and large scale shopping centres are characteristic of these changes 
and, as Swyngedouw (2010) remarks, each reader will be able to generate a list of their 
own favourites. This regeneration strategy has correlated simultaneously with 
increasing forms of policing and control designed to sanitise these environments for 
their new users, focusing on anti-social behaviours and quality of life issues, and 
expressing signs of a revanchist and aggressive mentality (Smith 1996).    
Whilst there are documentations of resistance at both a local and national level to these 
changes, they do bear the hallmarks of what can be defined as a post-political 
consensus. Each urban area is forced to compete for reduced levels of government 
grants and mobile capital that generates this neoliberal order by making one city the 
winner and another the loser within this ‘jungle law’ (Peck & Tickell 1994). Thus it is a 
capitalist policy response to the problems caused by capital in the first instance, and 
thus is stuck within this capitalist logic (Pugalis & McGuinness 2013). The intensification 
of a growth agenda in an era of ‘austerity urbanism’ looks likely to increase uneven 
spatial development as areas struggling for, or left partially developed by, previous 
rounds of capital will be overlooked in favour of areas with growth potential that can 
generate even more scarce sources of funding.    
The next chapter will explore these how these changes in UK urban policy have 
materialised in a specific British city. Salford is a city in the North West of England. It is 
adjacent to Manchester, which has become one of the most important cities to the 
English economy, and has seen the largest growth outside London in the last ten years. 
Salford is roughly half the size of Manchester and has much less economic might. 
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According to its own documentation it is a city ‘punching above its weight’ (Salford City 
Council 2013d). However, recent urban developments have seen Salford acquire a much 
stronger position, both economically and politically. The outcome of this is that Salford 
Council now has to balance the needs of increased competition with entrenched levels 
of deprivation.   
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3. An urban history of Salford 
What was described in the previous chapter took a national overarching picture of urban 
policy. What I want to consider in this chapter is the local variations that these national 
policy and programmes have taken. As MacLeod et al (2003) argue, urban politics do not 
diffuse ‘blanket-like’ across all terrain, but emerges in accordance with the locally 
specific economic, political and physical context in which they are articulated (p1658). 
For this thesis I am interested in looking at the local context of Salford, or more 
specifically, Central Salford. Salford is located in the North West of England, within 
Greater Manchester which comprises of 10 Local Authority areas. It is situated next to 
Manchester City Centre to the West, just over the river Irwell which runs between the 
two cities. Salford is only half the size of neighbouring Manchester with less economic 
success and high levels of deprivation and unemployment.  However it has recently 
found itself in a strategically strong position in which parts of the City have become 
central to the development of not only the City Region, but the wider North West 
generally, and moving towards gaining international recognition. The development of 
MediaCity UK in Salford Quays (SQ) and the relocation of parts of the BBC there in 2011 
is promoted as Salford’s flagship development.  
Salford has historically taken second place to neighbouring Manchester, with long 
standing conflict between the respective councils in competition for funding (Carley et 
al. 2000). However, more recently Salford Council has embraced entrepreneurial forms 
of governance, including  partnership working with Manchester City Council, other 
public agencies and private investors to ensure the securing of significant regeneration 
funding streams; and by taking the lead in major regeneration programmes (Robson 
2002). The success of this has put Salford on the investment map, even out-bidding 
Manchester for the BBC relocation. However, industrial decline over recent years has 
resulted in high levels of deprivation across the city, having a negative effect on the life 
chances of many Salford residents. The large amount of regeneration in Salford, 
particularly Central Salford, is intended to benefit all residents, through job creation and 
trickle-down economics. However, there are emerging signs of gentrification practices, 
community disaffection and conflict over space (Jeffery & Jackson 2012). What this 
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chapter intends to do is present a case study of the City of Salford and the urban 
regeneration that has taken place up to this point. I will explore how the national urban 
reform programmes discussed in the previous chapter have taken form in this city, how 
it has impacted the decision making of the local government and the effects this may 
have on the lived experiences of the residents. This chapter is based on desk research 
and is a survey of the relevant documentation and publications that relate to my field of 
analysis. It can be considered as a ‘first chronology’ or ‘first reading of events’ (Hajer 
2006: 73) before I move on to the empirical data that I collected as part of this research.   
3.1 Industrial beginnings 
Salford City has had a history of rapid industrialisation coupled with radical labour 
movements. Industrialisation in the 19th century saw Salford grow from being a small 
town of farmers and textile producers, to one of the greatest cotton towns in England. 
The advancements in steam power and machinery drew people in to work in the newly 
built factories. Vast numbers of terraced housing were erected nearby the factories to 
accommodate the expanding labour population flocking to the area for employment. 
The move to steam power increased the pace of industrial growth and in 1816 there 
were a reported 86 steam powered factories across Salford and Manchester (Clarke & 
Cochrane 2013). The construction of the Liverpool to Manchester railway in 1830 and 
the increasingly sophisticated canal networks increased Salford’s industrial capacity and 
also increased its necessary workforce (Nevell 2008). Industrialisation and the increased 
population created poor living conditions for many of Salford’s residents. This was 
vividly highlighted in Engels’ book, The Conditions of the working Class in England; 
“The traveller crossing this viaduct can still look down on plenty of dirt 
and poverty. If he takes the trouble to go through these alleyways and 
peer through the open doors and windows into the houses and cellars 
he can satisfy himself time and time again that the Salford workers of 
Salford inhabit dwellings in which it is impossible to live in either 
cleanliness or comfort” (1971: 74).       
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Engels’ work in the Conditions of the Working Class was to present a Marxist critique of 
industrial capitalism. He was keen to emphasise the conditions that this order created 
and the increasingly uneven spatialisation between the working classes and the 
bourgeoisie. But what he also served to do in this account was create an image of Salford 
and its levels of deprivation that is still drawn on and resonates to this day. This is an 
image that, as we shall see, has stayed with Salford challenging its efforts at renewal. 
The economic depression in the latter half of the nineteenth century and the increasing 
costs of importing goods to transfer by rail had negative impacts on the local workforce. 
The solution was to petition parliament for the creation of a ship canal directly in to 
Manchester and Salford (Williams et al. 2010). The ship canal was opened in 1894 by 
Queen Victoria and it brought much needed employment to the Salford area. After 7 
years of building, many men got full time stable jobs working on the Salford docks, which 
became the 3rd busiest port in England (Struthers 2003). However, after the First World 
War and the subsequent Wall Street Crash in October 1929, unemployment soon 
rocketed to unprecedented levels. In this crisis, not unlike the one just experienced in 
2008, the deficit was such that the government, in arguably protecting the interests of 
capital, slashed wages for the public sector workers and cut unemployment benefit, 
along with many other welfare programmes (Castles 2010). 
As advancements in technology and changes in trade occurred, deindustrialisation took 
hold and the Salford docks became less beneficial to the economy. The knock on effect 
from this was that increasing numbers of local manufacturing businesses closed, raising 
levels of unemployment even further (Bullock 1998). The housing erected so quickly and 
cheaply during the industrial boom soon began to decline. People once again were living 
in poor conditions of damp and cold. Slum clearance programmes were undertaken in 
the area during the late 1960s replacing terrace housing with high-rise flats and 
maisonettes. One of the most famous writings about Salford during this period is in the 
work of Robert Roberts (1973) in The Classic Slum. In this text, Roberts promotes the 
notion of working class solidarity and community spirit argued to exist strongly in these 
working class neighbourhoods but challenged by the slum clearance programmes.  
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When the docks finally closed in 1982, unemployment in Ordsall, where the docks are 
located, increased to 32%. This was followed by an increasing crime rate and the 1991 
Salford riots (Henderson et al. 2007). Following deindustrialisation were the neoliberal 
reforms highlighted in the previous chapter. These reforms encouraged a free market 
economy, which was to be directed by consumer preferences, making them more 
efficient and diversifying the range of consumption products. These changes are 
particularly important for a city like Salford, given its once strong industrial community 
base, and there is evidence of this insecurity amongst residents. The labour market in 
the area has changed drastically over the preceding decade. Manufacturing and 
elementary employees now make up the bulk of the unemployed in Salford and the 
emerging jobs in the area are in the knowledge based industry. This has created a 
significant skills gap in the area, characterised by above average levels of unemployment 
(Manchester Independent Economic Review 2009). The Local Authority solution to this 
has centred on training programmes and aspiration building, echoing the neoliberal 
responsibilisation approach (Raco 2009). The changing economy in Salford has brought 
new residents to regenerated and newly build areas, which has created antagonism 
amongst locals.  Expressions of general dissatisfaction, feelings of loss, a lack of 
ontological security and a sense of powerlessness have been documented in previous 
academic research due to the area changes (See Walklate & Evans 1999). There is also 
evidence of struggles over space and belonging in the newly built leisure and 
consumption areas (Minton 2009). These themes will be explored in the remainder of 
the chapter.   
3.2 Demographics of Salford1 
According to the latest census data in 2011, Salford holds 233,933 residents, which is 
under half the number of residents in neighbouring Manchester (503,127). This is 8.7% 
of the wider Greater Manchester total population and is the 5th most populated of the 
                                                     
1 The data in this section relating to Salford as a percentage of Greater Manchester and the ethnic 
composition of Salford residents has been aggregated by the author from the ONS census data 2011 
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10 Local Authorities (Office for National Statistics 2011). There is a mix of housing tenure 
in Salford. Half of all residents are homeowners, which is lower than the North West 
(NW) average of 64.5% and the England average of 63.4%. There is also a much higher 
than average rate of social housing in Salford, with 17.8% renting from the Local 
Authority (compared to a NW average of 7.7% and an England average of 9.4%) and 11% 
in Housing Association or Registered Social Landlord housing (compared to a NW 
average of 10.6% and an England average of 8.3%). The unemployment rate for Salford 
residents is slightly higher again when compared to the NW and England, with 5.2% 
unemployed compared to 4.7% and 4.4% respectively, with unemployment rates being 
higher for male residents than female. The ethnic composition of Salford is majoritively 
White (90.1%), which is similar to the NW ethnic composition (90.2%), but higher than 
the England average (85.4%) (ibid).  
Salford is ranked in the top twenty Local Authorities in England in 2010 which contains 
the highest proportion of most deprived areas (33%) (Department for Communities and 
Local Government 2011). Unsurprisingly, the health rate in Salford is poorer than UK 
average, with more people reporting bad or very bad health. Life expectancy for Salford 
residents at birth is lower than average. Between 2008-2010, the average life 
expectancy for males in Salford was 4 years below the England average and for females 
it was 3 years below (ONS, 2011b). 56.7% of people in Salford live below the England 
household income average (£36,009). The mode income in Salford is only £12,500 and 
17.5% of people are claiming out of work benefit. This is much higher than the national 
average of 12.1% (Salford City Partnership 2012d).   
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3.3 Uneven Salford 
 
Figure 8: Index of Multiple Deprivation 2007. Source - Salford City Council. 
Within Salford, the demographics vary considerably, from areas of significant poverty to 
areas of significant wealth (figure 8). Salford City is made up of 8 Neighbourhoods (figure 
9) which cover 20 wards. To the west of Salford exist some affluent wards, with the more 
deprived being those closest to Manchester, in the Central Salford locality. Central 
Salford consists of the seven wards of Ordsall, Broughton, Kersal, Irwell Riverside, 
Langworthy, Claremont and Weaste and Seedley and is the area which has been 
designated as key to the revival of the wider Salford economy (Central Salford Urban 
Regeneration Company 2006: 8). Worsley and Boothstown are the most prosperous of 
the Salford neighbourhoods and the only neighbourhood with all Conservative elected 
Councillors. It is amongst the 70% least deprived areas in England. It borders the 
Bridgewater canal and has a large proportion of Green land.  97% of the area is private 
homeownership, and the houses in this area are the highest price in Salford, with an 
average house price of £239,051 (Salford City Partnership 2012c). The median 
household income for Worsley and Boothstown in 2012 was £43,562 (the mean 
household income being £50,608) (Salford City Partnership 2012f).  
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Figure 9: Map showing Salford neighbourhoods. Source - Salford City Partnership, 2010 
Worsley and Boothstown compare drastically to the more deprived neighbourhoods in 
Salford, particularly East Salford and Ordsall and Langworthy. Both neighbourhoods 
border Manchester City Centre and are within Central Salford. Central Salford is locally 
referred to as ‘Old Salford’, distinguishing it from the more westerly wards which 
became part of the City area at a later date (Walklate & Evans 1999). The East Salford 
neighbourhood comprises of Broughton, Irwell Riverside and Kersal. It has seen a 
considerable population increase over the last 10 years, and comprises a larger than 
Salford average of people aged 20-29, a group which has increased 36% in the last 10 
years. It is predicted that the population will increase a further 25% over the next 20 
years (Salford City Partnership 2012g). However, income levels are low. The median 
household income in 2012 was £21,146 with the most occurring household income 
being £12,500, demonstrating the disparity within this space. Health is below both 
national and Salford average for people in the East Salford neighbourhood, and whilst 
there are variations within the neighbourhood, there are areas where the life 
expectancy of residents is 10.3 years lower than the national average (Salford City 
Partnership 2012a). This is a considerable difference in health, especially when 
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compared to the Worsley and Boothstown area within the same city which has an 
average life expectancy of 2 years above the national average, representing a 12 year 
difference in life expectancy within the same city, a distance of less than 10 miles.  
The Ordsall and Langworthy neighbourhood are particularly interesting neighbourhoods 
in Salford. There are considerable regeneration efforts on going in this area and have 
been on-going for several years. Ordsall is home to SQ a residential, tourist, leisure and 
consumption space, which also now includes MediaCityUK, a dedicated creative and 
media business and residential space. SQ has been Salford’s main regeneration project 
and its biggest economic driver. However, Ordsall and Langworthy remain significantly 
deprived, with Langworthy being the site of the recent 2011 UK riots (Jeffery and Jackson 
2012). In terms of income the figures are starkly different for the 2 wards, with 
Langworthy having a median household income of £19,435 and Ordsall having a median 
household income of £30,479. This figure for Ordsall is undoubtedly increased by those 
residents living in the more affluent SQ area, as the mode income for Ordsall in general 
is actually only £17,500 (Salford City Partnership 2012e). This shows the differing 
economic prospects of the new SQ residents compared to the rest of Ordsall. 39% of 
housing in this neighbourhood is social housing and the area has long waiting lists for 
vacancies. Conversely, the area has the highest rental market in Salford at the second 
highest rent levels. The majority of these are again the new developments in the SQ area 
(Salford City Partnership 2012b).  
As the below figure shows, there are levels of extreme deprivation in Ordsall, situated 
immediately adjacent to areas of considerable affluence (figure 10). The area of least 
deprivation in Ordsall is the SQ development. The other more deprived areas that 
neighbour it are the local residential spaces. Figure 10 also shows deprivation in 
Langworthy. Again, the least deprived area here is the Chapel Street area which houses 
the University of Salford but has also been subject to concentrated regeneration efforts.    
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Figure 10: Index of Multiple Deprivation for Ordsall 2007. Source - Salford City Council 
Between 2001-2010, Ordsall has seen an incredible population increase of 72.6%, which 
is an increase of 4,892 people in to the area. Over 60% of this increase (3,307 people) 
was between 2007-2010 alone (Salford City Council 2012g). The nearest to this of any 
other of the wards in Salford is the Irwell Riverside with an increase of 13.13%, 
demonstrating the disproportionate level of in migration to the area. Interestingly, 
Langworthy saw the biggest population decrease (6.7%) of all Salford wards during the 
same time period, caused by mass demolitions as part of the Housing Market Renewal 
Pathfinder project in that area (1912 demolitions) (ibid). These regeneration projects 
will have changed the face of the local landscape for existing residents considerably.      
What can be seen then in these demographics are uneven levels of affluence and 
deprivation both across the conurbation but also within local wards. Some of the 
changes in population as a result of the regeneration initiatives that have taken place 
have increased these disparities and resulted in a much more proximal unevenness, with 
sites of relative affluence next door to sites of deprivation, especially in Ordsall and 
Langworthy. 
3.4 The move to entrepreneurialism 
Despite the continuing high levels of deprivation in these areas, Salford has seen 
significant amounts of regeneration over the past three decades and has been successful 
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in receiving many of the regeneration funding streams mentioned in the previous 
chapter, including the Single Regeneration Budget from rounds 1,2,3 and 5, New Deal 
for Communities funding and the Housing Market Renewal pathfinders programme 
(Central Salford Urban Regeneration Company 2006). Salford Council has arguably 
embraced the task of securing funding to regenerate the area. It has been reported that 
many Labour controlled councils initially rejected entrepreneurial forms of governance 
and the involvement of private interest groups, with Manchester City Council being one 
of them (Quilley 1999).  
However, Salford, also a Labour constituency, welcomed private sector involvement, so 
long as the Council was not subject to an Urban Development Corporation described in 
the previous chapter (Barlow 1995). The differing responses of Salford and Manchester 
reportedly worked in Salford’s favour when bidding for funding (Henderson et al. 2007). 
Salford established its own regeneration partnership in 1994 called the Salford 
Partnership. Bringing together public and private interests, the Partnership was to 
consolidate and organise regeneration efforts, but with Council leadership. It was 
through the Partnership that bids were created and presented. Over time the 
partnership became more business-like, with contracts being developed, although not 
legally binding, through which all partners agree and commit to set aims (Carley et al. 
2000). This demonstrates how Salford Council began to engage with the entrepreneurial 
style of governance mentioned in the previous chapter, where partnership working and 
private investment work together in an attempt to upgrade the city.   
3.5 Housing Renewal and New Deals 
Central Salford has been the focus of most of Salford Council’s regeneration efforts. Its 
flagship developments sit on the SQ site in Ordsall. Improving the housing in the 
surrounding areas has thus been key for Salford Council. The New Deal for Communities 
(NDC) funding was secured to address neighbourhood decline in several Central Salford 
wards. £59 million was secured in 2001 to regenerate a significantly deprived area 
spanning the boundary between the Irwell Riverside and Kersal wards. At the time the 
NDC was established, the area comprised of over 50% social rented housing. As 
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mentioned in the previous chapter, the aim of the NDC was to draw on assumed strong 
community ties, social capital and individual responsibility to achieve the success of the 
project (Wallace 2007). The idea was that the active community would rehabilitate the 
disengaged or anti-social members in to the normative community way of living. Official 
Evaluation reports of Salford’s NDC programme demonstrated improvements in quality 
of life areas, for example satisfaction with the area, increased feelings of safety and 
lower perceptions of crime and dereliction, but not of economic or market based 
outcomes such as jobs or education (Batty et al. 2010).  
Wallace (2007) conducted a study of the Salford NDC and challenged the very concept 
of strong and active communities. He identified varying levels of conflict within the 
communities themselves. Young people felt over policed in the area, especially due to 
the increased policing initiative as part of the NDC, whereas older people felt under 
policed. Contentions over space occurred, with verbal support for certain initiatives, 
such as youth centres, but refusal from residents to have them within close proximity to 
their homes. Thus, Wallace argues, a singular community voice was not identified. There 
was also conflict between groups of residents seen as incomers and those seen as 
existing residents, for example, tension arose between the resident social housing 
tenants and the incoming home owners. The enforcement of social mixing that the NDC 
encouraged actually served to increase self-segregation; demonstrating that the 
existence of a community has to involve more than simple proximity.  
Salford was one of 9 areas to also receive the Housing Market Renewal (HMR) 
programme funding initiated under the New Labour government, to bring a housing 
market back in to low demand areas in the North of England under its Sustainable 
Communities programme (Leather & Nevin 2013). Working in conjunction with 
Manchester, the Salford HMR programme covered Broughton, Ordsall, Langworthy, 
Irwell riverside and the inner most parts of Kersal, Claremomt and Seedly. The areas 
selected all surround Manchester city centre, presumably to support the increasing 
growth which this area has seen (figure 11) (Audit Comission 2010). Under HMR, 
Broughton (split in to Lower and Higher Broughton) was classified as a major 
intervention area, in which a larger proportion of funds were directed.  
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Figure 11: HMR pathfinder in Salford and Manchester. Source - Audit Commission, 2010 
In Broughton, 1250 homes were demolished under the HMR process and 933 were built. 
In addition to this was the improvement works on 592 properties (Audit Comission 
2010). In Lower Broughton, only a third of the new build properties were purchased by 
existing residents, the rest being from external areas. Undoubtedly this regeneration 
work has contributed to the population increase in the area over the last 10 years. 
Broughton has also seen the highest house price increase of all the Salford wards over 
the last ten years. For houses this increase was over 100% and for apartments it was 
over 500%. In 2010 in had the highest house price to income ratio (7.3) against a Salford 
average of 4.4 (Salford City Council 2012g). These statistics indicate the scale of change 
occurring in this area, and the affordability issues for local residents that this has 
created.  
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The impact of HMR on local communities has been significant. Large scale demolition 
has displaced and disrupted many community networks, leaving people in empty and 
derelict areas or displaced to elsewhere (Power & Houghton 2007). Increased house 
prices have meant many evicted residents are unable to return to their streets having 
been priced out. There have also been considerable local media reports of local people 
being forcibly evicted, periods of stress and the loss of community (The Salford Star 
2010b). According to the Audit Commissions strategic review of the project in Salford, 
unemployment has actually increased and house prices have remained low (Audit 
Comission 2010: 9) 
3.6 Development of Salford Quays 
The SQ development has been the most significant of all the Salford developments. 
Salford Council purchased the majority of Salford docks in 1983, with the other part 
going to private business (Walklate & Evans 1999). This satisfied the government of the 
time’s desire to use Brownfield sites as areas for priority regeneration. From the 
Council’s own admission, there was uncertainty as to what could be done with the dock 
area, so architects who had previously worked on transforming the London Docks were 
commissioned to generate a plan for the area. The main aim of the plan was to transform 
the area so as to “…attract investment and activity of a different kind” (Salford City 
Council 1990: 8). The environment was to be improved, particularly the water ways 
which had suffered when the docks were still in use. The water feature of the area was 
central to the vision of the now named SQ (SQ) development. Housing was also another 
key initiative, particularly private build dwellings for home ownership. The SQ 
development was intended to change the class structure of Salford. The Council wanted 
a new identity for the city, a move away from the manufacturing industry of the old 
docklands (Henderson et al. 2007). New jobs were a necessity for the area due to mass 
unemployment but there was also recognition of needing to attract people with a 
different skills base to the traditional manufacturing industry of the area (Salford City 
Council 1990).  
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The docks area was to be transformed into an area where people could not only live but 
also work, socialise, spend leisure time and consume, recreating the ideal of inner city 
living. The allocation of an Enterprise Zone to cover a large proportion of the docks area 
encouraged businesses to relocate to the area. The economic downturn during the early 
1990s saw interest and development in the area slow. The Council then decided to forge 
ahead with an earlier idea of creating a Centre for Performing Arts, which was granted 
funding from the Lottery Millennium Funding (Henderson et al. 2007). The vision was 
transformed into the Lowry Centre which was opened in 2000. Its opening production 
was the Paris Opera Ballet, symbolically signifying the intended cultural capital of the 
project (Struthers 2003). What can be seen here is the adoption of the creative turn in 
urban regeneration, delivering a flagship cultural product.  
The Lowry project was important to the development of Salford, particularly promoting 
SQ as a new centre for investment. The centre consisted of The Lowry building, the 
Lowry Outlet Mall, the plaza, a Digital World Centre (state of the art facilities for business 
and enterprise) and the Lowry footbridge (linking to neighbouring Trafford and the 
Imperial War Museum (Salford City Council 2008a). The area was transformed, 
consisting of office spaces, new housing/apartments and new leisure facilities, featuring 
2 theatres, an art gallery, cafes, bars, restaurants and an indoor shopping centre (which 
in itself hosts a swimming pool, private gymnasium and a multiplex cinema). The 
regeneration of SQ has put Salford on the map with regards to economic development 
and appears to be Salford Council’s proudest achievement; as Assistant Mayor Derek 
Antrobus stated “It is no exaggeration to say that what has been achieved at SQ 
represents one of the most extraordinary examples of regeneration that the UK has ever 
witnessed” (ibid).  
The SQ development, led by Salford Council has exemplified the shift from Managerial 
to Entrepreneurial governance identified by Harvey (1989). The Council has embraced 
partnership working with private investors to deliver the changes at SQ. The Council 
created an Urban Regeneration Company in 2005, led by private business professionals, 
to take on the delivery of the project and lead on the negotiations with other private 
developers. The development can be seen as speculative in that its success was 
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unknown at the time. Most significantly and in relation to Harvey’s thesis, the SQ 
development was placed based rather than territorially focused. Its intended benefits 
were to move beyond just Salford. The site now is seen to give Salford the competitive 
edge over other cities in England. However, research has suggested that these changes, 
whilst successful with regards to economic development, have had a detrimental impact 
upon the local communities (Raco & Henderson 2006).  
Sentiments of gentrification were raised by the Ordsall community. As the in migration 
of new residents to the area began to increase, so did house prices in the wider Ordsall 
area, leading to fear of displacement (Henderson et al. 2007: 4). Raco and Henderson’s 
(2006) study of the regeneration project in Salford concluded that neither the new SQ 
residents, nor the Ordsall residents felt included in the development process, meaning 
that neither groups have developed a ‘sense of place’ in or about SQ, with a significant 
loss of heritage for those local residents (2006). The visible spectacle of SQ was intended 
to give people a demonstrable aspirational drive, it was intended to be viewed with a 
sense of pride. However, the proximity of these ‘islands of gentrified affluence’ to areas 
of extreme deprivation can actually serve to increase tensions and hostility between 
groups, rather than inspire aspirational thoughts (Jeffery & Jackson 2012).  
3.7 MediaCityUK 
MediaCityUK UK is the latest main development on the SQ site. Whilst the land that 
MediaCityUK was built on is owned by Peel Holdings, a private developer company, 
Salford Council has had significant involvement in the development process, seeing it as 
“…a catalyst to raise the profile of Salford, to raise aspirations and to create job 
opportunities for local residents” (Salford City Council 2014c). It is to serve the needs of 
the creative and digital industries, and comprises of studios, office space, apartments, 
retail and leisure spaces, a private members bar and hotels. The vision for MediaCityUK 
is “To become a leading international hub for the creative and digital sectors, and a 
vibrant destination to work, live and play” (MediaCityUK Manchester 2013). 
MediaCityUK gained most attention when parts of the BBC moved there in 2011. There 
is a whole range of other media and creative businesses there, including a new 
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development by Salford University and ITV have begun their move over to the area. 
Significant continuing development is planned to take place in MediaCityUK over the 
next 20 years, with additional office, residential, retail and leisure functions, and also 
the building of an SQ town centre (The Peel Group 2012b).  
The MediaCityUK development, Christophers (2008) argues is characteristic of a move 
towards attracting the Creative Classes, in which successful urban redesign is not just 
about providing business incentives and infrastructure, but about actively attracting and 
retaining those people who work in the creative industries and providing them with the 
urban lifestyles which they require. Attracting the creative classes, according to Florida 
(2003), is key to becoming a successful competitive city. The creative classes want to live 
in cities which allow them to be creative, to be adventurous and exciting, sites of 
diversity and culture with open leisure spaces, converted mills, coffee shops and 
walkways. Cities need to exhibit ‘the 3 T’s’ of Technology, Talent and Tolerance in order 
to secure the attraction of the creative classes. Creativity is seen as being a specific 
human trait to be developed, which over time can enhance the creativeness of others 
around them. Florida’s thesis has achieved considerable attention and following in 
urban policy and planning across the globe. It has also been subject to much criticism, 
most notably by Peck (2005) who argues that there is a failure by Florida to demonstrate 
how creativity can actually transform into economic growth. More importantly, Peck 
turns his criticism to social inequalities, identifying that existing creative cities are more 
often the most unequal. He argues that the labour divisions in creative cities may be 
necessary to their very existence, “A swelling contingent economy of underlaborers 
may, in fact, be a necessary side-effect of the creatives’ lust for self-validation, 24/7 
engagement, and designer coffee” (p756).  
Christophers (2008) claims that MediaCityUK, and most importantly the BBC move, 
signifies a competitive commitment to establishing the creative class in Salford, but not 
all of Salford, predominantly SQ. Christophers questions who the development is 
intended to benefit, alluding to the fact that most of Salford residents, if they do benefit 
via employment opportunities, will be in the lower paid service sector, echoing Peck’s 
assessment of labour divisions and continuing inequality. Evidence for this can be seen 
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by Salford Councils Business Team, who are responsible for encouraging new businesses 
to move to the area and actually promote the lower than average weekly wages of a 
typical Salford resident as a selling point, “In comparison to other cities, Salford's 
workforce is competitively priced, with the gross weekly earnings at £461.70, lower than 
many other large cities including Liverpool (£485.10) and Manchester (£514.30)” 
(Salford City Council n.d.). This speaks to what MacLeod et al (2003) referred to as the 
promotion of ‘segmented labour markets’ (italics in original) wherein agents attempting 
to sell their cities to potential investors will offer a low-cost and disciplined labour force 
alongside a pool of highly skilled and educated specialists. The authors argue that this 
segmentation, far from being a point of concern, is actually a well celebrated selling 
point. It has been reported that of the 3,172 Salfordian job applicants, only 24 have been 
employed in MediaCityUK (Carter 2012).  
The regeneration that had occurred was intended to improve the reputation and 
perception of Salford that has endured since Engels wrote about it in 1843. The cultural 
construction of Salford has often portrayed it as a rundown slum like area of traditional 
working class heritage, as described in the first chapter. In Ewan MacColl’s song ‘Dirty 
old town’ Salford is depicted as poor and dirty from its smoky industrial base in need of 
knocking down. The song concludes with the lyrics “I’m going to take a good sharp axe, 
Shining steel tempered in the fire, We'll chop you down like an old dead tree, Dirty old 
town, dirty old town”. The goal of the regeneration in SQ has attempted to move away 
from some of these cultural representations of Salford, aiming to promote a more 
modern, safe and affluent lifestyle attractive to incoming middle class groups. 
Interestingly, in a Guardian tribute article to Ewan MacColl the author comments, “today 
one suspects MacColl, far from wanting to “cut down” the place, would be fighting for 
the preservation of its industrial heritage against austerity-era cuts” (Spencer 2015).  
3.8 Budget Priorities 
The austerity measures in place after the 2008 economic recession has forced Local 
Authorities to implement large financial cuts. Local government have seen one of the 
most significant levels of budget reduction of all the public services (Lowndes & 
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Pratchett 2012), meaning that not only do they have to cut back services, but that they 
are more dependent on generating their own revenue streams. Due to this, Salford 
Council has had to impose £40m of savings in 2011/12, £24m in both 2012/13 and 
2013/14, with a potential £40m to be saved over following two years (Salford City 
Council 2013a). Cuts of this magnitude will undoubtedly have a negative effect on an 
area like Salford, which has a low Council Tax income and high levels of deprivation. 
Salford City’s Mayor acknowledged this negative effect, stating; “We've had the near 
impossible task of trying to come up with a scheme that will minimise the impact of the 
cuts on Salford residents and their families. But make no mistake, no matter what 
happens this could make life very difficult for a lot of our residents” (Salford City Council 
2012a).  
The cuts so far have seen 1,200 council job losses, large cuts to children and adult 
services, reduction in street maintenance and refuse services and axing of the area 
based grants, which were a government provision to make up the short fall from lower 
than average Council Tax income (Salford City Council 2011c). The Council has been 
vocally resistant to these cuts which are blamed on the Coalition government and has 
attempted to mitigate the effects by freezing Council tax and introducing the living wage 
for all Council employees. However, whilst these cuts are being felt, the Council is still 
providing significant amounts of money to developments in and around the SQ area 
including, in conjunction with the North West Development Agency, £61 million pounds 
of public funding to Peel Holdings for the development of MediaCityUK (Salford City 
Council 2011a), £20 million pounds over 8 years to the BBC Philharmonic Orchestra 
(Salford City Council 2008c) and £1.23 million on water taxis or ‘Waxi’ to transport 
people from SQ to Manchester City Centre (Brooks-Pollock 2013b). The funding of 
developments like Media City at a time of cuts to public services may cause further 
resentment and disaffection amongst community members who, as has been 
demonstrated by the lack of jobs secured in the SQ area, have not been receiving the 
benefits of these economic investments.       
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3.9 Regional success 
Despite the tensions occurring from the regeneration efforts at the local level, the 
changes in Salford have raised its profile as a growing economic sector. It has witnessed 
12% economic growth since 2004 (Salford City Council n.d.) and it is also of increasing 
importance to the rest of the region. Salford and Manchester have had a long recognised 
rivalry between the cities, with Manchester long being seen as the core city in the region.  
Manchester has seen considerable economic growth post industrialisation, and is 
regarded as 1 of 8 core cities currently driving the English economy (Core Cities 2010). 
In 1972, the entirety of Greater Manchester (10 Local Authorities) was placed under the 
governance of an elected County Council, coordinating the strategic progress of the 
conurbation.  This challenged Manchester’s privileged position as regional leader, as 
decisions were made which benefitted Greater Manchester in general (Hebbert & Deas 
2000). However, the differing needs of each council resulted in conflict and proved 
difficult to manage. In 1985, the Thatcher government, skeptical of big government 
organisations disbanded the County Councils, leaving the 10 Local Councils under their 
own governance, but with a coordinating committee which today remains as the 
Association of Greater Manchester Authorities (AGMA) (Deas & Ward 2002).  
After the dissolving of the Greater Manchester County Council, and with the increasing 
emphasis from the central government for partnership working, particularly to secure 
funding for urban development, Salford Council engaged in partnership working with 
several of the other Greater Manchester Authorities, particularly Manchester. Firstly 
was the creation of City Pride in 1994, a strategy between Manchester, Salford and 
Trafford Councils to coordinate regeneration efforts and increase the competitiveness 
of the centre of Greater Manchester. However, with Manchester as the central driver of 
City Pride, there were suggestions that it was not allocating resources fairly between the 
3 areas (Deas & Ward 2002). Salford and Manchester partnered again during the second 
round of bidding for the Single Regeneration Budget. They were the first cross council 
partnership to receive funding, but again, reports of distrust between councils and a lack 
of individual transparency caused problems (Carley et al. 2000).  
 89 
 
Most crucially to the continued partnership working between Manchester and Salford 
has been the creation of a Regional Centre. This is a designated area comprising parts of 
central Salford, with adjacent areas in Manchester and Trafford. The areas of Salford 
included in the Regional Centre are SQ and Salford University and parts of the waterfront 
development. The more deprived areas in Ordsall are not included (figure 12).  
 
Figure 12: Regional Centre of Salford and Manchester. Source - Manchester City Council. 
The Regional Centre has been designated as the key economic driver of the City Region 
and the wider North West region. It is the priority focus of regeneration initiatives, 
alongside the ‘inner areas’ which surround the Regional Centre, for Salford this being 
Central Salford (Government Office for the North West 2008: 128).  
Salford City is part of the wider North West (NW) Region. The NW region covers the 
geographical areas of Lancashire, Merseyside, Cheshire and Greater Manchester. Under 
New Labour, regions became of significant importance. New Labour decentralised 
power to regions with which they were to decide how national polices are implemented 
and how the region should be taken forward (Pearce & Ayres 2009). This marked a shift 
away from a previous focus on specific cities and their neighbourhoods to a more holistic 
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approach of whole regional development.  The purpose of regional focus was to enable 
strong networks of businesses, entrepreneurial initiatives and a skills base which would 
work together towards a common target to enhance the economic prosperity of the 
region. It was to give a greater strategic focus to the work that individual cities within a 
region were already undertaking and to reduce overlapping organisations that were 
already operating to the same objectives. The overall aim was to ensure a region would 
be able to compete globally with other regions (Jones & MacLeod 2002). European 
countries were already operating within this fashion and the UK regions were in 
competition against them for European funding streams (Webb & Collis 2000).  
The developments in Salford are being promoted as key to the overall North West 
strategy, specifically MediaCityUK. In the Future North West: Our Shared Priorities 
document produced by the North West Regional Development Agency in 2010, 
MediaCityUK is one of the key priorities for diversifying the economic base of the region 
and is also the site of developing an internationally recognised digital and creative 
industry (Northwest Regional Development Agency 2010). Interesting is that whilst 
MediaCityUK holds a prominent position with regards to future economic success, this 
particular document makes no reference to Salford, compared to 67 references to 
Manchester. The term ‘Manchester’ in most regional documents is used to refer to 
Salford as will be seen below, and this has received negative responses from local media, 
who skeptically view the advancing SQ and University as becoming parts of Manchester 
rather than Salford (The Salford Star 2011). Reasons for this include SQ being renamed 
‘The Quays’, dropping Salford altogether and Salford University recently rebranding to 
become ‘The University of Salford Manchester’. Most recently the governments latest 
proposals to reduce its number of parliamentary constituencies by redrawing 
boundaries have redrawn the Manchester city centre constituency to take over parts of 
Central Salford, specifically SQ and the University (BBC News 2011a). Whilst the 
perceived loss of identity for Salford residents is a source of contention, Salford Council 
planning professionals do not appear to share the same concerns, “we have become 
more relaxed about parts of Salford being described as “Manchester” in some quarters 
– I think this is a sign of confidence” (Findley 2009).     
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3.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a case study assessment of Salford and the changes in 
urbanisation that have taken place over several decades. It has provided an outline of 
the main regeneration projects that have occurred and their intended and actual 
outcomes. What the above has shown is that SQ has grown in profile and significance 
for a much wider area than its own juridical boundaries. Salford Council is now in the 
position of having to deliver regeneration benefit to not only its residents but also to a 
regional and potentially European economy. However, the success of these 
developments rests on attracting investment and increasing the wealth of the 
residential base. This may be hindered by the high levels of deprivation which continues 
to surround SQ.  
The skills gap between many Salford residents and the emerging economy of media and 
financial services is seen as a barrier to attracting investment (New Economy 2010). It is 
thus crucial to Salford Council that neighbourhood regeneration efforts, including 
education and training, are successful. However, as it has been seen, initiatives like the 
NDC and HMR have not provided the intended benefits of reducing deprivation. Nor 
have the SQ developments served to reduce worklessness. The conflicting demands of 
both the local (in terms of social need) and the regional (in terms of economic need) 
may cause the resident communities to be seen as an obstacle to be overcome if the SQ 
benefits are to be delivered.  
Whilst Salford Council is being subjected to intense levels of austerity, forcing it to slash 
public services, it is continuing a regeneration programme that requires drawing in 
significant private investment. The Council has demonstrated entrepreneurialism in 
working with the private sector to drive regeneration. The creation of the Central Salford 
Urban Regeneration Company to lead on the Lowry development is indicative of this, as 
is the Council’s continual working relationship and financial investment to Peel Holdings 
for the MediaCityUK development. However, Salford still suffers from high levels of 
deprivation and significant unevenness across the city, even within close proximity. It is 
likely that the recent policy changes which promote a growth agenda will exacerbate 
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this unevenness by channeling investment in to areas like SQ over some of the proximal 
areas of decline. 
The remainder of this thesis will present a more thorough examination of the 
regeneration of Central Salford through qualitative interviews with policy developers 
behind the regeneration projects that have been identified within this chapter. These 
interviews will seek to understand from these participants’ perspectives how these 
changes have taken place and their intention. It will also bring these perspectives in to 
dialogue with some of Salford’s local residents and community representatives to offer 
a multiplicity of perspectives. In the chapter that follows I will outline the main research 
questions and the methodology that was used to collect the data to answer these 
questions. It will specify who was interviewed and the data that was gathered, before I 
move on to an exploration of the themes that emerged throughout the data in the 
empirical chapters.          
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4. Research Methodology 
The following chapter will outline the methodology employed for the delivery of this 
thesis. Ultimately it will attempt to document how I translated my research problem into 
an empirical fieldwork strategy. I will begin by outlining the research aim and the key 
research questions that underpin this as informed by my initial literature review. I will 
then go on to provide an audit of the data gathering and analysis process with some 
reflections on why this process was undertaken and the advantages and potential 
disadvantages of this process. By the end of the chapter the aim is that the reader will 
have a clear understanding of the empirical research process that was undertaken.  
4.1 Research focus 
After having conducted some preliminary literature research and having spent time in 
Salford observing some of the changes that had occurred I was primarily interested in 
understanding the uneven spatial disparity that had emerged. I was interested in trying 
to understand the decision making process that lay behind the physical and economic 
outcome of the regeneration process up to this point in time across Central Salford. My 
interest lay predominately with the decision makers as opposed to the impact on 
residents per se. There were two reasons for this. Firstly, I kept coming back to a central 
question of inquiry which was ‘how has this transition occurred’? I felt that this question 
could only be answered by those people involved in the decision making process. 
Secondly, I was guided by previous research in urban policy which had highlighted the 
role of the central state and the local state in regeneration practices and called for a 
closer understanding of how practices were embedded differently in different places 
and at different times. As Fuller (2012) argues we need to pay much more attention to 
how spaces are governed and how they are shaped in different ways through the 
negotiation of crucial mediators. By focusing on this decision making at a local state level 
we can understand better how Salford has had the specific outcomes that it has. 
The overall aims of the research project were to; 
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 Understand, from the experiences of those involved in making the decisions, 
how the regeneration in Salford had come to be materially manifest in the ways 
that it had, and to explore the ways in which the regeneration outcomes were 
designed, implemented, negotiated and legitimised by those same people. 
 To draw on this case study to develop an understanding of the wider changes 
taking place within the politics of urban economic development   
The specific research questions that underpinned these aims are as follows: 
 What is the purpose of regeneration in Salford according to those responsible 
for making the decisions? 
 What role does the local government play in urban regeneration and what does 
it tell us about its priorities? 
 How do state and non-state actors engage to deliver regeneration at a local level 
and what is the impact of this for democratic accountability? 
 In what ways can we see regeneration moving away from a process based on 
spatially targeted need towards the delivery of economic growth? 
 Does a growth consensus within the urban political landscape foreclose 
alternative options for development? 
 How can we conceptualise the politics that take place behind urban economic 
development? 
The following is an account and justification for how I went about answering the 
specified research questions as detailed in the introduction.  
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4.2 Selecting the study area 
 
 
The primary focus of this thesis is Central Salford. The reason I have chosen to focus 
most heavily on Central Salford is that it has been the site in Salford where most of the 
regeneration programmes have taken place. It is described as different from the 
westerly parts of Salford due to the western wards being included later within Salford 
city boundaries and is often referred to by local residents as ‘old Salford’, signifying its 
more traditional or original status (Walklate & Evans 1999). Central Salford has 
significantly higher levels of deprivation than West Salford, which is considerably 
affluent in parts, and had been seen to be more in need of regeneration projects (Salford 
City Partnership 2012d). Its geographical location is beneficial from a place-making point 
of view as it borders Manchester City Centre and parts of Central Salford make up the 
‘Regional Centre’ with inner city Manchester. It incorporates both the river Irwell and 
SQ, both key features of flagship regeneration projects. An Urban Regeneration 
Company was created in 2006 to deal specifically with the Central Salford area and the 
Figure 13: Case study area – Central Salford. Source - Salford City Council 
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whole of Central Salford was targeted for regeneration within the Central Salford Vision 
and Regeneration Framework 2005.  Whilst West Salford became the subject of a 
regeneration framework in 2008, it does not have the same history of regeneration 
programmes as does Central Salford, nor does it have the same high profile areas or 
suffer from the same levels of deprivation. Thus Central Salford was chosen as the area 
to focus on for this research and the data that were gathered was in relation to the 
development programmes occurring in this specific locale. This research then is a case 
study of Central Salford. It can be defined as a case study in that Central Salford is the 
specific unit of analysis and all data gathered will be in relation to this unit for the 
purposes of a close examination of this area (Bryman 2012).  
The limitations most often levelled at case study research are that they are practical and 
context dependent and thus not as valuable as theoretical and context independent 
knowledge; not generalizable to other cases; only useful for initial stage hypothesis 
generating rather than theory building; open to verification bias; and difficult to 
summarise as they are so specific (Flyvbjerg 2006). However, Flyvberg (2006) goes on to 
argue that case studies can to an extent be useful for generalising as they enable a closer 
understanding of commonly held beliefs and views and challenge what we take as 
universal. This also helps with issues of verification bias. The case study, Flyvberg argues, 
is no more subject to verification bias than any other methodology, but in fact with the 
case study the researcher is more able to challenge commonly held beliefs that verify 
them. With regards the difficulties of summarising what can be difficult and complex 
case studies, Flyvberg advises instead of a summary, “Good studies should be read as 
narratives in their entirety” (italics in original, p241). This is certainly an approach that I 
intend to take during my thesis. I would like to present a full narrative highlighting the 
socio-historical changes that regeneration has taken over time.  
One element of the case study that I have found to be a challenge was in regards to 
naming the specific location of my case study area. Walford (2005) has argued that it is 
generally accepted as standard ethical practice that anonymity should be provided for 
participants and research sites. However, he also argues that this is not always necessary 
and that actually anonymity may encourage researchers to be more generalizable and 
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vague about context specific facts and details. I have not anonymised my research site 
because I feel that the context specific elements of it are key to the analysis. However, 
this raised certain ethical dilemmas. I selected and accessed my participants through the 
publicly available documentation and the availability of individuals’ names and job titles 
online. I was keen to offer confidentiality and anonymity to my participants. But I was 
also aware that if I identified Salford by name then others who followed the same 
research route as myself may be able to not directly identify but narrow down to a group 
of possible individuals who my research participants may be. This meant that it would 
have been ethically problematic to offer full anonymity to my research participants 
(Walford 2005). Instead I informed the participants in the information sheet and consent 
form that I would be naming the area but that their names would still be anonymised.       
Of course, there are those who are critical of the notion of ‘default anonymity’ for 
research participants (Kelly 2009). There is an assumption in ethical guidance from 
institutions such as the British Sociological Association and the Economic and Social 
Research Council that anonymity will be offered, but with little rationale as for why this 
may be the case (Moore 2012).  It has been argued that anonymity is difficult to 
guarantee in practice given the interactive nature of the research process (Walford, 
2005). It has also been argued that it only acts as a form of protection from harm when 
the participants do not object to what is being written or if what is being written about 
is too trivial to arouse a response (Nespor 2000). Critics have instead suggested a 
negotiated or situated process of offering anonymity, rather than a blanket approach, 
where by those participants who do not want anonymity do not have it imposed upon 
them (Moore 2012).  
On a few occasions during my research several participants suggested that I could 
publish their names in full without anonymising them. I believe this was because some 
of my participants are used to being in the public eye and providing interviews and 
comments on public matters and are themselves publicly accountable. This has not been 
done however, and all participants have been anonymised. The reason for this choice 
was that by identifying or ‘naming’ some participants it could narrow down even further 
to those participants who did seem more favourable towards anonymity. As Moore 
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(2012) argues, offering some of the participants anonymity “… is a zero-sum situation—
what one side gets by way of accommodation, the other must lose—because part-
anonymity cannot guarantee any anonymity for those who need it” (emphasis in 
original: 440).  
4.3 Identifying ‘key players’ 
Interview matrix Mode of interview  
Type of participant Face to Face Telephone Email  Total 
Elected Official 4   1 5 
Council Employee 9  1  10 
Private Property 
Developer 2 1  3 
Third Sector Officer 2   1 3 
Planning Professional 1   1 
Community 
representative 5     5 
Police Officer 2  1 3 
    30 
Table 1: Interview matrix identifying participants interviewed and method of interview 
My interviews were conducted with people I identified as being ‘key players’ (Hajer 
2006) in the field of regeneration in Salford i.e. people who were in positions of power 
or able to influence decision making that shaped the form of regeneration in Salford. 
This included people involved in property development at key regeneration sites. But 
more so I was interested in the role of the Local Authority and how policy was enacted 
by it. Blanco et al. (2014) have argued that a limitation amongst accounts of 
 99 
 
neoliberalism and its effects on urbanisation is that it often neglects the role of the local 
state in implementing ‘neoliberal meta-narratives’. This implementation of the macro 
to the micro engenders spatial variations in urbanisation and results in a ‘’messiness’ of 
local urban politics and practice’ (p3131). It is this ‘messiness’ that I am interested in, or 
more specifically how regeneration as a national policy has taken the specific form that 
it has at this local level. In Massey's (1994) terms, it is about generating an understanding 
of how the ‘specificity and uniqueness’ of a place has been created or ‘articulated’ 
through the interactions of networks of particular people (p117).  
In research terms these ‘key players’ are often referred to as local ‘elites’. The term elite 
is difficult to define and will inevitably mean different things to different people 
dependent on the subject matter in question. An elite in one situation may not be 
considered as such, or may not consider themselves as such in another. Woods (1998) 
argues the term ‘elite’ is often “employed largely as a short-hand term for those actors 
who are in some way perceived to be more powerful or more privileged than some 
undefined other group” (p2101). For Woods, then, the concept is often problematic and 
ill-defined but generally it is relational in that it refers to a person in a position of power 
as measured against someone else e.g. someone is a member of an elite only in 
comparison to someone who is not. Inevitably then that same logic also applies within 
groups of people who are considered to be ‘elite’, in that there will also be power 
differentials amongst themselves.  
Cochrane (1998) argues that the definition of local elites in research is often taken at 
face value i.e. taken to be someone in a position of seniority within an organisation, but 
that this assumption lacks sophistication. He argues that being in a position of standing 
in ceremonial terms within an organisation does not automatically mean you are in a 
position of influence. Nor does it include all those who are in a position of influence 
because, as Cochrane states, “Not only is there an absence of businesspeople, but the 
use of such starting points also frequently fails to reflect the full extent of power 
relations within the local welfare-state regimes (including, for example, the range of 
health-related agencies and major voluntary or not-for-profit agencies, such as housing 
associations)” (p2127).  Elites exist then not as a designated group but as network 
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members and are relational and dynamic. They change over time and some may be 
considered an ‘elite’ by definition of position but may not occupy the same key relations 
or networks that give them the power (Woods 1998).  
However, I was also interested in people who occupied positions that enabled them to 
be engaged or a party to the decision making processes but also with links to the 
residents and able to see how these decisions take shape on the ground. This included 
for example Neighbourhood Managers of specific regeneration areas and local third 
sector officers responsible for making employment links between local residents and the 
emerging businesses. This also included local policing teams with knowledge of the 
changing neighbourhood environments. I also was also interested in local residents who 
had involvement with regeneration decision making from regeneration boards and 
committees and residents involved in affected Social Housing Trusts.  
The sampling framework used to identify my participants was to systematically target 
each organisational area that I was interested in, specifically;  
 private developers operating within the regeneration areas in Salford;  
 the regeneration teams working for Salford Council responsible for the different 
projects;  
 locally elected councilors responsible for the regenerated areas;  
 professionals responsible for planning within Salford;  
 the Urban Regeneration Corporation;  
 local third sector trusts responsible for skills and work;  
 council business team responsible for securing investment; and  
 Local policing teams.        
These participants were identified through careful assessment of the council website 
and organisational charts, Council documents, key Council policy texts, local 
regeneration frameworks and media sources. The purpose of identifying people through 
this method was to try and determine the networks of regeneration practitioners. 
Seeing the same names or organisations appear across the documentation gives a good 
indication of relevant ‘key players’ by identifying those who are routinely exercising their 
power (Woods 1998). From these searches several names became apparent as either 
taking the lead or playing a role in certain urban developments. There was also an 
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element of ‘snowball sampling’ to the identification of my ‘key players’ (Bryman 2012). 
Through this sampling method I was able to identify other relevant participants as 
mentioned to me by other research participants.    
4.4 Making contact and gaining access 
For those participants operating in the public sector as officers or elected officials 
contact was made in the first instance through email. Due to the nature of their 
professional positions the participants had an online presence with contact details 
available and so I was able to make contact directly. From the research that I had done 
prior I had got a sense that many of the people I approached already had some 
familiarity with giving press interviews and some academic interviews, particularly with 
regards SQ and the BBC. I felt that this timing (the second half of 2013) benefitted me in 
gaining access considerably as MediaCityUK was such a dominating presence within 
Salford at that time. It actually felt on occasion during my interviews that the 
opportunity was being taken to demonstrate an individual’s involvement in this 
regeneration ‘success’. In fact, as one of my participants expressed, 
“They say you can judge the success of a project by the number of people 
who claim credit for it. I think every [practitioner] has put on their CV that 
they were responsible for the development of Salford Quays, and I’m sure 
that’s a good sign” (1 – Elected official) 
Ward & Jones (1999) argue that access to a political institution will not just be open or 
closed dependent on the organisation or the individual but will also need to take account 
of the ‘temporal variations in the mode of entry’ (p306, italics in original). Whilst for 
some researchers this temporality of political sensitivity may hinder access (see 
Desmond 2004), my experience suggested it may have emboldened it in that people 
were keen to discuss the significance of what was currently taking place. Interestingly 
however, in September 2014, Salford Council ratified an ‘Employee code of conduct’ in 
which it was stated to employees that “You must not make any statements to the media, 
or any other public statement which concerns the business of the Council, unless you 
have been authorised to do so” (Salford City Council 2014a) (p7). This code of conduct 
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suggests a closing of the research field. Whilst it is impossible to know for certain, there 
is a possibility that were I to conduct my research again, gaining access to these 
participants may be significantly more difficult. Where I failed to gain access to these 
participants it was often those interview requests where I had to go through a gate 
keeper (for example a Personal Assistant or Public Relations team). If all my interviews 
had to be secured through a gate keeper such as a service head my experience may have 
been very different. The above quote and its implications for the foreclosure of available 
information highlight this temporal nature of access.   
I secured fifteen interviews with public sector officers and elects (see matrix above - 
table 1). There was one participant that I was particularly focused on that did not 
respond to my requests but due to their high profile nature within the regeneration field 
they had conducted several publicly accessible interviews and written several articles on 
their involvement in regeneration which I have drawn on to supplement this gap. This 
person will be fully referenced when used and not anonymised like the interview data 
gathered by the researcher. Whilst not ideal, it does still allow for an insight that I would 
not have otherwise had.   
Where access did become more of an issue was with private developers. Three 
interviews were conducted with private sector participants and whilst one in particular 
was particularly important in relation to the high profile nature of the organisation they 
worked for, it would have been preferable to access more. One of the problems was an 
inability to obtain an individual person’s contact information. More often than not I 
would be directed through a website with an automated online query form in which to 
input my request for an interview. This made it difficult to specifically target an 
individual or to direct my inquiry to a particular team. There were occasions where no 
response was given or I received a policy statement that the organisation did not 
participate in academic research. On one occasion I entered into an email conversation 
with a developer who provided me with interesting information, but would not commit 
to an interview or sign a consent form.  
Whilst I felt that I had made contact with the ‘key players’, there is a very real possibility 
that I had missed some people from the pool of potential participants. If we take Woods 
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(1998) assertion that elites exist within and because of the networks that they are a part 
of, then it is important to consider the possibility that there will be other people in those 
networks that exert influence over the decision making in Salford that are not 
identifiable from the conversations I had or the literature and documentation that I have 
access to. Parry (1998) argues that elite networks may include invisible and informal 
members who are disparate and unable to be identified. It is likely that this is the case 
in Salford. With that limitation in mind I tried to follow up on all the names of individuals 
that were mentioned during the interviews I conducted. Thus this thesis is not claiming 
that it is fully representative of all ‘key players’ involved in Salford’s regeneration. 
However, it does account for the views of those most significant within the locality at a 
developer and Local Authority level.     
In addition to the participants identified above I also interviewed three professionals 
who occupied key positions in local third sector organisations. These people had a remit 
of lowering local deprivation and assisting with local employment and skills. Their names 
were mentioned through conversations with key players as being engaged with the 
regeneration process at a local level in trying to improve the chances of local residents 
in benefitting from the jobs created through regeneration. I also interviewed five 
participants who were actual residents who were either actively engaged with a 
regeneration scheme or were members of a tenant organisation in the regeneration 
areas. I also interviewed three local police officers in one of the more unevenly 
developed areas of Central Salford as I was interested in the requirement of 
regeneration programmes in lowering the crime rate in particular high crime areas 
(included in the matrix as ‘Public Sector Officers’). I was also interested in the dynamics 
between the incoming residents and the indigenous residents. These participants were 
all accessed through direct email as their details were publicly accessible due to their 
involvement with local regeneration schemes, except for two who I was put in contact 
with through a public sector policy officer using a snowball sampling method (Bryman 
2012).   
Whilst these eleven particular participants were loosely associated with the networks of 
elites described above, they were not within the network. Nor did they have access to 
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the same level of resources through which to exert power or influence. They arguably 
did not meet the same sample requirements as those participants mentioned above. 
However, it seemed important to speak with these people as it felt necessary to hear 
from people who were experiencing the outcome of some of these urban policy 
decisions. Hearing from people who resided in these areas or who were engaged with 
the regeneration process as a resident allowed me to bring their views and experiences 
in to dialogue with the claims and statements made by some of the ‘key players’ 
mentioned above. This was particularly important where the issue of jobs was 
concerned as some of these third sector institutions were used to bridge the gap 
between emerging jobs and unemployed residents and it was important to gain 
alternative perspectives on that. These participants allowed for a multiplicity of voices 
to be heard rather than to rely on a homogenous narrative.  This idea is informed by 
Massey (2005) who understands space to be the ‘sphere in which distinct trajectories 
coexist’ (p9). For Massey space is constitutive of the existence of multiplicity and it is 
through the interrelation of this plurality that any space is constructed as it is at that 
point in time. Thus for this research it felt important to expose some of this multiplicity 
and speak with people who are experiencing regeneration through multiple ways. It is 
not to claim that these participants represent the views of all third sector organisations 
or all local residents, but that in speaking to these people it can offer another layer of 
understanding to the complexity of regeneration in central Salford at a local level.        
In addition, and before I interviewed anyone, I conducted four ‘Helicopter interviews’ 
(not included in the matrix). These are, according to Hajer (2006) interviews with 
particular people who have a broad overview of the research field. In this instance these 
participants were a local journalist, two academics with good knowledge of the research 
area and a local government policy maker. These interviews were for general guidance 
and information only. The interviews were not recorded and the data was not 
incorporated in my data analysis in any substantive manner. The purpose was to gain 
some insight and clarify some of the points and themes. These interviews helped 
structure the focus of my subsequent formal interviews and were very helpful.  
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4.5 Semi-Structured interviews  
All face-to-face interviews were audio-recorded except for one where notes were made 
instead. The interviews were semi-structured and aided by a list of topics, rather than 
specific questions to be asked so as to allow for emerging issues during the course of 
the interview (see appendix B) (Bryman 2012). Whilst the topics were consistent across 
interviews, the specific focus would vary depending on the specificity of the particular 
interviewee. For example a private developer would be asked about their specific 
development project, but the overarching themes would be consistent in asking about 
their links to regeneration, partnership working, social impact and local contributions. 
The interviews were flexible and allowed room for manoeuvre but were focused on 
deciphering how the participant framed and defined the issues raised and the intended 
solutions that regeneration delivered.  
When conducting qualitative interviews it is important to consider the researcher-
researched relationship and its dynamics. This is particularly important when 
interviewing elites as there tends to be a power asymmetry in which the ‘researcher is 
dependent on the cooperation of a relatively small number of people with specialized 
knowledge’ (Desmond 2004, p265). Schoenberger (1991) argues that when conducting 
interviews with elites the usual dynamic of the researcher leading and being in control 
of the interview agenda is reversed. In this situation it is the respondent who is 
accustomed to having the control and authority over an interview situation. The 
potential problem therein is that the interviewee shapes or directs the questions 
towards their own agenda and away from the particulars as set out by the researcher. 
Thus is it important for the researcher to consider their own approach to the interview 
and the interviewee in question. The researcher needs to make sure they do not become 
too deferential depending on the status of the interviewee (Richards 1996). It also needs 
to be acknowledged that the interviewee may be more or less willing to give information 
away to a researcher depending on who that researcher is. As Sabot (1999) discovered, 
one elite interviewee could have a ‘Dr Jekyl and Mr H(i)de’ persona depending on 
whether or not they trust or support the individual researcher.  
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My own research approach was fairly consistent. I was conscious not to be controlling 
with the topic guide as I was interested in allowing the interviewee to guide the 
narrative, choose their own discourse and define their own terms. This was equally so 
for the interviews with the ‘key players’ as it was for the interviews with the community 
facing participants. Of course, there were times when I had to steer the conversation 
back on to the topic at hand, but again this issue was not exclusive to the ‘key players’. 
McDowell (1998) raises the question as to whether we as researchers should present 
ourselves as ‘experts or ignoramuses’. What she means is how much should we indicate 
that we already know about the research subject and how much should we present our 
own beliefs about the situation. For my own persona I was somewhat in-between expert 
and ignoramus. This position was not a deliberate cultivation of a research persona but 
a genuine position in which I had knowledge of a range of regeneration policy and 
practice in Salford but I was not aware of all of the detail or the perspective of those 
involved. I acknowledged where I knew what was being discussed and asked when I did 
not.  
With regards to presenting my own beliefs about the situation, this was more difficult. 
Whilst my primary goal of the interview was to identify the key players involvement in 
regeneration in Salford and their perspectives of it, I also needed to ask questions about 
some of the more negative elements of regeneration, for example the reports over the 
lack of jobs for local residents, issues of  displacement, housing demolition and 
undeveloped clearance sites. These questions were harder to ask and at times met with 
some hostility. But as Harvey (2011) acknowledges, asking difficult questions is a 
challenge for all interviews, not just with elites. However, elites may have more 
experience of answering these questions or finding ways to avoid them. For my own 
interviews I felt that on occasion I was getting a well-practiced response to a sometimes 
pre-empted question. On other occasions the responses were much vaguer. On 
reflection, I think I could have been more upfront about the need, as part of the 
interview, to tackle some of the more difficult and uncomfortable issues. Ostrander 
(1993) suggests that researchers should take this more direct approach and expose the 
awkwardness around it,  
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“It is helpful to acknowledge that their discomfort is not inappropriate, 
that I am in fact asking questions that might not be considered “polite”.” 
(p24).         
4.6 Secondary documents 
In conjunction with the interviews conducted, a systematic analysis of planning and 
regeneration documentation was undertaken. The majority of this data was gathered 
through the Salford City Council website. The first stage was a comprehensive search of 
the Councils Housing, Planning and Regeneration pages. Within these pages are a host 
of informative documents that establish the Councils Local Development Framework for 
planning and development. The cities Local Development Framework is comprised of 
Development Plan Documents (Statutory documents) and Supplementary Planning 
Documents (non-statutory documents). These documents, where relevant to the study, 
formed the initial body of secondary data for analysis and can be seen in the table below 
(see figure 14). In addition to these were the Central Salford Regeneration Framework 
developed by the Salford Urban Regeneration Company and Salford Councils most 
recent strategic vision ‘Salford 2025: A Modern Global City’.  
In addition to these documents information was also gathered from Salford Council’s 
Core Strategy, which is a repository of over 500 documents which make up the strategy 
and the supporting evidence. Importantly this repository includes consultation 
documents on development that detail the feedback comments from private developers 
and local stakeholders and responses to those comments from the Council. It also 
includes notes taken from core strategy hearing sessions that minuted the discussions 
that took place over Salford’s strategy and the main agents within these discussions. 
This is especially important for analysing decision making and questions of 
depoliticisation, as demonstrated in the introductory chapter. Similarly, I undertook 
analysis and constant monitoring of certain relevant council meetings and committees, 
including the ‘Regeneration Briefing’ and ‘Regeneration Scrutiny Committee’. Both 
meetings took place would include reports submitted to the committee on timely 
regeneration issues. The Regeneration Scrutiny Committee would also include minutes 
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from each previous meeting detailing discussions that had taken place in relation to that 
meeting’s agenda.  
  
Figure 14: Overview of main documents analysed 
Local Development Framework 
Development Plan Documents 
 City of Salford Unitary 
Development Plan 
 Lower Broughton Design 
Code 
 
 Design and Crime 
 
 Planning Obligations 
Supplementary-planning documents 
(SPD) 
 Housing  SPD 
 The Exchange Greengate  SPD 
 MediaCity and Quays point  SPD 
 Salford Central  SPD 
 Irwell City Park SPD 
 Ordsall Riverside SPD 
 Pendleton SPD 
 Shaping Salford, Design SPD 
 Shaping Central Salford’s Spaces and 
Places SPD 
 The Crescent SPD 
Other notable documents: 
 Central Salford Regeneration Framework 
 Salford 2025: A Modern Global City 
 Salford Core Strategy 
Meetings of significant contribution to analysis: 
 Regeneration Briefing 
 Regeneration Scrutiny Committee 
 Full Council Meeting 
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Attention was also paid to the full monthly Council meeting which also provided meeting 
minutes, including a section on questions and comments by council members and 
questions from members of the public. This allowed for analysis of the decision making 
processes and the conflicting positions within the Council and in relation to wider 
political changes. For example, the minutes for the 18th September 2013 included a 
question raised by a Council member regarding decision to grant a planning application 
on greenbelt land. The response from the Assistant Mayor for Strategic Planning 
highlighted the National Planning Policy Framework as favouring private developers and 
‘outweighing’ any Local Authority opposition (Salford City Council 2013b).  Here we can 
see the appearance of a fatalistic ‘no alternative’ approach to planning. Again, these 
sources of information were valuable for creating a body of data that allowed for a post-
political analysis, demonstrating the decision making processes that underpin the more 
formal planning documents also under analysis (the specifics of this analysis is detailed 
in the following section).    
Documents are useful for analysis in that they can illuminate how a discourse is 
manufactured and how it may serve a function (Prior 2003).  Atkinson & Coffey (2005) 
argue that documents are not reflections of an objective reality but are an organisation’s 
constructed reality. The authors state that documents are designed to represent an 
organisation or a subject matter in a particular way and in order to accomplish 
something. For this research then, I used the more formal planning documents to gauge 
the intended outputs and end points of the regeneration programmes. I also used 
documents to gain insight in to how Salford is being constructed through them in a 
productive and active sense. This is particularly relevant for this research when trying to 
ascertain how Salford is being changed and how this change is being enacted. The 
decision making process was analysed through the consultation documentation and the 
meeting minutes identified above. These helped to gauge how a consensual growth 
mentality was emerging over time. Of course, documents do not capture all of the 
decision making that takes place outside of these organised meetings and documented 
events. They can never capture fully the engagement that precedes before them. 
However, documents do serve to add to our understanding of a situation, they generate 
a narrative of events, they ‘order the events and produce them anew’ (Prior 2003: 93).    
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Whilst the Council site was a generally good resource, there were some reports and 
parts of meetings that were closed to the public. This was particularly the case with 
regeneration documents and data relating to partnerships. This ‘closed to the public’ 
happened occasionally within some meetings; however during the beginning of 2015 
the Council put up a notification that it would apply closures more widely for certain 
meetings. The ‘Regeneration Briefing’ was one such meeting. Now every regeneration 
briefing meeting will include a section where the public and the press are excluded from 
taking part. This reinforces Ward & Jones (1999) in their discussion of the temporality of 
entry to research information. Since my research began, access to information from 
Salford Council appears to have become harder to obtain. There has been a foreclosure 
of accessible information. This has caused me to reflect on my own research as the 
product of data that I have been able to gain access to and the implication of further 
closing the research field (Bryman 2012).    
4.7 Data analysis 
My interviews were on average an hour long, with some being as short as 40 minutes 
and some being as long as two hours. I began transcribing my interviews using 
transcription software called ‘Express Scribe’. I also utilised the services of a professional 
transcriber. My data was analysed using NVivo, a qualitative data analysis software 
package that allows users to, amongst other things, code data in to themes and 
categories (Bazeley & Jackson 2013). Of course the software itself is just a tool to 
organise the researcher’s analysis. The construction and direction of the analysis comes 
from the researcher and will be informed by both the data but also the prior knowledge 
and theoretical understanding held by the researcher and shaped by the questions 
asked (Ryan & Bernard 2003). For my data analysis I took a reflexive approach in which 
I allowed themes to emerge from a close reading of the text. Themes in this context are 
categories that are identified by the researcher through their data which relate to the 
research focus/question and that builds on the codes identified through the analysis 
process which allows for a theoretical understanding of that data (Bryman 2012). 
Thematic analysis in my research was conducted by firstly reading through all the 
transcripts and field notes generated through the data collection stage. Once this had 
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been done and several common features began to emerge, I used NVivo to generate 
codes; which are the labels attached to text.  
To begin with my codes were a mixture of descriptive (e.g. specific mention of 
partnership) and topical/thematic (e.g. discussion of working with the private sector). 
My initial coding approach took the form of a ‘splitter’ (lots of codes looking for fine 
grained themes) as opposed to a ‘lumper’ (fewer overarching themes) (Ryan & Bernard 
2003, p95). The result of this was that many codes were created. Using NVivo then I was 
able to cluster together some of these codes in to hierarchical tree-structures. These 
hierarchies resulted from considering and developing an overarching analytical concept 
that the codes all identified with (Bazeley & Jackson 2013). Below (figure 15) is an 
example of where codes were created in the first instance and then recoded in to higher 
levels of themes. In the example below there was often reference to generating growth 
which I had coded initially as ‘Growth creation’. This then was recoded within a theme 
that referred to the general notion of being driven by the market. I called this code 
‘Being market led – proactive’ as there was also a theme of ‘Being market led – resistant’. 
However, both of these, amongst others, were eventually recoded under an analytical 
theme of ‘Normalising private growth’ which referred to the normalisation of a growth 
agenda as a regeneration practice. I came to this overarching theme after the initial 
coding process in which I considered what it was that all these themes were speaking to 
and what was linking them together. A normalising process seemed to be at work 
amongst the discourses that I had gathered. 
 
Figure 15: Example of authors coding hierarchy 
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As mentioned above, these themes were not objectively data driven but were shaped 
in part by the literature that I had already read up to this point. This then raises the 
question of validity. How can I know as a researcher that my themes are valid and not 
purely verification bias? As Ryan & Bernard (2003, p104) highlight there is no ‘ultimate 
demonstration of validity’ and different researchers will undoubtedly identify different 
themes to one another. There are two things that Ryan and Bernard identify can be done 
to make validity more likely. The first is to be clear about what judgements have been 
made about the data throughout the research. If it is made clear what is an inference 
rather than a fact then the reader is able to refute these claims if they so wish. The 
second is ‘intercoder agreement’. This is where several researchers agree on a coding 
framework. As this was an individual project with only one researcher then this was not 
possible. However, discussions I had with my thesis advisors could be seen to be acting 
in this manner. Ultimately, I will rely on making my judgements clear and provide 
enough detail of quotes and context to allow the reader the scope to question these 
judgements as they see fit.    
Discourse analysis also influenced my data analysis method for both the interview and 
the documents identified above. This was informed by prior research on urban policy 
that used discourse analysis as a methodology (see for example Jacobs 2006; Lees 2004; 
Atkinson 1999; Hastings 2000). In particular I was interested in using discourse analysis 
to identify ‘how a narrative constructs a particular problem’ (Hajer 2006, p66) and how 
solutions are also legitimised using this same construction. This enabled me to focus on 
answering my research questions, in particular:  
 What is the purpose of regeneration in Salford according to those responsible for 
making the decisions? 
 What are the perceived benefits of regeneration in Central Salford and who are the 
perceived beneficiaries?   
 How is the outcome of regeneration legitimised by those responsible for its occurrence? 
There has been what Lees (2004) calls a ‘discursive turn’ amongst urban researchers 
who have moved towards discourse analysis as a method of understanding language as 
producing particular courses of action. Jacobs (2006) offers two reasons for this 
discursive turn. Firstly, he argues that discourse analysis allows us to uncover the role 
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that power and ideology plays in decision making amongst key players and organisation 
structures. Secondly, focusing on language gives researchers a more thorough insight in 
to how particular policy objectives are perused by organisations in the comments and 
documentation they produce.  
For post-structuralists, language is not simply a tool for communicating through which 
our understanding of an objective reality is shared, but rather language is the 
mechanism through which we create that reality (Hastings 2000, p131). In this context 
we can think of language as being active in its production of the social. It does not just 
reflect but actively creates the social context that we inhabit. In analysing discourse 
through this lens we can start to uncover how problems are defined and produced 
through the language we use to explain them and subsequently how solutions are then 
generated to solve these problems. Its value for this particular research then is in how 
policy makers describe and understand the urban problems in Salford and its 
subsequent necessity for regeneration. Importantly, discourse analysis will allow us to 
see how particular solutions and regeneration programmes are justified and legitimised 
in the first instance but also in relation to other possible options. The language used will 
allow us to consider how Salford is being re-imagined and promoted through the images 
and visions created which are then embedded within regeneration frameworks. The 
focus for analysis in this research is on what actions are being enacted through the 
choice of particular discourses and the outcome of specific uses of language.  
For Hastings (2000) researchers using discourse analysis should be concerned with what 
is being accomplished through the use of particular discourses, instead of treating 
discourse purely as an honest reflection of participant’s thoughts. In not considering 
what is being accomplished we miss the productivity of language. We also fall in to a 
trap whereby we treat discourse as a participant’s honest reflection rather than 
approaching it as ideologically driven or perhaps given as socially desirable. This is 
particularly important to consider when researching elites or professionals who are 
representatives of a particular organisation. As researchers we must be mindful of the 
answers given and the potential that they are carefully considered responses to 
politically sensitive questions. For example, I conducted an informal non-recorded 
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interview with a key participant who informed me that were we to conduct the interview 
formally i.e. recorded and used for analysis purposes, then their responses to the same 
questions, even though anonymous, would be different; they would be professional 
rather than personal answers. This highlights that participant’s responses may not 
always be an accurate reflection of their individual beliefs and that they should not 
always be taken at face value. Because of this issue, discourse analysis is a useful 
methodology. This participant demonstrated that the organisation they work for 
commits to a certain ideology that is performed through the discourses they promote. 
Being a part of that organisation requires a similar commitment from that individual 
within it. Thus what would have been spoken formally would be reproducing this 
ideology. By focusing on discourse analysis we can unpack some of these ideologies.   
Hajer (2006) refers to this as a ‘discourse – coalition’ which is where a group of actors 
engaged in a particular form of associated practice, for example regeneration, utilise a 
shared set of discourse which reinforces this practice, ‘Discourse is then defined as an 
ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories through which meaning is given to 
phenomena, and which is produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of 
practices’ (p70). With regards to politics and power, Hajer argues, we can see particular 
discourse become influential when the discourse used to conceptualise a particular 
phenomenon becomes institutionalised as a form of practice. Of course there will always 
be numerous discourses that are included in political debates, but there will usually only 
be one that comes out as dominant. Through my data analysis I was exploring the way 
in which the practice of regeneration is embedded within the dominant stories amongst 
the relevant discourse coalitions in Salford. Through these discourses we can identify 
how a particular problem has come to be defined by those in a position of storytelling 
and how other stories then are foreclosed or other options are side-lined. In particular, 
I used this methodology to identify the nuances of this institutionalisation through the 
differing stories proffered and the power within the coalitions that result in the 
dominant practice.  
To assist me in analysing the discursive practices mentioned above I drew on 
Fairclough’s three-tier framework for analysis (in Lees 2004). This is textual analysis, in 
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which the researcher studies the grammar, vocabulary and the way the text is 
structured; discursive practice, which is about considering the context in which 
statements are made, its process of creation and how it is informed by others; and social 
practice, which is the ideological and structural conditions that the discourse is 
constructed within (Lees 2004, p104). Primarily I was interested in the discursive and 
social practices that create this discourse and the effects it has on the redesigning and 
shaping of Salford through the regeneration frameworks produced and the discursive 
strategies employed by the key players interviewed to explain and justify decisions. This 
allowed me to highlight the circumstances through which this discourse is produced and 
how it comes to take a dominant position amongst contesting voices. Specifically I was 
interested in exploring the discourse practices used to strategise regeneration within a 
potentially post-political frame. Therefore I was interested in: 
 The narrative ‘cues’ (Hastings 2000) used to define the policy problem that 
regeneration was intended to ameliorate, drawing on temporal discourses of 
decline and progress,   
 The discursive presentation of the solution to the identified problem, drawing on 
a growth orientated discourse and considerations of offered alternatives,  
 The justifications for those solutions, drawing on the framing on inevitable 
change, necessity and presentation of a ‘we’ that may challenge individual 
subjectivities (Mouffe 2005). 
These discourses were then analysed in relation to the wider social and structural 
contexts within which these discourses were generated. In particular: 
 The changing forms of democratic accountability and emerging managerialism, 
 The changing practices of economic development within the urban political 
environment  
 The way that spaces are valued in the economic and political context 
One criticism levelled at discourse analysis as applied to urban policy is that it is useful 
for identifying issues of social justice, but that it does not do enough to actively create 
social justice. For Lees (2004) then, ‘we need to start with the discursive, but then we 
need to move away from it because talking about social justice is not enough – we need 
to create it!” (p105). For Lees then, discourse analysis is a starting platform from which 
to mobilise more urban activism. Jacobs (2006) refutes this criticism as a generalisation 
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and misunderstanding of the interpretative role that discourse analysis should play.  For 
Jacobs, discourse analysis is primarily about highlighting the role that language plays in 
power dynamics and institutional inequalities. However, I agree with Lees in that as 
urban researchers we should be not only highlighting but challenging inequalities. 
Hopefully this analysis, in conjunction with the contested narratives and multiplicity of 
voices in this thesis can open up some ground for critical engagement with the 
regeneration processes as they are occurring in Central Salford.  
4.8 Conclusion 
Throughout this chapter I have outlined the research focus of this thesis and 
documented the data collection process, the form it took and the choices made to 
answer these questions. I have also offered some reflections on the limitations of this 
particular chosen methodology and how I have aimed to overcome them. I have raised 
the issue of using Central Salford as a case study approach and the problems this raises 
with regards to anonymity. I have discussed some of the challenges in relation to 
interviewing 'elites' and ascertaining data that can be validated. I have raised the issue I 
had over ensuring I had selected the relevant people for the interviews and the 
subsequent experience of access to these identified participants. I have also discussed 
the problem of available documentation to be analysed and that which is closed to the 
public. I have outlined the data analysis techniques that will be used and the potential 
challenges that these raise. 
The following empirical chapters will start to explore the data collected and unpack 
some of the themes that have been identified throughout the analysis process. This next 
chapter in particular will focus on the outcome of the discourse analysis, looking in 
particular at how Central Salford has been perceived to benefit from regeneration and 
who the intended beneficiaries are. Each section in the chapter has been arranged 
around the common themes that emerged from the data using relevant examples to 
highlight and justify the arguments raised. 
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5. City on a journey: the ‘right to dwell’ in a changing Salford 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will be focusing on the three research questions identified in the 
methodology which are; what is the purpose of regeneration in Salford according to 
those responsible for making the decisions? What are the perceived benefits of 
regeneration in Central Salford and who are the perceived beneficiaries? How is the 
outcome of regeneration legitimised by those responsible for its occurrence? This 
chapter will begin with an exposition of the data gathered throughout this research from 
research participants to start to answer these questions. It includes data from the point 
of view of the policy makers, which include those from the public sector, the private 
sector and the third sector. It also includes data from interviews conducted with 
community members involved in relevant community housing associations. Each section 
has been arranged around the common themes emerging from the data.  
The chapter outlines the journey that Salford is intended on taking, as determined by 
the policy makers. It outlines the transformations needed for Salford to achieve the 
changes necessary to make this journey. The chapter begins by exploring the narratives 
from participants that depict Salford after the loss of industry as a city in decline, a city 
that has regressed through a loss of population, employment and economic capital. In 
particular the city is described as having lost ‘good people’ and in its place has resulted 
in a residualised population of unemployment and poverty. This discursive frame is then 
used to justify market intervention that reimagines and restructures the area, 
something which is depicted as normal and necessary to reverse such decline and begin 
a journey towards modernization and progress. It will be argued that this begins a 
process of reducing the multiple uses of space into one that will signify this 
transformation. Drawing on Massey (2001), it will explore the concept of a trajectory 
which forces all on to a singular linear timeline, foreclosing alternative options for a 
different trajectory.     
The chapter will explore how resistance to change from residents is deflected by policy 
makers as either a misunderstanding of the benefits to be realized or as an unwillingness 
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to progress. Through this discursive reframing of resistance it is argued that dissenting 
voices are quietened so as not to challenge the planned future for Salford. It will be 
discussed how local residents are seen as feeling ‘out of place’ in the newly regenerated 
spaces like SQ due to the class signifiers built in to this environment and the erosion of 
familiar cultural symbols. I will raise the theme of tolerance and discuss how local 
residents are not necessarily tolerated within these spaces as they are seen as not using 
this space in the ‘right way’, drawing on the notion of ‘cultural capital’. This will raise the 
issue of exclusion and an ‘us and them’ divide. 
The theme of aspiration will then be explored to discuss how SQ and other 
developments are to be utilised by local residents. It will be argued that discourses of 
aspiration building is used as a ‘pacifying force’ (Raco & Henderson 2009) to negate the 
lack of benefits generated for local residents from these developments. New 
developments are designed as something for local residents to aspire to rather than 
immediately benefit from. This pacifier places the onus on the residents to achieve 
success and to justify a possible lack of tangible benefits. This links to a discussion of a 
skills deficit. The notion of skills was raised as a problem for local residents. They are 
depicted as not having the skills required to take advantage of the new jobs created in 
the area. It will be argued again that this is a legitimising discourse which deflects blame 
away from the creation of a new economy which does not meet the needs of residents. 
It will raise the implication of what Raco et al (Raco et al. 2008) calls a ‘politics of space-
time’ in which benefits for some are prioritized as occurring before others. For some, 
their perceived benefits are pushed to an undefined time period.  
The chapter will discuss the changing residential population of the area and the priority 
to create mixed tenure neighbourhoods that reduce the size of monotenure estates 
whilst trying to ensure there is no displacement. Within this theme we can see that the 
policy makers are striving to bring economically active residents to the area. To do this 
the area is being redeveloped to meet their requirements. It will be argued that what is 
occurring here is the dilution of the concentrated problems in the area that regeneration 
is intended to solve. Increasing the economic base of the area and the number of 
employed who live there in a socially mixed way serves to improve the demographics of 
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the area without actually reducing the problems in holds. This will also explore the 
possibility of gentrification and the returning of the middle classes to a working class 
area through policies of social mixing.   
From this theme I will explore how it relates to what Slater calls ‘false choice urbanism’ 
(2014). For Slater, regeneration or gentrification as he sees it is posited as an alternative 
choice to decline or deprivation. Gentrification and its potential negative social 
implications like displacement are still seen as preferable to a lack of investment or 
decline. Within this binary gentrification becomes the chosen outcome and focus is on 
reducing the negative implications of this. These negative implication then become a 
moral problem; how to avoid displacement, how to avoid exclusion. However, in 
focusing on the moral implications we neglect the broader question of how these 
inequalities emerged in the first instance. And this is the false choice for Slater, as both 
options (investment and disinvestment) are a result of circuits of capital accumulation 
that is both the problem of uneven development and the solution to it. 
The chapter will then move on to consider how the journey Salford is taking is forcing 
those involved on to a singular trajectory which reduces the diversity of experience 
within a space and challenges what Davidson (2009) calls the ‘right to dwell’. When we 
consider space in economic terms we overlook space as social and as a lived experience. 
Displacement can occur even if one remains geographically located. It occurs through 
the dislocation of someone and their relation to their changing environment. One can 
reside in a place but begin to feel ‘out of place’. This chapter will explore how local 
residents are increasingly unable to ‘dwell’ in a manner that is not aligned to the journey 
that Salford is undertaking. There is a foreclosure over the multiplicity of identities and 
ways of living allowed within this space.            
5.2 A Failing City 
Interviews conducted with participants involved in the regeneration of Salford all began 
their narratives of change from a position of decline. The discursive frame used to 
describe Salford prior to the beginning of its regeneration was that of a failing city, a city 
in reverse or in backwards motion. The narrative was that after the collapse of industry 
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there was mass unemployment and those who could leave the area did so. Demand for 
housing reduced which generated a change in ownership and tenancy type. People with 
greatest need moved in to the area and the crime rate increased. Capital in terms of 
services and facilities left the area. They were, as one participant described it, ‘sucked 
out’. The below exemplifies this sentiment. After deindustrialization and the beginnings 
of a population loss; 
“They then put in housing benefit type tenants who don’t care about the 
property. Their rent is paid straight to the landlord so they’re okay. They 
just sit there and there’s no community cohesion. So the community that 
was very solid begins to break up. That then attracts more anti-social 
behaviour, more crime often around drug dealing, petty crime and 
criminals. That means that the remaining good people think ‘I don’t want 
to be here’, so they sell. The only people then buying are at the wrong end 
of the market. So you get more properties owned by absentee landlords 
with the wrong type of tenant, increasing fractured community matters, 
more crime, more anti-social behaviour. It’s a continuing spiral down” (3 - 
Planning Professional).  
This socio-historical account of a ‘spiral’ of decline was offered readily when explaining 
the need for regeneration. The result was an area of residualised poverty that did not 
compete in the economic market for financial investment of any kind,    
“Interviewer: Why do you think that it was low demand housing?  
Participant 2: Well there was a sort of vicious circle. There was terraced 
property which people unfortunately some had been sold off to landlords, 
landlords had put in tenants that weren’t particularly good tenants 
causing problems on the streets, people moved out of the area, the value 
of the propertied started to go down and there was a vicious spiral 
downwards” (2 – Elected Official) 
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In framing the problem in this manner it opens up a legitimising discourse in which it is 
reasonable for policy makers to want a return of those good people to the area. Not only 
would this improve the tenant base but it would also return capital to the area. The 
discursive construction of the problem Salford was facing as one of a declining social and 
economic base serves several purposes. For Mele (2000), the employment of these 
particular narratives serves to ‘define urban restructuring as normal and beneficial’ and 
by linking the physical with the social it legitimizes change and also silences dissenting 
voices from those considered responsible for the problems. Secondly these discourses 
legitimize the negative social implications, especially displacement of residents, as it 
seeks to ‘better’ the area through its restructuring and changing residential base. 
Displacement becomes a necessary but unfortunate feature of improvement. Mele also 
argues that these discourses facilitate the need for a new identity in order to accomplish 
the necessary change (p632).  
What this discourse also does is construct Salford in temporal rather than spatial terms. 
The narrative of Salford is that it was in some ways regressing or going backwards as 
opposed to moving forwards, to progressing or developing. For Massey (2001), 
conflating space with time creates a trajectory of development that forces a place onto 
a singular linear timeline. Space should be understood as the site of difference all 
existing simultaneously. However, when a place is forced to be considered on a temporal 
axis it reduces this difference of a place or the multiplicity within this space so that all 
are pushed in the same direction and to the same end point. It closes down the 
possibility of difference or living in different ways and the chance to move along a 
different trajectory. Instead it points to an ‘inevitable’ future for all. Drawing on both 
Mele (2000) and Massey (2001) we can see Salford being conflated with the temporal. 
The differing experiences of people living within that space is described as regressing 
rather than progressing, foreclosing the option to remain in this way. It is important then 
to consider what trajectory Salford will be expected to take through its urban 
restructuring.   
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5.3 A time for change 
5.3.1 Local stagnation  
It is envisioned that Salford Central will undergo substantial change over the coming 
years. Central Salford’s Vision and Regeneration Framework states that “Central Salford 
will be transformed” (Central Salford Urban Regeneration Company 2006: 7). According 
to the writers of this Framework the vision for Central Salford is “…deliberately 
ambitious. It envisages comprehensive transformation” (ibid, p8). This transformation is 
framed in the documentation as a ‘journey’, one through which Salford will be reborn 
as a competitive modern city. Frequently occurring discourse from the policy makers 
interviewed also framed regeneration in this temporal way as a journey or progression 
towards a particular way of life, particularly a more ‘modern’ way of life, one in which 
“Local communities must – and will – play their part in this journey” (Salford City Council 
2013d: 4).   
However, one of the frequently reoccurring themes emerging from interviews 
conducted with participants spoke of the immobility, or stagnation of the local 
community rather than them participating in a journey. As the below quote 
demonstrates, 
“Yes its [regeneration] changing things and that’s always a very difficult 
thing to do because people have got ideas as to where they, you know, as 
they’d like things to stay as they were” (2 - Elected Official). 
The perceived desire by local residents not to participate in this journey, not to change 
the materiality of their local space was viewed in the negative: as a lack of foresight or 
understanding about how the future for the area and consequently themselves will look.      
“The younger element gets it [Salford Quays] because it’s about modern 
living and how modern living is. You know, you’ve got to change.” (4 - 
Elected Official.) 
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The participant here was referring to the style of living created for people at SQ. SQ is 
described as being;  
“…a 24 hour metropolis of the highest international quality, offering an 
extraordinary environment in which to live, learn, visit, create, watch, or 
simply experience” (Salford City Council 2008b: 64).  
For the local residents to express resistance towards this very distinctive and ‘modern’ 
style of development at SQ then demonstrates, in this participant’s view, a lack of 
understanding about what the future will inevitably look like. This sentiment echoes 
Allen’s (2008) research which demonstrated that resistance towards regeneration 
efforts by residents (HMR in his study) were perceived, accepted and reproduced by 
policy makers and developers as a fundamental lack of understanding on the resident’s 
behalf. The dominant assumption was that the residents displayed resistance because 
they had not yet fully understood the purpose of the development or the ‘benefits’ they 
would obtain in the future from the developments. Resistance, therefore, is framed as 
a communication problem, one that can be solved by breaking down the problem to be 
explained in more detail, or by producing more examples to demonstrate the type of 
urban environment to be understood. Either solution however, serves to reduce any 
resistance to changes to communication problems, rather than to a developing conflict 
over the construction of this particular future (Allen 2008). We can see this occurring in 
Salford through the use of this language that posits resistance as a lack of understanding 
about what is to come. There is a restriction over the possibility of an alternative to this 
inevitable future for Salford.    
In the following quote, SQ is understood to represents a microcosm of Salford’s future. 
 “I like to think (Salford Quays) reflects what Salford will become, yes. And 
that’s why I keep saying to people that we are very proud of our past but 
we don’t want to live in it. We actually want a future and (Salford Quays) 
represents our future and that represents how our world is going to 
develop” (2 - Elected Official) 
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The participants in this study often referred to a very particular conception of future. 
For these participants, the future is one in which Salford can engage and compete as a 
‘modern global city’, where growth, investment and desirable urban living is prominent 
(Salford City Council 2013d). As Robinson (2002) argues, the concept of the Global city 
is a ‘regulation fiction’, one which designates this type of achievement as a 
developmental goal in itself, restricting other economic or cultural ways of living.  
Becoming a global city is an ends which justifies the means, and directs all policy 
processes towards achieving this goal. Allen (2008) argues that by representing a 
particular position as self-evident i.e. that there exists one particular, inevitable future, 
we can obscure the wider structural conditions in which this view was produced. 
Axiomatic assertions about a particular ‘future’ hide any self-interest or self-benefit that 
may sit behind this very particular and constructed view of what the future will look like. 
By representing it as inevitable the residents of Salford may be less inclined to question 
how becoming a Global City will benefit them.  
Within the descriptive imagery of being stagnant, Salford communities were also very 
often described as being ‘traditional’. What this meant was that they were seen to be 
‘close-knit’, stable and unchanging communities, particularly within the mono-tenure 
housing estates. The view from some research participants was that, whilst these 
traditional types of communities could be seen as a positive, in an almost nostalgic way, 
it was also necessary to be open to change; 
“I still want to maintain [traditional neighbourhoods] don’t get me wrong, 
but I want people to be moving in to those local neighbourhoods and 
becoming part of it, rather than just staying as it is”. (2 - Elected Official).   
The above quote demonstrates a paradox. Whilst the participant acknowledges the 
desire to ‘maintain’ these pre-existing communities, their preference is that they will 
also be able to incorporate incoming groups. For the same participant however, a 
traditional community was also expressed as a negative. There was a sense that a more 
transient and changing residential base was preferable because it was characteristic of 
a creative city, something which was held up amongst urban regeneration professionals 
in Salford as a utopian ideal, 
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“Creative cities do tend to have a higher amount of immigration and 
people coming in to the area and a bit of a churned over population. So I 
think it’s much better to have that than an entirely static population that’s 
never moving or changing.”  (2 - Elected Official) 
However, the negative description of stagnant communities was at odds with some of 
the residents in these transition areas who expressed feelings of stability and good 
fortune to be living in such ‘static’ communities. As the below quotes demonstrate:  
“I’ve lived in this house since it was built. This is a council house, you know, 
on this estate. My house was built 16 October. Well, that was the date we 
moved in, 16 October 1978, so we’re coming up to 35 years. Very lucky – 
I’ve got the original neighbours as well either side” (9 - community 
representative, emphasis added) 
“A lot of them have lived there since they were built in 71 or 72. I’m one of 
the newcomers and I’ve been there 20 years!” (12 - community 
representative). 
The above quotes place residents who fall in to this category directly at odds with the 
desires and vision for Salford that the regeneration policy makers foresee. The above 
residents find a sense of comfort and happiness at the fact that they are long term 
residents with stable neighbours. This fact is a source of value for them. However, by 
positioning communities as unchanging and outdated they are inherently framed as 
standing in the way of progress. It places residents in a position of resistance or almost 
deliberate immobility. They are set apart from what Salford is going to become, 
“Salford is quite parochial and people want to stay near their parents, near 
their family, near their friends” (4 - Elected Official).   
These discourses of stagnation and parochial resistance de-legitimise the wants of 
residents to live in a manner that is inconsistent with the dominant views of what Salford 
is intended to become. It begins a process of what Atkinson (2015) calls ‘un-homing’, a 
process of changing people’s attachments to their environment and challenging their 
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rights to experience it in a manner that has been no longer accepted as legitimate (p4). 
The local communities discussed above are less warranted within the new visions for 
Salford from the policy maker’s point of view.      
5.3.2 Exposure 
Very often it was expressed that local residents did not see new developments like SQ 
as relevant to their lives, particularly some of the cultural developments like The Lowry; 
“The Lowry, … I think it is kind of accepted that people who live nearby…, 
Ordsall and Langworthy wards, generally don’t consume the cultural 
products if you like, It’s one way of putting it, offered by the Lowry” (22 - 
Council Employee). 
This is reinforced through The New Economy (2013) report on The Lowry that stated the 
majority of visitors come from outside the Salford/Manchester area. In a bid to try to 
encourage local residents to attend they have established an ‘Our Lowry’ scheme. 
Through ‘Our Lowry’ membership local residents can receive discounted tickets and, 
whilst it is acknowledged that the majority of these discounts have been dominated by 
people from the more affluent areas of Salford the report states that “the scheme has 
managed to attract over 2,000 members from more deprived Salford neighbourhoods” 
(New Economy, 2013, p19). The report does not clarify the demographics of these 
particular residents. However, they are set apart as ‘different’ from the typical Lowry 
visitors,  
“…these Our Lowry performances are noticeable by the different 
audience they bring to the venue and the extra energy and excitement 
this generates during the performance” (New Economy 2013, p19).   
Side stepping the hint of condescension in this statement, it highlights quite clearly that 
local Salford residents embody a difference which is amplified when in a space like The 
Lowry. Their presence is noticeable in this space because of their usual absence. The 
below quotes demonstrate the perception from the policy makers of this situation,   
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“There is a sense that these opportunities (at Salford Quays) are… seen, 
‘it’s not for us, it’s for others and it never will be for us’” (22 - Council 
Employee) 
“There was this sense that a lot of things ‘weren’t for the likes of us’” (1 - 
Elected Official) 
This theme was reinforced from the conversation had with local residents and third 
sector representatives. As the below resident states,  
“(Salford Quays) relationship with me though is nonexistent, and the 
relationship with the kids I work with is nonexistent” (17 - Community 
resident/representative) 
There is an expression here of being symbolically excluded from this space because of 
the symbolism it is imbued with.  Davidson (2009) has argued that class distinction is 
built in to the physical architecture of a newly developed space. This is done in 
regenerated and gentrified spaces to reproduce class divisions. This reproduction is 
necessary to distinguish middle class practice from working class practice. Davidson 
argues that middle class identity needs a working class identity to distinguish itself from; 
there needs to be a baseline from which one can be elevated. Here Davidson is talking 
about ‘new build’ gentrification as opposed to classical gentrification. Classical 
gentrification refers to the process whereby middle class groups move in to working 
class neighbourhoods and change it though their cultural and economic consumption 
practices, reinforced by their economic capital (Davidson 2009). Their differences 
become apparent and restrict social mixing. However, new build gentrification is 
developer led. As Davidson states,  
“Distinctions between `them' (incumbent working-class residents) and 
`us' (gentrifiers) are therefore presented, shaped, and mediated by the 
architecture, marketing, and built form of gentrifying developments 
created by real estate developers” (2009, p537).  
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The differences are purposely built in to the physical environment to attract a particular 
class group and enable those class distinctions to be maintained. This is necessary from 
a developer’s perspective to position and market the development as a successful, 
competitive destination. In doing this it symbolically removes the space from its local 
area.  
What emerged in the interviews is the experience of this exclusionary effect of 
distinction. However, this exclusion experienced by local residents was packaged by the 
policy makers interviewed as a ‘disconnection’ from SQ that comes from the residents 
themselves. The assumption was that they were wary or fearful of the unknown 
contained within SQ. The solution posited to this feeling of exclusion was that of 
exposure. Exposing local residents to the new types of culture or lifestyles on offer in 
this space would encourage them to use it and open them up to different opportunities,  
 “…university wasn’t for them because that was for somebody else, the 
opera has nothing to do with us, you know, ballet, you know, exposure to 
it. It’s not a question of forcing people to like particular things but actually 
making sure that they have the opportunity to grab hold of the things that 
they like” (1 - Elected Official). 
When this participant was asked to expand upon why local residents may feel that the 
types of developments in SQ were not for them, the answer was framed as one of class 
difference, as the below quote demonstrates,  
“You could probably go to any inner city area in the country and find that 
this was the case and that it had something to do with social class, what 
sort of work the parents did, and all the things associated with that, which 
meant that there needed to be some intervention to expose… people to all 
the opportunities that life could offer” (1 - Elected Official) 
The response here suggests that the reproduction of people’s social class, in this case 
working class, through the influence of parental generation’s limits people’s abilities to 
engage with these new opportunities. Opportunities here refer to the developments at 
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SQ like The Lowry, MediaCityUK and the University; spaces designed with a 
middle/upper class lifestyle in mind. The disconnection here is seen to lie with the 
individual. The responsibility of the Local Authority then is to change the individual 
through an ‘intervention’ in to their lives. However, it could be argued that this ignores 
the class demarcations that these cultural aesthetics create. This symbolic distinction 
contributes to local residents perceiving of the space as not for them. To assume that 
simple exposure to this space would result in consumption of the products on offer 
negates the class displacement that it inherently generates. It also ignores the embodied 
capital necessary to consume these products in the ‘right’ way (Bourdieu 1986).  
Bridge (2001) argues that aesthetically redesigning a city is an act of class power, it is “to 
transform working-class housing into a display of bourgeois good taste” (p 93). Drawing 
on Bourdieu’s theory of capital, Bridge states that certain displays and embodiments of 
culture are placed at higher value than others and that it is those with power who are 
able to determine and classify what is seen as being good taste. These distinctions in 
taste reinforce class boundaries. Gentrification is one way in which working class spaces 
are reclassified and bounded as middle class spaces. This is achieved through the 
inclusion of particular types of living, leisure and consumption practices which are more 
aligned to the tastes and value judgments of middle class residents. The exclusion of 
working class cultural expression demarcates the space as one that is not intended for 
working class residents (Bridge 2001).  
Cultural capital, in Bourdieu’s (1986) definition, has 3 forms: Embodied cultural capital 
are the skills, knowledge and tastes acquired over time, most notably ‘inherited’ through 
family socialization and is often “unrecognized as capital and recognized as legitimate 
competence” (p 86); the Objectified state of cultural capital is this capital in its material 
form e.g. Art, literature, instruments and the like, but these materials can only be 
consumed using the embodied capital of the individual; Institutional capital is the 
institutional recognition of the embodied cultural capital through for example 
educational attainment (1986). As Bridge (2006) argues, class power is exercised 
through all three forms of cultural capital as each form enables distinctions to be made 
which separate out tastes as legitimate or not. 
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Using the notion of cultural capital we can see how local residents may feel displaced 
from this space. In the recreation of SQ there has been a transition of cultural tastes or 
a creation of a new set of tastes which are being legitimized as the dominant form. Pure 
exposure to these leisure and consumption habits does not automatically result in 
assimilation with this space. In fact it may serve to reinforce that capital distinctions 
between groups as one set consume in the right way and the other do not. 
It is difficult to ascertain exactly how often local residents actually do use SQ. However, 
what is evident amongst participants in this study was a tension over the loss of what 
would have been perceived as the more working class cultures and spaces of leisure in 
the area, predominantly the local shops and pubs. The below quote demonstrates the 
historical predominance of those spaces in the local area, 
“For maybe 100 little corner shops they might only have like 5 shops left. 
For all the pubs that they had… there used to be a saying that you could 
never get from one end of Regent Road to the other and have a half a pint 
in every pub without being too drunk, run out of time or whatever. You’d 
never make it. Now there isn’t one pub on that road” (12 - Community 
representative).  
“Just down the road here, if you go down Lower Broughton Road, down to 
the bottom of it, there were probably half a dozen pubs round there. 
Because people worked in heavy industry, heavy work, they’d come home 
and they’d go for a few pints or whatever. They’re all gone bar about two 
I think now… nearly all of them have been demolished” (19 - Elected 
official) 
As the above two quotes demonstrate, there is a narrative of loss here, particularly 
regarding the pubs in Central Salford in recent years. Within this narrative of loss there 
lies a wider concern with what Cole (2013) calls a ‘symbol of decline’, whereby 
neighbourhood facilities, places of employment and shared social space disappear from 
a neighbourhood (p.74). The practical and symbolic function these places once 
performed are lost without respective replacement, signaling an erosion of legitimate 
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avenues for social engagement and interaction. The narratives of loss also signal a 
discomfort as local residents slowly become de-familiar with the area in which they 
reside. For Atkinson (2015) this ushers in a sense of “psychic distance” from the 
landscapes that emerge around people which represents a break from the past (p11). 
The old pubs that remain in the area but no longer as pubs do so in another guise, either 
as an abandoned relic of the past or as a frontage housing another purpose, for example 
a nursery.  
The above residents spoke about these spaces with both a fondness and sadness. They 
shape memories of a shared past. They are, as Edensor (2008) calls, an ‘absent-presence’ 
that haunt the present day. They are reminders of histories past and they remain 
present in memory for the residents who used them previously. And whilst the 
eradication of the more obvious working class cultures is treated with sadness and 
nostalgia, the imposition of middle and upper class culture at SQ was treated as an 
aberrant indulgence, as the below quote demonstrates:  
“(Salford Council) gave a lot of money to the Philharmonic Orchestra I 
think. Well, what good is that to a pensioner trying to heat her home or 
trying to put food on the table?” (7 - Community representative). 
This resident expressed a sentiment common amongst other people spoken to: that the 
cultural developments at SQ are so far removed from the realm of accustomed daily life 
that they become in direct opposition to it. For the above participant, publicly funding 
the Philharmonic Orchestra is taking funding directly away from local residents, 
particularly those on low incomes. So rather than exposure to the Quays resulting in 
usage, there is a possibility that it could lead to factionalism, as the below resident 
remarked on the same topic, 
“I don’t go there [Salford Quays], I hate it. It’s an absolute fucking 
disgrace” (17 - Community representative). 
For this resident, SQ was a disgrace because it represents the prioritising of something 
for outside groups over local residents. It is seen as a visible display of the replacement 
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of local culture and heritage for the purpose of redesigning the space for the interest of 
someone else.     
5.3.3 (Not) tolerating the locals 
The previous section discussed exposing the local residents to the new developments in 
Salford, particularly at places like SQ. The assumptions raised above from the public 
sector policy makers was that the local residents needed to be exposed to these 
developments so as to encourage them to make use of and develop a taste for the 
products and services on offer. This next section will explore the inverse of that 
exposure; exposing the incoming groups to the local residents. One of the themes that 
emerged from the interviews conducted was that local residents were not always 
tolerated within the newly developed spaces or by the incoming residents. As the below 
participant described: 
“Local people do use the Quays but it’s not always appreciated. When the 
weather is hot kids go swimming in the Quays water and unfortunately 
what sometimes happens if it’s a, you can almost write a formula around 
this, you need a number of days of consecutive warm weather and the 
numbers increase over that time people going over and then you get 
families going over, big groups of young men and if it’s a weekend they 
will be drinking all day and guess what happened next, you know, ASB, 
some criminal damage, some mischief which goes beyond fun really, local 
residents get abused, it’s not a happy scene really when it gets like that” 
(22 - Council Employee). 
The above quote is referring to what is and is not deemed as acceptable and legitimate 
forms of usage at SQ. Coleman (2003) argues, drawing on Sibley’s notion of ‘boundary 
erection’, that urban spaces have been re-imagined in ways that promote disorder free 
spaces of ‘quality of living’ and consumption. As part of a broader neoliberal shift 
towards encouraging flows of economic capital back to the city through ordering, 
sanitizing and regulating urban centres, this re-imagining creates boundaries that are 
constructed through the intolerance of difference within those spaces. This is a 
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reinforcement of Davidson’s (2009) argument in the previous section about maintaining 
distinctions between ‘them’ and ‘us’. The designing of these spaces physically builds in 
a sense of legitimate order and thus illegitimate disorder. Dictating appropriate 
behaviour through moral separations reinforces these boundaries. They enable a 
symbolic or real denial of access based on what is predetermined as inappropriate 
behaviour or usage of those developments. This spatial ordering can be described as 
social ordering, in which certain types of people belong and others do not (Edensor 
2005b).  
This careful planning and ordering can be seen in SQ which has created a space in which 
its use is highly regulated, carefully designed and built with particular type of use in 
mind. The restaurants, piazzas and pop-up-bars determine what food and alcohol can 
be consumed and in which places; the designated seats and recreational commons 
dictate where to pause and relax; the walkways and bridges channel the movement of 
people down specific routes and the carefully manicured and maintained physical 
externality communicates to users how the area is to be treated. The looming access 
controlled buildings dictate who can come and go. The lack of affordable or social 
housing on the site specifies the income expectation of the residents who live there. The 
usual urban security presence, both public and private, reinforces appropriate behavior 
within this environment, particularly the private security at MediaCityUK who patrol the 
privately owned terrain on futuristic Segways. Swimming and other water sports in the 
Quays is allowed, but only through the designated purpose built Water Sports Centre 
which requires prior registration and payment, of which swimming is £5 per time.   
This sense of appropriate use was summed up by one respondent, who stated simply 
that,  
“It’s not just about bricks and mortar… it’s about how people use it” (8 - 
Private developer).  
As mentioned previously, there used to be a dispersal order at the Quays to allow police 
and security to dispel groups of people identified as acting anti socially or making people 
feel harassed or intimidated within the dispersal zone. This dispersal order was called 
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for in part by businesses, residents and workers at the Quays who identified particular 
behaviour they deemed anti-social, which included unregulated swimming in the water. 
However, in recent years this order has not been used in part due to the negative public 
reaction to this power (see The Salford Star 2010a) and in part because the same process 
can be done via different means, as the below quote demonstrates,  
“It is a power that you could use, a legitimate power, um, but there are 
some Salford Councilors who don’t like us doing a dispersal order. They 
think it gives a bad impression... Anyway we didn’t have one last year and 
we don’t have one this year so there’s no dispersal power, and one of the 
reasons we’ve not done it this year is that police officers last year said 
actually, when the kids realised there wasn’t a dispersal order they didn’t 
run away from the police. So the police were able to talk to them and 
persuade them to leave” (22 - Council Employee). 
Thus, the dispersal of people within this space still occurs but through a method which 
reduces dissenting voices. Exclusion takes place through persuasion rather than force, 
reducing the bad impression it creates. This raises the issue of tolerance and 
(un)acceptable behaviours in this area. Linking back to Coleman’s (2003) discussion, a 
key feature in the revalorizing of post-industrial urban spaces has been the necessity to 
build into the physical environment notions of safety, predictability and civility. Signs of 
crime and disorder or lower level Anti-Social Behaviour (ASB) and nuisance behaviours 
are at odds with the re-imagining of urban centres that are keen to promote safe and 
sanitized cultural and consumer spaces which promote a good quality of life. As Atkinson 
(2003a) has argued, people increasingly need to “conform or pay to use public space” 
(p.1832). What is seen to be occurring in redeveloped spaces like SQ is that they are 
being re-imagined for a middle class audience. This is symbolically excluding local 
residents by signifying its intended beneficiaries as being other incoming people. Those 
local residents who are using that space in a way that is designated as inappropriate or 
uncivilized are othered via exclusionary methods based on cultural or economic capital. 
Residents and consumers using SQ in the ‘correct’ way are seeing disorder in its 
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inappropriate usage. They are seen as not having a legitimate form of ‘embodied capital’ 
with which to display competence in their use of this space (Bridge 2001).   
Conversations with policing representatives and public sector policy makers commented 
that the incoming groups are much less tolerant of certain types of behaviours, 
particularly around anti-social behavior. Behaviours that may have been previously 
tolerated by existing residents are no longer tolerated. As one police officer describes it, 
the incoming groups have a lower ‘threshold’ for disorder and ASB. They are more likely 
to report these issues to the police or the Council and they are described as being more 
‘resource intensive’ as they expect a suitable police response to their reports. One of 
the tasks in redeveloping Salford is to change its reputation as a high crime area. 
Reducing crime and disorder is a key feature of the many regeneration schemes in 
Central Salford and planning guidance require developers to take safety and security in 
to consideration when designing the new developments in central Salford. As the below 
quote demonstrates, 
“it’s almost as if it’s easier for them to go somewhere else because the 
community has changed and they’re now prepared to grass-up their 
neighbour, which they wouldn’t do before” (3 – Planning Professional). 
There are differing perceptions of incivility here. And whilst no doubt some of what the 
above quote is referring to is genuine criminality which will negatively affect residents, 
some of it is also described as behavior seen as unproblematic by the existing residents. 
This is compounded by the intolerance of particular types of usage that set groups apart 
based on issues of taste and moral sentiments of civility.  
The intolerance, however, is not all one way. There is also a perceived element of 
resistance from the existing communities to the incoming groups. The close-knit 
element of some of the local communities that was seen previously as a barrier to 
modernization is also seen as a barrier to community mixing. As the below quote 
demonstrates, 
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“It’s like a little village. They are not very tolerant of new comers to the 
area and that’s been a big challenge for us with new people moving on to 
the estate” (22 - Council Employee). 
Whilst it is assumed that there will be examples of harmonious interactions between 
incoming and existing residents in central Salford, what the participants interviewed 
here referenced were intimations and explicit examples of conflict. They represent what 
Jeffery and Jackson (2012) referred to as a proximate class disparity which is then a 
“cause of friction, antagonism and conflict” (p.19).  Demarcating space for different 
social uses erects boundaries within the actual lived experience of place. These 
boundaries exist regardless of ‘exposure’ to these spaces. They also serve to reduce the 
multiplicity of existence within the space, challenging the rights of people to experience 
place in a manner suited to them or in a manner considered to be different.    
5.3.4 Inspiring the locals to aspire? 
Rhetorics of disconnection and exclusion mentioned above were very often explained 
as a problem of low aspirations, particularly in relation to employment. The discourse 
around a dependency culture and aspiration building is an embodiment of New Labour’s 
‘social inclusion’ policy strategy of the late 1990’s, as described in chapter two. It was 
during New Labour’s term in office that we saw a policy shift from notions of equality to 
notions of inclusion/exclusion. The solution for New Labour to this exclusion for both 
individuals and whole residential areas was to enable them to reconnect. For individuals 
this was done through increasing aspirations and social capital which will allow people 
to be in a position to take advantage of the opportunities on offer rather than offering 
direct provision (Kearns 2003). This fed in to the wider neoliberal shift to responsibilise 
individuals.  
One of the key benefits of exposure to SQ, policy makers expressed, was that it would 
give local people something to aspire to in the future. This was particularly in relation to 
the prospect of jobs for the younger generations of local people. The current perception 
is that local people suffer high levels of unemployment because they have become 
disconnected from the work place due to a lack of aspiration or confidence. There was 
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an assumption from many of the policy makers interviewed that Salford suffered from 
a ‘dependency culture’; that some local residents were content not to work, as the 
below quote demonstrates, 
“The communities here have spent so much of their life living on benefits 
and they operate on the grey economy. That’s the way it works. They’re 
not necessarily going to want to change that unless somebody tells them 
that their benefit is going to be stopped and they’ve got to change it.” (14 
- Council employee). 
As Leitner et al (2007) argue, neoliberal cities rely on their citizens being responsibilised, 
hard-working and contributing. Under this guise, individuals become responsible in part, 
not only for their disconnection but for their reconnection also. SQ is seen as something 
which will encourage and inspire local people to make that choice, 
“I think Media City has got to be seen as something which local people 
aspire to” (15 - Council employee). 
In promoting SQ as something to aspire to, there are less tangible guarantees around 
actual provision of employment for local people from this development. Aspiration here 
can be used to serve as a panacea of trickle-down. As Raco and Henderson (2009) note, 
regeneration discourses promoting inclusion and aspiration building over underlying 
structural issues like the loss of employment opportunities and housing availability can 
be used ‘strategically as a pacifying force’ (p302). It legitimizes an outcome in which 
benefits from regeneration efforts are not felt by local people. It acts as a preemptive 
justification for this potential disconnection. It also serves to deflect the blame away 
from the authorities for the lack of opportunities or successes of local residents.  
5.4 Benefitting the locals 
5.4.1 Local and low-skilled 
So far I have discussed how policy makers intend the transformation of Salford to take 
place and the legitimation of the effects this has on the lived experience of Salford 
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residents and incoming groups. It is envisioned that Salford residents will modernize in 
line with the future vision for Salford as a ‘modern global city’. In doing this they are 
expected to navigate an increasingly changing landscape. It is expected that exposure to 
these spaces will overcome feelings of being ‘out of place’. It is also expected that it will 
inspire people to embrace the products on offer, including employment, leisure and 
housing. It can act as a visual representation to mobilize accomplishment.  
Alongside some of the cultural barriers in place to achieving this aim as identified above, 
other issues relate to the skill base of Salford residents. So whilst aspiration is promoted 
as a necessity to modernise, it has to be translated into employable skills to become 
usable. The problem of skills shortage has become more apparent with the changing 
labour market in Salford. According to the New Economy’s (2010) latest Economic 
Assessment of Salford the majority of the 2000’s saw the highest number of private 
sector job growth of any of the other Greater Manchester conurbations in Salford and 
substantially above the national average (+11.5%, from 82,400 to 91,900 private sector 
employees). The main drivers of private sector growth in Salford, and neighbouring 
Manchester, have been in the financial and professional services. This sector has 
doubled in size over the past decade and now accounts for approximately one fifth of 
all employment in Salford (from 5.8% to 18.3% of all jobs in 2010). In particular Salford 
has a large number of banking and insurance companies, though much of the 
productivity in this sector in Salford are likely to be the back office functions, as indicated 
by the lower than average wages.  The development of Media City has also caused an 
expansion in the digital and creative media industries (New Economy 2010). Whilst the 
increase in private sector growth is heralded as a barometer of the good economic 
health of the city, the evidence states that the residents in Salford are not benefitting 
from this growth. Work place wages are lower in Salford than other comparable Greater 
Manchester Local Authorities indicating that many of the new business functions are 
lower value types or back office jobs. Additionally, Salford residents’ wages are again 
lower than the average work place wages, indicating that actual Salford residents may 
not have the requisite skills to obtain these particular jobs (see table 2) (New Economy 
2010).  
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Table 2: Local area earnings both resident and workplace (New Economy 2010). 
The view of the participants interviewed was that the Local Authority and the local 
developers are delivering opportunities for work and employment, but that local people 
have a skills deficit that precludes them from taking advantage of these opportunities 
now provided to them. As the below quote demonstrates, 
“We’re very good at, in terms of regeneration, delivering the physical bit. 
The more difficult bit is actually then linking local people to the jobs and 
often some of the criticism we get in some of the communities is, we talk 
about creating local jobs but do we really create local jobs and it’s a 
challenge because sometimes those people within the local areas don’t 
have the skills that the employers need” (11 – Council employee). 
By framing the problem in this way the Local Authority can feel vindicated because they 
have provided employment opportunities2. It is the people, however, that are the 
                                                     
2 A press release from the Salford City Council claimed the National Audit Office report on the amount of 
economic growth generated by the BBC’s move to Salford was a ‘vindication’ of what the council had 
AREA 
RESIDENT WORKPLACE 
ANNUAL WEEKLY ANNUAL WEEKLY 
Bolton £23,164 £445 £21,447 £412 
Bury £26,056 £501 £24,558 £472 
Manchester £23,054 £443 £26,674 £513 
Oldham £21,497 £413 £20,788 £400 
Rochdale £23,754 £457 £21,115 £406 
Salford £22,954 £441 £23,759 £457 
Stockport £25,973 £499 £26,368 £507 
Tameside £22,814 £439 £22,436 £431 
Trafford £27,745 £534 £27,080 £521 
Wigan £23,152 £445 £22,539 £433 
Greater Manchester £24,016 £462 £23,676 £455 
England £26,148 £503 £26,138 £503 
Great Britain £25,931 £499 £25,909 £498 
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problem. What occurs here is a pathologising discourse that situates the blame with the 
individual for structural inequalities that are being created through the regeneration 
efforts (Matthews 2010).  
Unemployment then becomes a result of not having the skills to achieve the new types 
of jobs on offer, rather than a problem of the inaccessibility of the jobs created. For this 
participant, the skills shortage is the key to reducing poverty, 
“I don’t agree with the government that keeps saying you can measure 
poverty by other indicators; it’s the absence of money to my mind and it’s 
a fact that people have not got good qualifications or skills so they were 
unable to access higher paid jobs and were left with the lower paid jobs 
which are dropping out of the economy at the moment” (2 - Elected 
Official). 
The skills deficit was identified in Salford’s most recent economic assessment (2010) that 
highlighted how local residents have not benefitted from the growth in Salford’s 
knowledge economy (New Economy 2010). On average, Salford residents have a lower 
skills profile than the Greater Manchester or national average, with 23.4% of Salford’s 
working age population holding an NVQ level 4 qualification or above (compared to GM 
average of 26.7% and national average of 29.8%). 10% of Salford’s 16 to 19 year olds are 
not in education, employment or training, a higher than the GM average. As the 
economic review states, because of Salford’s skills deficit,  
“…the city has a disproportionately large proportion of working-age 
adults that remain economically inactive, with high levels of long-term 
unemployment and entrenched worklessness, particularly concentrated 
in its deprived neighbourhoods” (New Economy 2010:18).   
                                                     
done, even though the report acknowledged that only 39 local Salford residents had been employed 
(http://www.salford.gov.uk/pr-13-3523.htm).   
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However, the sectors that may now be beyond the skills level of some of Salford’s 
residents have not simply ‘emerged’ as indicated in the previous quote by the elected 
official, but have been purposely encouraged and enabled by the Local Authority and 
the developers in Salford. The entrepreneurial role Salford Council has played in securing 
investment to the city has been key to creating this economic transition, with the 
knowledge-based sector identified as a priority. Since 2002 Salford has been a significant 
partner in delivering the Manchester – Knowledge Capital, which has been a key driver 
in Central Salford’s regeneration initiatives (Salford City Council 2003).  Salford Council, 
along with Peel Holdings, spent considerable time and money securing and building 
what was intended to be a world class Media City, hiring Michael Joroff to consult on 
the pitch to the BBC. Michael Joroff is a senior lecturer at MIT in Urban Planning. His 
main research interests include advising cities on how to generate a knowledge 
economy. Salford Council also draws on Richard Florida’s Creative Classes thesis to 
inform its economic regeneration strategies (Salford City Council 2009a). The point to 
be made is that there is a specific and dedicated attempt to change the economic base 
to feature more businesses that require higher levels of skills and qualifications, a 
change which will inevitably leave local residents as under-skilled. The current provision 
of the type of economic opportunities available in Central Salford was not a curious 
occurrence, but part of a well-planned and considered growth agenda.  
The using of a ‘skills shortage’ discourse to shape the problem enables the solution to 
be located within the unavailing individual. As the below quote demonstrates,  
“I think from time to time you get the criticism is the only jobs you’re 
creating,… the only jobs the Salford people will get will be the cleaning 
jobs. That’s a school of thought. Well, why is that the case? Why can’t they 
get the managerial jobs?” (3 – Planning Professional). 
Whilst the above quotes shape the issue as one of a skills barrier, one participant 
described the job opportunities as not yet ‘open’ to local people, as the below quote 
demonstrates, 
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“… the real well paid good jobs that have been created, which are the 
majority of jobs, are not necessarily open to local people at this stage” (22 
- Council Employee). 
There is a suggestion of foreclosure here. The assumption being that in the future the 
local residents may have the necessary skills to secure these jobs, but as it currently 
stands, the jobs are closed to them.   
The documentation published by the Council and the conversations had with interview 
participants consequently posit themselves as having a problem. They have a declining 
sector that requires low skilled workers, they have ‘successfully’ created new job 
opportunities in a more specialist skilled sector, but the local residents are unable to 
take advantage of these opportunities because they now suffer from a lack of relevant 
skills. This discourse allows the policy makers to distance themselves from the gap that 
has been created between the local skill base and the skills required by the new 
economic employment sectors. The below quote from a local policy maker sums up this 
apparent paradox,   
“The problem we’ve got at the moment is a lot of the established 
manufacturing sectors have all declined, …and therefore it’s, what do 
young people do who for whatever reason are not going to aspire to the 
higher value jobs that come out of the BBC and other businesses in the 
Quays?” (11 - Council employee). 
Unemployment is viewed in a very different way when it is presented like this. When 
there was a lack of jobs in the area - it was a problem with the economy. Now the jobs 
have been created - it is a problem with the people.  
5.4.2 Nobody said it was going to happen overnight 
As demonstrated above, the interview participants and the Local Authority through 
accessible documentation do acknowledge that there has been dearth of local residents 
acquiring employment in the newly developed employment sectors in Salford. However, 
what emerged from the data collected was that the policy makers involved in its 
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development were fully aware that this would be the outcome in the first instance, as 
the below quote demonstrates, 
“So we hear figures about very low numbers of people that are employed 
there despite a lot of Council investment, and all that’s true, but nobody 
said it was going to happen overnight” (22 - Council Employee)  
The quote here parallels other interview participants’ response to this issue, namely that 
local residents were never going to get the newly created jobs immediately. This was 
particularly the case when defending the creation of Media City and the move of the 
BBC. In the early stages of development, it was stated that MediaCityUK would create 
‘employment opportunities for 15,500 people’ (Salford City Council 2013d). Since that 
time there have been numerous reports of a lack of jobs being created for local residents 
in Media City. This tension has been compounded by the other forms of exclusion felt 
by local residents mentioned earlier in the chapter. But again, the concession offered 
was that this was always going to be the case. In fact, it is presented as almost obvious,  
“If you think about it, most of the jobs here were filled by existing people. 
They either moved from Oxford Road or they were moved from London. 
That was always the deal. So in terms of Salford residents getting work it 
was never going to be an instant thing. What this has done is create a 
massive opportunity for people who are long term Salford residents” (16 - 
Private developer). 
In articulating the problem as obvious it is possible to reduce any disquiet, as Mele 
(2000) argues, “Constructing the status quo as intolerable and restructuring as logical 
(and even natural) often neutralizes residents’ protest of the social costs of changes to 
their community” (p632). The lack of available opportunities for local residents is 
restructured here as ‘logical’. To present it in this way reduces the politics of dissent to 
one of presumption. One participant interviewed became visibly annoyed by these 
critiques voiced on this topic and responded to them as such, 
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“The BBC relocated staff from London to Manchester and lo and behold, 
of the jobs that were available in Manchester most of them went to the 
staff who were relocating so it was headlines, ‘local people don’t get these 
jobs’. Well, they weren’t anyway and I think you’ve got to look at it in the 
longer term that there are kids at school now who when the vacancies 
come up at the BBC 5, 6, 7 years’ time they will have actually gone through 
the sort of education and the sort of experiences that will give them a head 
start in any applications to the BBC. No firm is ever going to say ‘we will 
employ you because you live at this address’. You’ve got to have, there’s 
got to be the right vacancies and you’ve got to have the right skills” (1 - 
Elected Official). 
This point is referring specifically to the new Oasis Academy MediaCityUK school 
situated, as of 2012, on SQ. The Academy promotes itself as a Media Centre offering the 
usual school curriculum alongside TV studios and other production facilities (Oasisi 
Academy MediaCityUK 2015). The expectation that benefits will be realized in the future 
most often is directed at the younger generations who are expected to take advantage 
of learning so close to MediaCityUK. However, the older generation of Salford residents 
are often removed from this temporal vision of future benefit, 
“This is a sore point for most people in Salford due to the fact that when 
the BBC moved, jobs were promised to local people but it didn’t really 
happen. Some work is being done now to help local businesses recruit from 
Salford. More opportunities are arising for young people but there are very 
few opportunities for older people who lack work experience” (24 - Third 
sector officer). 
So whilst younger generation may benefit in the future by shaping their education and 
experiences to meet the needs of the new business sectors, the older generations who 
are either currently completing education or beyond education will find obtaining work 
here much harder,   
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“Not everybody is going to work in media are they? Again, you’re raising 
people’s expectations to something that actually you’re not going to get. 
Just because we’ve got Media City doesn’t mean that everybody is going 
to work in the media. We’ve always had Coronation Street and ITV, well 
you don’t see everybody from Salford going into ITV or being in Coronation 
Street do you?” (14 - Council employee). 
Occurring here is what Raco et al (2008) refer to as the ‘politics of space-time’. For these 
authors, regeneration literature has focused too heavily on the spatial transformations 
of an area and how these have occurred. Less has been said about the time element of 
regeneration, particularly when changes should or do take place. They highlight the issue 
of time, particularly; they discuss the contestation over which benefits will be delivered 
first and why and who gets priority over others. Regeneration developments 
incorporate a multiplicity of timeframes relevant to the different needs of interested 
parties which include the Local Authority, private developers, private financiers and 
local residents. Delivering commercial interests, profit and short-term goals usually take 
precedence over longer term social objectives, like reducing deprivation and 
unemployment. The politics of prioritizing one set of needs over another represents 
power inequalities between interested parties in these regeneration developments. 
Those with less power are less able to contest the decisions made and the timeframes 
agreed.  
Sustainable regeneration projects are supposed to deliver more than quick-wins. They 
should deliver benefits to local communities. However, what transpires is that these 
benefits are often the last to be delivered, if ever they are (Raco et al 2008). However, 
for the local residents discussed above, their deliverable benefits are also now 
contingent on them being able to acquire the skills necessary to take advantage of these 
benefits. This discourse not only legitimizes the lack of immediate jobs for local people, 
but also makes local residents responsible for their success or failure. Whilst some 
people have benefitted and are still benefitting immediately from the regeneration of 
SQ, the local residents have to understand that they will not be benefitting until some 
point in the future when they are able to. It can be inferred from this that the Local 
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Authority appears to have privileged the future possibilities of Salford and what it is 
envisioned to become, over its current needs (Mele 2000). What this serves to do it 
sacrifice a generation of people who require immediate improvements. If they are 
unable to mobilize themselves to traverse the divide that has been created between 
themselves and the new requirements for employment in the area then they are unlikely 
to feel any resulting benefits.  
Of course, the BBC is not the only economic development at Salford Quays and whilst 
there have so far been reports of low numbers of Salford residents employed here 
(Salford City Council 2012f) there is scope for Salford residents to gain employment 
within some of the other emerging sectors. Specific data on how many local Salford 
residents have been employed on Salford Quays is generated locally through Business 
Surveys conducted by the Council making the data only a sample of the entire area 
(Salford City Council 2013e).  However, the latest available data from 2012 shows that 
there are now 25,782 employees working at Salford Quays, this is nearly one quarter of 
the total employment within Salford and a huge increase from when the Quays was a 
working dockyard, demonstrating significant jobs growth (Salford City Council 2012f). 
The below table demonstrates the economic industries at Salford Quays as at 2012:  
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Table 3: Employment sector at Salford quays 2012, source Salford City Council 2013e 
As the above table shows, the biggest employment sectors on the Quays are Information 
and Communication (13%),  Finance and Insurance (14%), Professional, Scientific and 
technical (9%) and the largest sector is the Business administration and support services 
(25%). This sector in particular has seen a substantial decrease in full time jobs and 
Employment 
Sector/No.Employed
No. %
Manufacturing 983 3.77
Construction 1828 7
Motor trades 156 0.6
Wholesale 1115 4.27
Retail 756 2.9
Transport & storage 
(inc postal)
607 2.33
Accommodation & 
food services 
748 2.87
Information & 
communication 
3508 13.44
Finance & insurance 3785 14.5
Property 523 2
Professional, scientific 
& technical 
2424 9.29
Business 
administration & 
support services 
6731 25.79
Public administration 
& defence
1071 4.1
Education 486 1.86
Health 661 2.53
Arts, entertainment, 
recreation & other 
services 
669 2.56
Total 26051 99.82
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subsequent increase of part time jobs (Salford City Council 2013e). A sample of these 
businesses show approximately 10% of employees to be Salford residents. It is not 
known from this breakdown what types of jobs these are. However, an assessment of 
employment at MediaCityUK specifically states that the jobs Salford residents are 
employed in are more likely to be facilities management, hospitality and retail (Salford 
City Council 2013e).  For example, 72% of the 80 staff employed at the Holiday Inn hotel 
live in Salford; 34% of the 94 staff employed at Booths supermarket reside in Salford; 15 
out of the 70 G4S security staff live in Salford (Salford City Council 2012f).  
5.4.3 Divisions of labour 
The emerging situation then is that local residents are competing for the lower skilled, 
low paid positions that are appearing alongside the higher paid roles. These are often in 
the service sector which is also a growth area in Central Salford. One participant involved 
in assisting people in to work commented that current vacancies were most often in the 
retail, hospitality and customer service roles. These were most likely to become 
available and were the types of roles the job seekers were most likely to apply for. Their 
skills set was most suited to these roles. However, this is not necessarily seen in a 
positive way by local residents. And the demand for these jobs has also reportedly been 
high, with Salford being reported consistently as the hardest city to get a job in the UK 
from 2013 to 2015 (Adzuna 2013). So what is actually transpiring is that some local 
people are benefitting from the jobs growth, but in the lower skilled service sectors, 
“It would be the jobs around (MediaCity) that would actually be the crucial 
ones. For example, supermarkets, hotels, and those sorts of developments 
it’s generated. We expect to pick up a goodly proportion of those jobs and 
that’s in fact what’s actually happened. So it’s not the BBC necessarily 
directly to start with, it’s the industries and companies around it” (2 - 
Elected Official). 
One of the acknowledged problems of the emerging Professional and Financial or the 
creative sectors is that it does not absorb the surplus labour created following from the 
decline of manufacturing. The skills required in the new economy are not transferable 
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from the old. This raises issues for moving people out of unemployment into work (Pratt 
& Hutton 2013). Peck’s (2005) critique of cities that have adopted an urban strategy 
aimed at attracting the creative classes argues that these creative economies necessarily 
function with lower paid service workers. These workers are crucial pillars in the service 
economies in creative quarters where consumption and leisure preferences need to be 
met and lifestyle choices need to be maintained, as Peck ponders “…who will launder 
the shirts in this creative paradise..” (p.757). Media City is shaped around the ideas of 
this creative lifestyle. Creative professionals will work in these spaces but will also 
require the lifestyles that accompany them. This includes leisure and consumption 
spaces that will allow for this creativity to flourish. This forms part of the vision for 
MediaCityUK and the Quays as a whole,  
“Their next goal is to build the night time economy at Media city. They 
recognise that the creatives don’t work 9-5. They have drinks and coffee 
and network at a variety of times. They need an environment which will 
support this lifestyle.” (29 - Council employee). 
“The idea is that these people will want places to eat and relax and talk 
about things” (2 - Elected Official). 
The data generated from the interviews conducted suggests that the low skilled local 
workforce in Salford will be suitably placed to occupy these service roles.   
“If you live in Ordsall or if you live in Langworthy the chances are you 
haven’t got a media degree or you’re not a television producer. But you 
might be a security man or you might be a cleaner. I know it might sound 
a bit, you know, but that’s the facts of it.” (16 - Private developer) 
Discussions with local residents gave the impression that local people employed mostly 
as security guards on SQ has become somewhat of a trope; a recognized caricature at 
their expense. This was, however, legitimately posited by policy makers as a good thing, 
a good achievement for local people, 
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“There are other businesses down there (Salford Quays) where people 
might be less skilled. So there are restaurants, hotels, big supermarkets 
down there which do provide good opportunities and good career paths 
as well. Some of the restaurants are really good and stuff.” (6 - Council 
employee). 
The sentiment emerging from the interviews was that any job is better than no job, even 
the lower paid jobs. So long as local people were being employed in some form, this was 
heralded as a success from the perspective of local policy makers, 
“Its not just the issue of the BBC, and people will no doubt say that so far 
the BBC hasn’t employed all that many from Salford - we never expected 
them to initially. What it did was that all the industries around it and all 
the creativity opportunities around it employ significant numbers of 
people in Salford - to the hundreds basically” (2 - Elected Official). 
These figures are very difficult to scrutinize as there are neither publishable figures to 
attest nor are there recent local data collection, so I was informed. Notwithstanding the 
numbers given, the type of jobs is still purported to be the same. Again, this is expressed 
as a positive. However, the opposition to this dialogue comes from local residents, who 
do not necessarily share the same positive disposition,     
“Not everybody is going to stand in front of the camera and most people 
here don’t have those skills to do that job. But there will be jobs working 
in the canteen, sweeping the floors, doing the reception and the admin. 
And those are the jobs that people tended to have got. But that doesn’t 
necessarily mean that the people of Salford see that as a celebration” (14 
- Council employee). 
What appears to be developing then is an acknowledged division of labour in which the 
new higher skilled jobs are being occupied by people from outside of Central Salford, 
whilst the lower skilled service jobs are more likely to be occupied by local Salford 
residents; something which is seen to be a bone of contention. However, this is not only 
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acknowledged but justified by pointing to a temporal dimension in which Salford 
residents will benefit in the future. By accepting this as legitimate allows the policy 
makers involved not only to vindicate the decisions made up to this point but to reduce 
any criticism to this as illogical. From a top down level, the success of SQ can be 
measured in terms of overall job creation and business growth. The number of jobs 
located in Salford has increased since the redevelopment of SQ. From a policy 
perspective, this is a good thing. It is seen as less important who specifically is employed 
here and where they are from. As the below quotes demonstrate, 
“We knew the docks weren’t going to come back again, we knew the 
heavy industry wasn’t going to come back again, so we had to look at 
something different. And now actually on the overall dockland side, if you 
include the BBC and Media City, there are more people working there than 
there were when it was a dock. So in that sense it’s worked” (19 - Elected 
official). 
“If a company relocates here they will bring their own people with them 
so it’s wrong to say to local residents that we are creating 3000 jobs there 
cos were not. They are moving 3000 jobs there but there will be jobs 
already occupied so they are not new jobs being created from nowhere. So 
we have to make sure that we tell the truth about that, but none the less 
its 3000 people employed in this area on the Ordsall estate” (22 - Council 
Employee). 
Success here is measured by growth and Salford is demonstrating achievement on this 
scale. This speaks to a much wider shift in urban policy in which growth leads decision 
making. This will be explored more in Chapter 7. By repositioning the benefits of these 
developments as one of overall growth the consequences for local residents are able to 
be less of a concern. This is an issue for individuals with regards skills acquisition. The 
above participants have argued that any job is a good job and that even the lower skilled 
jobs are better than nothing. For some residents of course this may be true. And as 
indicated previously approximately 10% of all Salford Quays employees are Salford 
residents (Salford City Council 2013e). The Council is also working to increase the skills 
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base of the local residents and to source employment through for example the Bridges 
to MediaCityUK Partnership. This is a partnership initiative which has been in operation 
since 2010. Its focus is on maximising the potential for employment and training at 
MediaCityUK for local people (Salford City Council 2012f). The Council also have an 
‘Inspire to Aspire’ programme which targets young people not in education, 
employment or training to develop relevant skills. The Council ‘Transformation’ 
programme is run to assist unemployed residents generate skills necessary for potential 
employment in the creative sector.  
However, the above discourse emerging from the quotes overlooks the unequal 
structure developing within the new economic sectors in Salford whereby one group of 
people services the needs of others within the same locality. The transformation relies 
on having a lower paid service sector to perform these functions. They are a necessary 
component of delivering the professional and creative services and leisure spaces.       
5.5 The ‘good and bad’ of regeneration 
5.5.1 Gentrification as a nexus of critique  
What has been presented so far in the chapter alludes to potential issues of 
gentrification. The movement of capital back to the city speaks to Hackworth and 
Smith’s (2001) third wave gentrification. Large sums of capital have moved into spaces 
of decline, areas presenting a rent-gap, and in doing so are fueling the return of more 
capital through other business investment and the economic potential of people. This is 
turn may be having negative effects on local residents in which they begin to feel ‘out 
of place’. But as the notion of gentrification becomes more common parlance amongst 
urban planners and citizens alike, there was a considerable awareness during the 
interviews of the need to manage and reduce not only the implication of gentrification 
but the consequent occurrence of displacement.   
The participants interviewed who were involved in the decision making and 
regeneration implementation demonstrated a hyper awareness of this existing critical 
gentrification debate. Through the interview process many participants displayed that 
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they existed in a space where, because of their position within the urban regeneration 
field, it was necessary to be cognisant of the negative appraisal of regeneration 
programmes. By operating within this nexus of critique they were keen to assert that 
the more recent and ongoing programmes of development did not involve displacement 
or gentrification. The participants interviewed displayed an informed knowledge of the 
potentially loaded nature of these terms, an awareness of gentrification as a ‘dirty word’ 
(Slater 2006). Several participants demonstrated a pre-emptive consciousness of the 
debate surrounding regeneration within the interviews by stressing, unprompted and in 
anticipation of the potential critique, that this was not the case. For example one private 
developer mentioned, when discussing the development of a recent housing estate that, 
“I should say that in that process we didn’t knock down any homes with 
people living in them. No one was displaced. That’s not what we’re about.” 
(23 - Private developer). 
For one public sector participant, not only were they well versed in the critiques of 
regeneration and its links to gentrification but they were demonstrably fatigued by the 
notion,  
“There are those with certain political axe to grind who use terms like 
gentrification and the clearing out of the so called ‘traditional Ordsall 
Salford community’, which hasn’t happened by the way” (22 - Council 
Employee). 
For the below participant, there is an acknowledgement that local groups may see the 
development as intended for incoming groups, i.e. a perception of gentrification, but 
this is dismissed as fanciful, as though the suggestion is unfounded,   
“Um, I think its change you know, you get that in any community where 
you start to see change so any development that goes ahead in any part 
of the city, oh you know ‘we oppose this we want to keep things the way 
they are’ and if you’re building something new it must be for the ‘mythical 
outsiders’” (1 - Elected Official). 
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One of the ways in which the regeneration of Central Salford has tried to avoided 
accusations of gentrification and displacement is by focusing instead on the notion of 
social mixing. As Lees (2008) has argued, social mixing has formed a major part of the 
urban regeneration policy initiatives since New Labour’s Urban Renaissance agenda, 
particularly as part of their social inclusion strategy. For Lees however, social mixing is a 
rhetoric used in place of terms like gentrification, specifically because of its negative 
connotations. Promoting social mix necessarily removes any acknowledgement of class 
conflict. Instead it is promoted as a positive policy solution to spatial concentrations of 
poverty, bringing much needed financial benefits to the area, a solution that in theory, 
is difficult to take issue with, unlike gentrification which implies negative connotations 
(Lees 2008). This social mixing initiative is promoted in the below quote, 
“There have been no house clearance and there’s been no reduction in the 
quantity of social housing in the area, we’ve stayed committed to that. But 
building private houses alongside those was the idea of this notion that 
mixed tenure is generally a good thing for an area. And I don’t think 
anyone can really argue with that” (22 - Council Employee). 
Identifiable estates of mono tenure social housing in particular were to be avoided in 
the new mixed areas,  
“The aim from the beginning was not to have a complete mono tenure of 
Council social housing but to go for a mixed tenure with owner occupation, 
affordable rent, which is the new term for social housing, offered by 
housing associations and also some market rented property as well” (3 - 
Planning Professional). 
From the above quote it can be seen that the mixing of tenures was primarily to break 
up the concentration of social housing, not of owner occupied housing. One of the ways 
the Council is aiming to achieve this social mixing of tenures is through a ‘tenure blind’ 
building process. Any new house building in Salford that has a mixture of affordable 
housing and private housing will be built in a tenure blind manner. What this means is 
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that all the houses will be built with the same aesthetic. There will be no obvious 
difference between the tenures from an external view.    
“Our ideal solution is something that’s called tenure blind where by you 
can go in to an estate and not know which ones have been sold which ones 
are owned by people which ones are rented”. (2 - Elected Official).   
The point of having a tenure blind approach is to prevent people from being able to 
determine the tenure of the property so that to the external gaze it is impossible to see 
the difference. It serves to manage the materiality of the housing and what those houses 
symbolically represent, as the below quote demonstrates, 
“Well, it doesn’t look like a mishmash. It doesn’t make people feel they’re 
looked down on” (18 - Community representative). 
Implicit here is the proposition that the social mixing approach to regeneration may 
actually contain a source of conflict from the incoming groups towards the original 
residents. The benefit of a tenure blind approach was only explicitly phrased as being 
beneficial for the residents in the lower value tenures,    
“We wanted it mixed. And by mixed were not talking about, there’s one 
estate and its at that end - the poor people; its literally you’ve got a terrace 
and a terrace and you’ve got maybe 3 houses in that terraced and 2 houses 
in that [owner occupied]… they’re mixed in like that” (5 - Council 
employee). 
Again, this discourse focuses on the removing of signs of poverty or low income 
residents. Through a tenure blind approach these visible representations of lower 
income housing and households can be removed from view. The residents themselves 
can remain in the area just behind a different façade, one which quells the concerns of 
incoming groups and makes the area more attractive to new residents. The purpose of 
social mixing here then is to break up, or mask, the concentration of poverty in a 
particular space. It also, as Lees (2008) argues, constructs a particular way of living as 
the ‘right’ way, specifically a middle class way of living. This serves to ‘other’ the working 
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class residents who are removed from the spaces they reside in as it is seen as poor or 
disorderly.  
Whilst displacement was rejected as something the Council strived not to do, it was also 
seen as at times unavoidable in the current climate, particularly around ‘affordable 
rent’. Affordable rent is part of the Coalition governments affordable housing 
programme initiative, in which any new social housing built after 2011 will be charged 
to tenants at up to 80% of market rates, which is actually more than current social 
housing rental levels, and will give shorter term flexible tenancy contracts (Hodkinson & 
Robbins 2012). Thus any resident moving from demolished social housing in to a new 
affordable house will likely see their rent increase. Simultaneously, the regeneration 
developments in Central Salford have seen the housing market increase in price. In 2014, 
Salford saw the greatest increase in house prices of any UK city triggered by the 
development of MediaCityUK and the relocation of the BBC (Osborne 2014). The effects 
of this serve to further increase the market value and the chargeable rent levels of the 
surrounding housing. Consequently, those residents who were promised housing within 
their neighbourhoods may still be offered them, but at a much higher price; one which 
is potentially unaffordable, 
“When we’ve been talking to the community in the past we’ve been saying 
we’ll do everything we can to ensure that you move with us then all of a 
sudden some policy change happens in between time and you’ve got to go 
back to those people and say we’ll still give you the same choice, we’ll still 
work with you, however circumstances have changed where it now costs 
this amount of money to move into that new shiny home over there” (20 - 
Council employee). 
This means that there is much higher chance that local residents will be spatially 
displaced. However, according to this public sector participant when asked specifically 
about this potential problem it was constructed as an unfortunate but necessary 
concern to continue greater levels of growth,  
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So it’s a bit of a tricky one at this moment in time. But it’s one that I’d 
rather have than not have, if that makes sense” (20 - Council employee). 
This response is indicative of what Slater (2014) calls ‘false choice urbanism’. Slater 
argues that the false choice in urbanisation is thinking that we are choosing between 
gentrification/reinvestment as an alternative to decline/disinvestment. Financial 
investment (read gentrification in Slater’s terms) for cities is seen as a solution to 
neighbourhood decline. Even with potential negative consequences like displacement, 
Slater argues, gentrification is still, on balance, determined as a better option than the 
alternative. Approaching it in this way, this problem is then reduced to a moral issue of 
how to mitigate the negative side effects for those people affected by the incoming 
investment, i.e. those financially or spatially displaced. However, in focusing on the 
moral we serve to neglect the political issue of capital flows as fundamentally linked to 
uneven development in which some financially benefit whilst other lose out (p.519).  
Drawing on Neil Smith’s ‘rent gap’ thesis Slater highlights how investment and 
disinvestment; renewal and decay, are not alternative choices or options but are 
fundamental and inevitable antagonisms that occur within the overall process of 
financial capital moving in and out of spaces seeking to accumulate. To see investment 
as an alternative to decline ignores how decline occurred in the first instance. It ignores 
the gradual withdrawal of capital from places like Central Salford over the past 40 years. 
It ignores the creation of rent gaps from the movement of capital out of Salford that can 
now be capitalised on again. The participants interviewed displayed this rhetoric of 
investment as a necessary alternative to decline, even with the inclusion of 
displacement, neglecting the critical consideration of circuits of capital that had come 
before. As the below quote exemplifies, 
“Ensuring that Salford has the right quality and quantity of housing to 
support its growth in economic strength is vital. This in turn will help to 
attract and retain a diverse range of citizens that will continue to make 
the city prosperous. The city’s remarkable success, however, comes at a 
cost. Salford is faced with a shortage of good quality affordable homes. 
Homelessness and overcrowding remain ongoing challenges and rising 
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housing costs are also hitting working households on low and middle 
incomes. The economic case for continued investment therefore is 
compelling” (Salford City Council 2014c Emphasis added). 
The above quote, taken from Salford’s latest housing strategy, demonstrates how 
capital is entangled within the moral question of this ‘false choice urbanism’. Success 
results from investment which increases inequalities that can be solved through more 
investment. The irony, Edensor (2005a) argues is that in replacing that which is now 
determined as unproductive in order to inspire production and progress we are 
removing those signs which remind us that progress is not continual or linear; we 
remove the symbols of previous rounds of destructive capitalism. As Edensor states, 
“modern capitalism proceeds by forgetting the scale of devastation wreaked upon the 
physical and social world, for obliterating traces of this carnage fosters the myth of 
endless and seamless progress” (2005a: 101).   
5.5.2 The economic value of people 
Read in the above way, the quest for social mixing appears somewhat disingenuous. 
Individual economic capital will determine who can reside in these redeveloped spaces. 
This individual capital is also seen as crucial to continue to secure the wider investment 
necessary to further the overall transformation agenda. One goal of redeveloping 
Central Salford was the need to bring economically active people to live within the area. 
One of the reasons for this is the recognition that as the area continues to improve, 
developers are less able to take advantage of cheaper land prices compared to 
surrounding areas like Manchester.  There is recognition that the rent-gap is closing in 
some of the higher demand areas.  Salford now needs to ‘derive competitive advantage 
from non-price differentiation’ by having skilled residents to draw in business and 
support the local economy (Salford City Council 2009a). As the below quote 
demonstrates, 
“The object was to bring in Economically Active people to reinvigorate the 
existing community, to make a bigger community where there is more 
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economic activity there by supporting businesses… without economically 
active  people that wouldn’t work” (8 - Private developer).   
Bringing those with economic capital to the areas is then necessary to maintain upward 
growth and foster more business investment. An example that can demonstrate this 
recirculation of capital back to Central Salford is the Salford Shopping Precinct within 
Pendleton, home to planned PFI which is a £650 million pound programme looking to 
redevelop 1,253 existing properties and build 1,600 new homes alongside them (Salford 
City Council 2014f). Pendleton is situated in a location that is seen as a key corridor 
connecting Central Salford with SQ, Manchester City Centre and the regeneration 
occurring in Chapel Street. The aim is to develop the area in a way that will expand the 
local housing stock offer to incoming groups and improve the housing for existing 
groups. The Shopping Precinct within Pendleton is designated for substantial 
redevelopment. The precinct itself services the needs of many Central Salford residents 
as the main shopping centre in the area. It is an indoor shopping centre that houses 
several national brands but also contains many discount stores (99p store, Poundland, 
Pound store and Super Pound Store), cash generators (Cash Convertor, Cash Generator, 
CEX, Grainger Games, H&T Pawnbrokers, Mays Pawnbrokers and Jewellers), gambling 
outlets (Arcade, Betfred, Ladbrokes, William Hill) and money lenders (Money Line, The 
Money Shop, Speedy Cash) (see figure 16 below).  
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The consistent story around the Precinct is that when the population began to decline 
post-dock closure, many of the big stores left the area, including Marks and Spencer and 
WH Smith. When the precinct was first built during the late 1960’s it had required large 
scale demolition of houses and shops to make space for its manifestation. At the time 
the precinct was designed to be ‘the finest in Europe’ (The Salford Star 2010c).  Whilst it 
never quite obtained this status, it did require substantial Council investment to build. 
Since the 1990’s it has had several cash injections to improve its fascia, including £4 
million pounds from the Council. In 2000 it was sold to a private investor and ten years 
later in 2010 it was sold again to Salford Estates (ibid). Salford Estates is owned by Praxis 
Holdings, which regards itself as one of the UKs most ‘active, reliable and discrete 
investors’ (Parxis Holdings 2013). They sell themselves as ‘well-resourced and highly 
acquisitive’ and specialise in purchasing ‘under-performing or non-performing’ assets 
speculatively that can reap benefits in the short and medium term. Salford Estates have 
Figure 16: Salford Shopping Precinct – Authors own photo 
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planned to transform the Shopping Precinct into a newly marketed ‘Pendleton Way’, a 
main shopping provider of the ‘New Salford’.  The precinct is to be modernised, 
providing higher a quality physical realm and a greater choice of shops, housed within 
modern, double height units (see figure 17 below). 
 
 
However, whilst some of the planned developments have materialised - the building of 
an Aldi which has already been sold off to another developer – the development of the 
Shopping centre has yet to begin. The plans have been widely publicised not only 
through the Pendleton Way website which has been visible since 2011 but also local 
news media sources and Council statements. There however appears to have been little 
by way of updates since 2011. From the author’s personal correspondence the 
suggestion is that the development is contingent on securing nationally recognised 
tenants to commit to leasing the space. These commitments, however, appear to also 
be contingent on improving the demographics of the catchment area and their spending 
power, a fact that has not gone unnoticed by the local residents, as the below quote 
demonstrates,  
“Companies won’t commit to go there [shopping centre] until the 
demographics go up the scale a bit. As long as we’re all peasants on our 
social assistance, or whatever it is, they’re not interested” (18 - Community 
representative). 
Figure 17: Salford Shopping Centre Design. Source - Pendletonway Developments 
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The implication is that investment will begin to return to the area as people with 
economic capital return. Until they do, these plans are left to languish and the date for 
redevelopment keeps getting pushed further in to the future. What becomes explicit 
here is who these particular developments are intended for. Drawing in economically 
active people to the area becomes more and more crucial to maintaining Salford as an 
investment destination, reversing the capital withdrawal that occurred previously.  As 
Fuller (2012) argues, the differences between affluent incoming groups and the less 
affluent local residents are framed as a difference in their market value and that “…those 
that have economic capital are more hegemonic as they have the ability to regenerate…” 
(Fuller 2012: 920). What can be seen in the interviews conducted is that economically 
active people are sought after because not only will they be less demanding of services 
from the Local Authority but they will be crucial in driving forward growth. The inverse 
of this assumption then is that non-economically active people who currently reside in 
Salford are not only less crucial to the regeneration of Central Salford but increasingly 
less able to deliver its success, particularly when success is most frequently measured in 
investment and growth terms. To achieve regeneration success in these terms then it 
appears, through the interviews conducted, that the existing residents do not 
necessarily need to feature prominently.   
5.5.3 Delivering ‘success’? 
‘Salford 2025: A Modern Global City’ is the latest available prospectus detailing the 
strategic vision and aims for Salford’s future transformation. This document subsumes 
the earlier regeneration frameworks into a much more ambitious strategic vision in 
which Salford readies itself to compete in a global economic market,  
“Salford 2025 A modern global city sets out that ambitious vision – 
founded on a commitment to complete the work already started on 
Salford’s transformational agenda, creating decent jobs, outstanding 
environments where our communities can grow, and sustained economic 
growth. Critical will be the ability to inspire, upskill and connect Salford’s 
growing (and increasingly diverse) population to the new opportunities 
created” (Salford City Council 2013d: 3). 
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The prospectus highlights the successes so far achieved during Salford’s transformation 
agenda beginning with the adjudication that Salford has been changed ‘dramatically and 
positively’ (ibid p5). The inventory of accolades identifies ‘tangible benefits’ that have 
been so far delivered for Salford and the rest of the region. A major success which is 
featured as most significant has been the securing of substantial private sector 
investment - £1.3 billion pounds from the private sector over 5 years. This investment 
achievement is attributed to the successful partnership working at a regional and 
national level. This investment is deemed a success in that it delivers the regeneration, 
but also demonstrates to an outside audience the entrepreneurial ability of the Local 
Authority to work with partners to secure investment and deliver growth (a topic I will 
discuss in chapter six). The delivery of these projects in and of themselves then serve as 
a measure of the Local Authorities ‘unique ability to deliver jobs, growth and success’ 
(ibid p5). The measure of success then can be seen as heavily weighted towards securing 
investment.  
In terms of people, as previously mentioned, success is identified through the 
employment opportunities that have been created for residents to connect with and 
take advantage of. Little is said of the amount of actual connections that have been 
made at present. This speaks to Mele’s (2000) discussion of how the rhetoric around 
urban land-use change rareify the political and economic interests behind such changes 
by presenting suitable benefits for all users as a positive outcome. However, he argues 
that when these benefits are presented as universalistic - as something for everyone - 
they are equally evasive enough to avoid specificity over who will actually benefit and 
how. In the Salford context, the inability of some to connect to opportunities is then 
actually used to justify more of the same types of regeneration and private investment, 
as evidenced below (Salford City Council 2013d). 
What overlays all these evident successes is a recognition that Salford is becoming a city 
of choice to ‘live, work, invest and visit’ (Salford City Council 2013d: 6). This recognition 
of choice is taken as illustrative of Salford as having made its way towards succeeding in 
its transformation. Being a city of ‘choice’ has consistently featured in Salford’s 
ambitions. The notion of choice in this context, as mentioned previously, has an 
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economic undercurrent to it. Choosing to ‘live, work, invest and visit’ Salford implies a 
movement of capital or people towards Salford from somewhere else. Success is seen 
in the valid choice of Salford over other competitive offers, sending a message to the 
wider investment market. To choose Salford demonstrates its success in moving away 
from being a city of low demand; and being in demand has significant market value. 
Implicit in this discourse is that those residents who remained in Salford after its 
financial decline and deindustrialisation do not represent Salford as a neighbourhood of 
choice. For many, their economic necessity invalidates their choice of wanting to stay 
and reside in Salford. To see an area in competitive market terms invalidates as fruitless 
the want of people who reside in a place for personal, potentially non-economic, 
reasons. Success in economic these terms do not necessarily translate as successes in 
communitarian terms, as the below quote demonstrates, 
“But now it’s all people who go out to work. It’s all people who just want 
somewhere to get their head down really or to come home to after a night 
of partying in Manchester. And there isn’t that sense of community. It may 
have improved the housing stock. It might have improved the housing 
market. But it hasn’t improved Salford over much, not in that sense of a 
place to live.” (18 - Community representative). 
To measure success in economic terms can serve to mask the remaining issues that the 
regeneration may not have solved, not as of yet anyway. As we have seen previously, 
the benefits for some is intended to be realised at some undefined point in the future. 
The view from some of the participants interviewed was that in the meantime, 
improving the physicality of the space and increasing general employment levels in the 
area will present a façade of improvement that does not necessarily include the existing 
residents. The below quote exemplifies this point: 
“I think my only concern with regeneration is that - and it does get better 
and things will get better and houses will improve, more people will come 
in working - but that won’t change the numbers. It will change the 
percentage of people not working but it won’t change the numbers will 
it?... its still 800 people and that’s the beauty about percentages isn’t it. 
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You can water them down can’t you by simply increasing people… But 
you’ve still got that 800 cohort that within those families don’t change… 
and then it doesn’t matter because you’re making your tax you’re giving 
them the benefit… still 800 people you’re leaving out. Still 800 poor 
people” (10 - Third sector officer). 
The above participant was referring specifically to an area within Central Salford. The 
point being made was that the regeneration ‘successes’ do not specifically need to 
benefit the local people in order to be deemed a success. To flood the area of Central 
Salford with incoming groups in tenure blind housing may dilute, rather than ameliorate 
the underlying problems that the regeneration schemes are designed to tackle. In 
addition to not ameliorating the issue, it may actually serve to exacerbate some of these 
problems around housing affordability and a lack of relevant skills.   
What appears to emerge within the data is that as the area begins to change, and the 
image of Salford and what Salford is intended to become changes, many of the local 
residents may become displaced. Displaced here does not refer solely to the spatial 
movement of people in to and out of the area, although this may occur. Displaced here 
refers to, drawing on Davidson’s (2009) thesis, the lived-experience of space, or more 
importantly, the dislocation from the socio-spatial relations within that lived-
experience. As Davidson argues, to reduce displacement to a spatial dislocation means 
that urban planners can counter these claims by preventing this out-migration, as is the 
case with policies aimed at social mixing. However, this misses the more philosophical 
dimensions of place as a site of social relations. Within these spaces of relations people 
should have the ‘right to place’ and the ‘right to dwell’ (Davidson 2009:232). 
Displacement is more than just spatial because it concerns the erosion of place, and the 
social relations constructed through lived-experience of that place. What we see in 
Central Salford is the loss of place for some of the existing residents, be that through the 
creation of areas in which they feel culturally ‘out of place’ or the residential spaces in 
which they inevitably have to make space for incoming groups, spaces in which their life 
styles may be subsequently less tolerated. Their ‘right to dwell’ is challenged when 
bringing market value to the area becomes a central regeneration goal. The scale of 
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change in Salford forces existing residents to consider their place in relation to these 
changes. As the below quote demonstrates,   
“In terms of affordability, yep Salford has an affordable housing problem. 
Which is not that the houses are too expensive, but that people are too 
poor” (5 - Council employee). 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has aimed to document the changes being seen at a local level in Central 
Salford from the perspective of those involved in its transformation. It has aimed to 
understand how Salford was intended to benefit from those changes and who those 
benefits were intended for. As has been seen, Salford is undertaking a major 
modernization journey in which local residents are expected to ‘play their part’. A new 
modern ‘global’ future is on the horizon and change is a key to that future. Local 
residents are encouraged not to be a barrier to that change, not to be stagnant within 
that journey. Using this discourse resistance to this journey is reduced. People who are 
not supportive or who demonstrate immobility to this change are posited as failing to 
understand or fully grasp the inevitability of where Salford is going. Their resistance is 
foreclosed and renamed as confusion.  
It is expected that local residents will acquiesce to these changes by being exposed to it. 
But as seen earlier in the chapter, some local residents feel ‘out of place’ within the 
developments like SQ. There is an exclusionary element built in to this space through 
cultural and economic barriers. The demarcation of space in its orderly logic designates 
appropriate use, and this appropriate use incorporates employment. In employment 
terms local residents are able to engage with the physicality of the space through 
maintenance and service provision for people who are able to engage with it on a 
different level, a more content specific level. In this context, local residents are not 
displaced from this area but placed as a crucial underprop to it, an underprop that 
reinforces division and polarizes groups in this microcosm of Salford’s new future.  
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Salford residents are also not displaced from the area, or at least that is the aim of the 
regeneration policies. Spatial displacement is avoided in theory through mixed use 
developments and policies to rehouse in the same area, but not necessarily avoided in 
practice as has been seen with the increase in affordable rent. However, in seeing 
displacement as a spatial issue policy makers are able to overlook displacement as a 
social or relational issue. People still express feelings of loss or dislocation from their 
surrounding areas as the space is redesigned around them. They experience ‘un-homing’ 
through the changing environment and their relation to it and others within it (Atkinson 
2015).  
What we can also see occurring here is the eschewal of part of the current generation 
of Salford residents who have what is seen as neither the aspiration nor the skills 
necessary to allow them to benefit from the regeneration and creation of new forms of 
employment in Salford. For younger residents the hope is that in the ‘future’ they will 
be able to take advantage of what has become available, although of course this is by 
no means a certainty. However, for particular residents who are beyond education age 
there is little expectation that they will benefit. It would seem that on this journey 
particular groups of people will remain left behind. 
The success and benefit of regeneration is measured in terms of growth and the 
potential to secure further investment. Private investment is able to profit from the 
established rent gap that has been created by previous circuits of capital disinvestment 
in Salford. The creation of additional employment in the area is regarded as a success by 
Salford Council in and of itself, regardless of who is actually benefitting from this 
employment. The numbers of employed signify improvements to an external audience. 
What can be seen emerging is a larger demographic of economically active residents 
which in turn increases the economic wealth of the area. But as has been demonstrated, 
this changing of the demographics does not mean that deprivation has decreased. By 
flooding the area of incoming residents it has simply served to dilute the concentrated 
effects of poverty rather than improve the conditions of residents. If anything, this 
mixing may create an ‘us and them’ where boundaries are symbolically erected between 
groups of people.  
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The vision for Salford and its journey towards being a modern global city is designating 
as inevitable a particular future for the city. It is reducing the ability of people to dwell 
in an area through their perceived lack of market value. It reduces the ability of people 
to dwell in multiple ways by forcing people to succumb to and promote a particular 
image. However, in the quest for investment and economic growth at the expense of 
the residents that live there, the Council is eradicating the reminders of what caused the 
decline in the first instance. It is removing signs of capital disinvestment in an attempt 
to secure capital reinvestment. Removing these signs encourages policy makers to rely 
on something to drive their linear trajectory of progress that by its very nature relies on 
circuits of destruction. This has serious implications for the future of Salford if there are 
further changes to the economy.  
In the following chapter I will explore this issue of capital investment and disinvestment 
in more detail by focusing on the regeneration of SQ. In this chapter I will explore, using 
the data gathered from participants, the role of Salford Council in securing the 
investment to redevelop SQ. It will look at the vision for the site and the involvement of 
private developers to deliver this vision. In particular it will explore the power dynamics 
between the Council and private capital and the possibilities for democratic decision 
making when attempting to deliver growth.      
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6. Articulations of Salford Quays: From car park to MediaCityUK 
6.1 Introduction 
The last chapter looked at the effects of the regeneration of Salford on local residents 
and questioned who the main beneficiaries were. This chapter intends to focus on the 
redevelopment of Salford Quays (SQ) specifically, through using key documentation and 
interviews with some significant actors who were closely involved, to understand the 
how and why behind this regeneration. The reason SQ was chosen as a focus over other 
regeneration projects in Salford was due firstly to its identification as a representation 
of how Salford intends to transform. In this sense it can be thought of as a microcosm 
of Salford’s intended future. Secondly it allows for an analysis of how the Council has 
been involved in the governance of the project and the role that they have taken in its 
regeneration. Thirdly it is a development that involves a significant private developer in 
Salford and the wider region in general. This enables us to consider quite clearly the 
effects of private sector involvement at a large scale.   
Essentially that chapter will aim to consider, from the perspective of those decision 
makers involved, why the Quays has taken the form it has, who has driven the 
development in this way and how it intends to connect to the social conditions it is 
intending to ameliorate. In particular, the research questions it aims to address are: 
what role does the local government play in urban regeneration and what does it tell us 
about its priorities? How do state and non-state actors engage to deliver regeneration 
at a local level and what is the impact of this for democratic accountability? 
To begin with the chapter will look at the development of the Quays site from the initial 
decision to renew the space after its closure as a dock. It will trace its development from 
a governance perspective up to the creation of MediaCityUK. It will trace this 
development through a series of stages which are both temporal and conceptual. It will 
argue that the authority responsible for the site itself never had a clear vision of what it 
was to become, allowing it to be market led rather than anything which was planned 
according to local demand. One of the key reasons behind it taking this form was the 
changing political landscape to one which curtailed the ability of local government to 
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reverse the impacts of deindustrialisation through redistributive social policy. The 
consequence of this was a reliance on private investment to deliver regeneration, 
something that was at first forced but then engaged with willingly. The reliance of 
investors meant giving them the power to determine the form the Quays took, 
something which incrementally moved further away from meeting local need. What we 
will see as a result is the creation of a MediaCityUK in which local residents do not have 
the required skills to be employed in the jobs created.  
In the context of this discussion this chapter will move on to describe how, throughout 
this process, the local Council can be seen to commit more and more to a growth 
agenda, adopting an entrepreneurial role through which to compete for increasingly 
mobile capital (Harvey 1989). Drawing on Davidson and Iveson (2014) I will argue that 
by invoking the language of ‘necessity’ the Council demonstrate a fatalistic attitude to 
private investment. It is expressed as the only available means to regenerate the site. 
Because of this necessity the Council is more willing to compromise its otherwise 
statutory controls so as to smooth the investment process and provide a suitable 
environment for it to go. Through these public-private interactions the Council is also 
forced to bear some of the risk of speculative investment. It is argued in this chapter 
that this quest for growth results in regeneration which moves further away from the 
need to tackle structural conditions. Instead this is tackled through a specially created 
public sector programme as a separate project, rather than the development itself, 
allowing us to question whether or not it is imbued with any regeneration intentions.  
This chapter also documents the emergence of a key private developer in this area; Peel 
Holdings. This company has development interests in the region, of which the SQ site 
forms just one of many. Peel’s relationship with Salford Council will be discussed in this 
chapter, highlighting how its size and power as a land owner and the network of elite 
business people it connects with give the company a bargaining power over the Council. 
It will be discussed how the involvement of Peel allows them to shape the project in 
their interests through the uneven power relations they engage in. Here we will begin 
to see challenges to democratic accountability and responsibility through this 
relationship.  
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In order to justify the disconnect emerging between the local residents it intends to 
benefit and the development that emerged interviewees employed a legitimising 
discourse in which the key sites in Salford are promoted as regional/international/global 
drivers of growth. By employing this discourse of scale they are able to justify the 
development and public sector financial involvement as being regionally beneficial, 
rather than locally beneficial. In this flexibility over scale there is also flexibility over the 
brand-identity of Salford as a place. Here we see it referred to as Manchester. This is 
again justified as necessary to secure business investment, arguing that Manchester is a 
more competitive brand. Through this changing identity of place beyond one which is 
territorially demarcated, Massey (1995) is drawn on to understand how this is 
constructed through the power relations that allow a new determining of Salford’s 
identity. Those uneven power relations, who span the bounded geography of Salford 
are articulating a new future for Salford, one which is heavily influenced by 
unaccountable private elites.  
6.2 Becoming Salford Quays 
6.2.1 Stage one – Inviting the private sector 
One of the themes emerging from the interviews with participants involved in the 
redevelopment of SQ was the lack of a coherent and specific sense of what the Quays 
would develop into. The Salford City Council purchased the majority of the docklands in 
1983 after its closure as a working port. Initial conceptions of the space included mass 
council housing and a large carpark, neither of which came to fruition (Goodey 2010). A 
suggested reason for this was that the government at the time would have been 
unsupportive of non-private sector led developments, especially ones which would 
involve the provision of council housing (correspondence with participant 1). There was 
recognition that despite this being initially a Council-led regeneration initiative, the 
redevelopment of the Quays would need to be driven by the private sector to be seen 
as legitimate by the national government and subsequently, the market. Because of this 
perception the Council joined up with a private sector developer, Urban Waterside Ltd, 
in a partnership arrangement in 1984. One of the docks was transferred to the 
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ownership of Urban Waterside to be developed, with the agreement that they would 
secure substantial private investment in addition to public sector investment.  
“So we got Ted Hagan [private developer] and we set up this Urban 
Waterside Company and he bought up a couple of bits of land and he 
fronted a lot of the discussions with ministers and with other private sector 
companies. He was a real supporter of the Council in those early days and 
obviously because of government policy there was no money then for 
public sector housing so we had to get housing developers interested and 
so we were able to sell it very much as a private sector-led development, 
although I think it was a public sector vision and it was public sector-
enabled” (1 – Elected official) 
The central government was not prepared to provide funding grants to improve the 
environment at the Quays until it was matched by private sector investment (Struthers 
2003). The irony identified by Henderson et al (2007) was that Salford Council had to 
financially underwrite parts of the private finance in order to secure its investment. The 
Council had to assume the financial risks in order to generate the funding.  John Willis, 
then the chief executive of Salford Council, reportedly stated that, "At the City Council, 
we had sleepless nights over the guarantees we had to give, but they were never called 
on" (The Lowry n.d.). This requirement of private sector involvement reflected a core 
belief within the Conservative government that local Councils could not and should not 
be delivering urban renewal. Private delivery vehicles, like the newly created Urban 
Development Corporations, were the preferred model for urban policy implementation; 
they were deemed to be market responsive, de-bureaucratised and accountable only to 
central government, bypassing local planning requirements (Imrie & Thomas 1999). 
The initial plan was that the Quays could become a popular mixed-use waterfront 
destination, an appealing leisure space much like waterfront regeneration projects 
occurring in the United States, particularly in Baltimore, Boston and New York (Jones 
1998). The specifics of what the development would include were not overly prescriptive 
and the Council drew advise from architects Shepherd, Epstein and Hunter in 1985 who 
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had previously been involved in designing the vision for the redevelopment of the 
London Docks to conceptualise in what way it could materialise, 
“The potential of the site is there for all to see. What is not so evident is 
the way in which this potential can be realized. For this reason the City 
Council commissioned architects, with their experience of similar schemes 
in London Docks, to prepare a redevelopment plan for the area” (Salford 
City Council 1990: 3).  
The plan itself set out in the framework that the Quays would be a mixed-use 
development where people ‘live, work and enjoy recreation’ (Ibid: 17). Primarily the 
aims were for development around housing, office and work spaces, hotels, leisure and 
tourism (including those for sports) to be undertaken mostly by the private sector, with 
the Council being involved as a ‘promoter and coordinator’ (ibid: 25). Here, Salford 
Council can be seen as adopting an entrepreneurial role, moving from what Harvey 
(1989) describes as managerial to entrepreneurial governance, as described in chapter 
two.  
As can be seen in the early stages of the development of the Quays, the local Council 
involved private developers as a method of financing its production. Funding through 
the Derelict Land Grant from central government was not approved until private 
investment was secured (Struthers 2003), although the project was underwritten by 
public funds, 
“…the regeneration had to be dressed up as being private sector led 
although it was always underpinned by public investment in the 
infrastructure, the vision was laid down in Local Authority plans, the design 
consultants were employed by the Local Authority, but somehow you had 
to, at that time, you had to dress these things up to get government to 
give you some money” (1 - Elected Official)    
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The partnership here is construed not as a choice but a necessity in accordance with the 
new funding arrangements. The Council alone was unable to make the required renewal 
efforts within the restrictive framework established by the government.  
During the late 1980’s development on the mixed-use site was underway, shaped by the 
vision of Shepheard, Epstein and Hunter (which included a hotel, cinema, some private 
housing, offices and leisure centres). At the same time other developers began to 
commit to investing in the space (Salford City Council 2008a). Developers began to build 
large-scale office complexes on parts of the site, increasing the scale of production. But 
this production was also speculative, 
 “So in the progression of development at the Quays there were a series of 
relatively low-density housing and industrial schemes built around 6, 7 and 
8 Dock. And then there was a sort of gear change to these bigger multi-
storey developments at Trafford Road Swing Bridge and the Anchorage 
and what was called Harbour City with the Victoria building. Between the 
three of those [developers] dropped about half a million square feet of 
speculative office space on to the market. And if you work roughly on 
about £100 a square foot to build it, that’s a big investment in the area.” 
(16 - Private developer).  
As can be seen the development was very much seen to be supply- rather than demand-
led making the space attractive for investors with no clear direction or real stipulation 
over the type of economy or labour market that was to be created, 
Interviewer: Was there a clear vision for what types of jobs and what types 
of businesses [would be on the Quays]? 
Participant 1: I don’t think there was. Funnily enough there was an early 
feeling that it might attract media companies and given the fact that 
MediaCity is there now, that was more prescient than we imagined at the 
time. I think the honest answer is that we didn’t know (1 - Elected Official). 
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There are obvious implications here about the social benefits for local residents who, as 
it has been previously mentioned, have in general a particular set of labour skills. The 
overall vision for SQ at this point was place-based rather than territorially targeted, 
echoing Harvey’s (Harvey 1989) identification of place over territory as a feature of 
entrepreneurial urbanism. There is no specific development plan here to replace in 
some way the type of employment that was lost that matches the skillsets in the 
surrounding areas.  
Kramer (2011) has argued that what we see occurring in renewal efforts like this are the 
basic underlying principles of neoliberalism. Drawing on Logan and Molotch’s notion of 
the ‘Growth Machine’ Kramer explains how, under neoliberalism, coalitions of public 
and private actors come together to extract profit from particular land at the expense 
of alternative, less profit-driven uses. Privatism underpins the idea of growth machines. 
Here, this logic of growth is justified by claiming that in order to improve an area 
suffering from the effects of deindustrialisation it is necessary for the public sector to 
produce a useable piece of land through providing tax breaks and a developed 
infrastructure. This will then encourage much needed developers and speculators to 
privately invest in the area. In turn, newly-created jobs and increased property values 
will inevitably ‘trickle-down’ to those in the surrounding areas. However, as Kramer 
argues, what is often absent from this logic is “any mention of the kinds of policies or 
strategies that are to be implemented in order to ensure that promised financial gains 
flow back into the public sector” (2011: 243). In fact it is suggested that these types of 
privately funded regeneration efforts aimed at local growth can serve to actually 
exacerbate existing inequalities. Salford Council adhered to such an ideology by 
conducting reclamation works in the early 1980’s and designated part of the docks as an 
Enterprise Zone to exempt businesses locating in the zone from development land tax 
and rates and offer them 100% capital allowances (Salford City Council 2008a). The types 
of development that would directly benefit local residents were not so obviously 
specified.  
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6.2.2 Stage two – The cultural turn  
A review of the Quays development plan was conducted in 1988 and it was proposed 
that a flagship development was needed on the site. Whilst some building had taken 
place, it was suggested that what was necessary in place-making and promotional terms 
was a large-scale development signaling the transformation of the wider Salford area 
and acting as a catalyst for change; what had occurred so far was insufficient to have 
the intended transformative effects. The catalyst was to be something culturally 
significant. In particular the Council had envisioned the creation of a performing arts 
centre after having seen similar developments take shape in other cities, for example 
London’s Tate Modern and Bilbao’s Guggenheim. This perhaps signaled in Salford what 
has been described as a ‘cultural turn’ in urban renewal, a concept emerging from these 
seemingly successful regeneration projects that relied heavily on flagship developments 
of cultural significance. Designating areas as Cultural Quarters and achieving ‘city of 
culture’ status also became seen as legitimate and successful ways to regenerate and 
transform a particular area during the 1990’s (Miles 2005).  
The decision to construct something cultural was selected based on these apparent 
successes elsewhere. As noted by the Council, the decision emerged upon “Realising the 
contribution that landmark cultural buildings can make to economic development and 
tourism in major cities across Europe and the globe…” (Salford City Council 2008a: 10). 
What we saw occurring here was a replication and transplantation of international 
regeneration strategies in specific localities, regardless of local context and/or necessity. 
This represents, it has been argued, a global network of regeneration strategies in which 
cities across the globe follow the same pattern or strategy for post-industrial 
regeneration (MacLeod 2011). All cities adopt a strategy whereby they each seek to 
create ‘spaces of spectacle’ but through roughly the same approach (Raco 2003) 
There is an accepted (but, as yet, unfounded) assumption that cultural regeneration in 
a given area will solve the social problems created by deindustrialisation (Miles & 
Paddison 2005). Felicity Goodey, the lead on the building of The Lowry, conceded that 
at the time the idea of a performing arts centre was conceived “…at a possible cost of 
£127 million, the Council had absolutely no idea how it would be funded” (2010: 47). It 
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was acknowledged that rather than being privately funded, this initiative was to be 
publicly funded, in large part due to the lack of demand for land amongst the private 
sector at that time because of the downturn in market conditions (Struthers 2003). Here 
then, rather than facilitating development by acting as a ‘promotor and coordinator’, 
Salford Council was necessarily taking an active role in delivering and financing flagship 
development. The performing arts centre, which subsequently became known as The 
Lowry Theatre was funded as a millennium project through securing a bid to the National 
Lottery funding, with some finance also secured from European and Regional public 
funding streams and the Salford City Council itself (Struthers 2003).   
Figure 18: The Lowry Theatre at night (above). Source - TFIVenues.com 
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Thompson (2013) has argued that the inclusion of L.S. Lowry’s art and the eponymous 
naming of The Lowry was much of an afterthought; not something envisioned during its 
design or creation. The turn to Lowry was to offer an element of heritage and localism 
to an otherwise locally disconnected space. However, as has been discussed in the 
previous chapter, the extent to which local residents have benefitted from the 
development of The Lowry is questionable. And yet it is deemed successful in terms of 
its attractiveness to tourist and the financial contribution this makes to economy 
through visitors and job creation. The New Economy (2013) estimated that The Lowry 
added £26.9 million to the regional economy but importantly does not identify how 
much of that contribution goes to Salford specifically. It employs 373 people, of which 
approximately 70% are part time or casual contracts. 31% of employees live in Salford 
although the report does not specify if these employees resided in Salford prior to 
employment at The Lowry (New Economy 2013). It can be assumed that indirect jobs 
will also have been created in the industries that surround The Lowry, particularly 
Figure 19: The Lowry Theatre and Lowry Outlet Mall (above). Source - Geograph.org 
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tourism facilities like hotels and restaurants. The figures for local employment of Salford 
residents in such industries are not available. The New Economy’s report does identify 
The Lowry as being the biggest tourist attraction in Greater Manchester and deems it to 
have contributed to the marketing of Salford to an external audience.  
The Lowry, whilst viewed as successful in these ways, was still seen as not having 
delivered enough to change the composition and demographics of the wider Salford 
area. As described by Felicity Goodey (2010), “The Lowry was a turning point, it started 
to engender confidence, but it was not enough” (47). In 2005, Salford established an 
Urban Regeneration Company (URC), headed by the former BBC journalist Felicity 
Goodey. The URC can be seen as an amended version of the previously mentioned Urban 
Development Corporations of the Conservative government. URCs were first envisioned 
in New Labour’s 1999 Urban Task Force report which encouraged the creation of public-
private organisations that acted at ‘arm’s length’ from political accountability (Kort & 
Klijn 2011). A continuation can be seen here towards maintaining responsibility for 
regeneration as a private sector role with public sector financial support.   
In Salford, the URC was financed by English Partnerships (the government’s 
regeneration agency), the North West Development Agency and Salford City Council. 
The URC created Central Salford’s Vision and Regeneration Framework and acted as the 
lead on carrying out the plans that were now to include all of Central Salford, with SQ 
forming a part of it. The importance of the Central Salford URC here is to demonstrate 
the more formal statutory shift to public-private partnership regeneration in Salford and 
to also acknowledge the positioning of certain key people in the next stage of SQ 
development, specifically MediaCityUK. As we have seen so far, the Council has 
employed a variety of strategies in which to develop SQ, at each stage incorporating the 
most recent developments in regeneration, particularly the move to a cultural flagship. 
But at this stage there was still no obvious overarching vision for how the space will 
connect to the local environment or how it will develop in the long term.  
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6.2.3 Stage three – Peel’s arrival 
In 1987 Peel Holdings, a major land developer in the North West, purchased the 36 mile 
long Manchester Ship Canal in addition to the Bridgewater Canal estates (on which they 
built the retail development The Trafford Centre) that they already owned. Since this 
they have purchased, amongst many other things, the Liverpool Mersey Docks and 
Harbour Company. Together these form one of Peel’s major projects, the Ocean 
Gateway, in which they intend to bring together the Liverpool and Manchester City 
regions by developing at least 50 projects along the land corridor (The Peel Group 2015). 
The below figure demonstrates the spatiality of the Ocean gateway and the projects 
along the corridor.  
 
 
 
Figure 20: Peel Holdings Ocean Gateway Plan. Source - The Peel Group, 2009 
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The emergence of Peel at this stage of Salford’s development established a relationship 
with Salford Council that has continued and intensified in to the present, as will be 
elaborated on more in the following chapter. The acquisition of large areas of space in 
Salford and around the region place Peel in a strategically important position and from 
which to engage in political decision making which affects its company vision (Harrison 
2014b).  
The reason for this purchase of the canal was not for the waterways but to acquire the 
land that sits either side of it. Peel specialises in land acquisition and development which 
individually may form part of an overall project, but are not directed by any particular 
development plan, as the below Peel representative stated, 
“Interviewer: So there’s never necessarily a clear idea of what’s going to 
go on the land?  
Participant 16: That’s the way Peel operates, yes. Other companies, they 
might specialise in building retail warehouses or building shops or building 
offices and those sorts of companies will go out and buy a piece of land for 
a particular purpose, to build an office block on it or whatever. Peel buys 
companies that own land - so we get into all sorts“(16 – Private developer) 
What this speaks to is the notion that the Quays development was never driven by a 
specific objective or a clear rationale beyond seeking private investment for the site as 
a goal in and of itself. The private developers and land owners were performing to what 
appeared to be the most lucrative use of the land at the time, rather than a specific 
developmental goal. What seems to be missing from these plans, both formal and 
informal, is a sense of how the Quays regeneration would specifically connect with local 
residents to achieve the aim of reversing some of the decline created by 
deindustrialisation. The same argument can also be made for the creation of 
MediaCityUK, as shall now be described.  
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6.2.4 Stage four – The BBC’s on the move 
As we’ve seen so far in this chapter, some success from the development on the Quays 
site had been experienced, particularly with The Lowry. The subsequent Development 
Framework objectives governed by the URC had set out to regenerate other key sites in 
Central Salford. However, there was a suggestion that Salford still needed something of 
more significance in order to provoke the kind of transformation intended by the 
flagship development The Lowry, as the below participant stated,     
“I think MediaCity is the big project that we were looking for to actually 
create what we wanted to see happen” (2 - Elected Official).  
The implication was that Salford had achieved transformations to an extent, but that it 
was still falling short of the kind of flagship development that would bring it all together 
and mobilise greater change. It is not surprising then that when the suggestion of 
MediaCityUK began to emerge, it was supported wholly by Salford City Council, the URC 
and Peel Holdings. 
In 2004, the BBC committed to decentralising parts of its activities to outside of London, 
in order to be more efficient, provide economic benefits to a region other than London, 
and to better serve its northern audiences (National Audit Office 2013). The Manchester 
region was identified early on as the main target area by the BBC. The move of the BBC 
was seen as crucial for the North West region in general and for the Manchester City-
region as an asset of competitiveness, as acknowledged by the Chief Executive of 
Manchester City Council, Sir Howard Bernstein, in a statement to the House of Lords 
Select Committee on the BBC Charter Review, 
“I think the vocabulary of all parties over the past few years has been the 
significance of city regions in trying to drive the national economic 
capacity of the UK. In that context, over the last few years what we have 
seen is a much greater focus particularly on places like Manchester in a 
wider sense, not just the City of Manchester, in focusing around those key 
value-added economic sectors which are capable not only of achieving 
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transformational change but also at the same time improving national 
competitiveness” (Manchester City Council 2005: 3). 
The BBC development was seen as a key opportunity here to enable the Manchester-
city region to act as a competitive area in driving the regional economy, able to compete 
with city regions like the South East. What can be seen in this quote is the recognition 
by Manchester City Council of the need to think beyond their immediate geographic 
territory to other spatial scales, a point that will be revisited later in the chapter. Also 
here is the recognition of the BBC as an investment that can enable transformational 
change and increase the region’s competitive standing. The move of the BBC, then, 
signals a much wider national objective of the redistribution of regional ability to 
engender growth through positioning themselves as competitive by developing specific 
regional assets. This speaks to Healey’s (2009) point that in the shift to entrepreneurial 
state governance the state decentralises power to the regions in order for them to 
compete for global capital.  The state is no longer responsible for the creation of 
employment for citizens but allows the region to identify and promote their most 
competitive place-based assets which will enable them to generate local growth; a shift 
in state responsibility from creating an ‘employment dividend’ to ‘economic dividend’ 
(2009: 834). In Sir Howard Bernstein’s quote above we see such an inference of this 
‘economic competitiveness’ line of regional governance. The securing of the BBC to the 
Manchester city-region was thought of as a contribution to its place-based competitive 
assets. 
In its memorandum to the House of Lords Select Committee on the BBC Charter Review, 
Salford’s URC and Salford Council stressed the importance of the BBC’s relocation to the 
region, stating at this stage that the site in particular, whether Salford or Manchester, 
was less important than the overall move (Salford City Council & Central Salford Urban 
Regeneration Company 2006). However, there was competition between the two cities 
for the BBC to relocate. It was something that was seen as necessary for Salford to 
continue its transformational vision. But prior to its emergence on Salford’s radar, there 
was no suggestion that SQ would be developed in to a MediaCityUK, 
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“Here were talks going on with the owners Peel about what sort of 
development would be appropriate [on the Quays], whether it would be 
housing or commerce and then this opportunity came along of the BBC”(1 
- Elected Official)  
After discussions with key people involved in the creation of MediaCityUK and analysis 
of related documentation there was no clear story identifying how it initially began to 
materialise. Several different MediaCityUK origin stories were given, in which different 
parties identified themselves as the first point of call. All parties agreed, however, that 
the initial idea was prompted by the relocating of the BBC to a site in the North.    
“Out of the blue we get a letter from a firm of agents in Manchester saying 
have you got a site for 300,000 square feet of offices? It didn’t say who it 
was for... And then a couple of months later out of the blue we get a 
response and it actually came from the BBC’s head of property and it said 
you’ve responded to this and we’ve looked at what you’ve sent in and it’s 
us and here’s an RFI, a request for information, in a lot more detail saying 
we don’t just want 300,000 square feet of offices we want some studios 
and are you interested” (16 - Private developer).  
It can be assumed that before this correspondence the idea of a MediaCityUK was not 
planned for. What the above quote also demonstrates is that the BBC’s relocation was 
not just about decentralisation but also changing in some ways how the BBC operated. 
There was a desire to rent buildings and outsource production functions rather than 
own and develop it all in house. The request was for a plot of land large enough to allow 
for this scale of development. Another participant asserted that it was the Council, 
writing to the BBC on another matter that initiated the consideration of Salford as a 
potential site: 
“[Salford Council] wrote to the BBC about this and they were very 
interested but the culmination of that correspondence was that they 
eventually wrote to us and said ‘oh by the way why have you never offered 
us the opportunity to come and look around Salford for potential sites?’, 
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so [Council] wrote back and said well we always assumed that you were 
going in to Manchester but we are more than happy to help you look at 
some sites in Salford and they wrote back and said ‘ok yeh, we’ll do that’, 
and as soon as we got that letter - whoosh  [speed sound]-  that’s when 
we set up the urban regeneration company to pursue it and everything 
after that is history” (1 - Elected Official) 
As can be seen in the quote, when the BBC indicated their want to consider Salford as a 
potential site the Council was more than willing to accommodate them and actively set 
about exploring its feasibility through the direction of the URC acting as a lead. The URC 
version of events is slightly different again: 
“Manchester thought this was a done-deal so when I began to take a URC 
interest in the BBC opportunity I got my knuckles wrapped and was told to 
go away… By this time the BBC had five potential sites in mind, two of 
which were in Salford, and when the BBC came to us to discuss them the 
gloves were off and we were plunged into real competition” (Goodey, 
2010, p49).    
In this retelling, the URC only got involved once the BBC approached them directly. 
Whilst previously it was shown that the BBC’s move to the region was crucial, ‘whatever 
site’ was chosen, it can be seen here that the two Councils did compete quite seriously 
to be the chosen site.   
It is difficult to disentangle from these narratives who initially promoted the BBC to 
consider Salford as a location in the first instance. However, what is interesting is how 
all actors were independently involved to some extent in communications with them 
from the outset. MediaCityUK, in all of these accounts, was embraced and fought for 
right from the beginning. As one developer stated: 
“I think by the time we landed it we’d spent about £1.5 million just on 
design and stuff, just on spec. It was fairly big stuff.” (16 - Private 
developer) 
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Throughout this research there was never any suggestion that there was resistance or 
hesitation over the move. For all concerned there was a significant sense that they 
would do whatever was necessary to make this happen. There was an agreed consensus 
amongst all parties that this was something to be achieved. The plans for the site now 
began to focus and be tailored towards this end, 
“When it started we didn’t expect to win but we thought it was worth 
doing just because it would help us for future sites of that nature. As 
it…went on it became obvious that we stood a chance and we had to work 
out what our strategy would be” (2 - Elected Official). 
 
6.2.5 Stage five – MediaCityUK 
 
It was at this point that the vision for an entire MediaCityUK started to emerge. Again, 
this was not pre-planned by the partners involved but driven specifically by the BBC 
itself. The BBC wanted more than just offices. They wanted additional studios and media 
centres and an environment in which these could all work together. It was the BBC that 
Figure 21: MediaCity UK design. Source - Joroff, Frenchman and Sanal, 2007 
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thus encouraged the URC and Peel (who were leading on the development) to contact 
Mike Joroff, Professor at MIT in urban planning. In particular, Professor Joroff works with 
city planners and partners to promote innovative city development. Jorrof and 
colleagues advise city planners on developing what they refer to as ‘new century cities’, 
guided by principles that more resemble “…those of modern enterprises than of 
traditional city planning” (Joroff et al. 2009: 6). These principles should be inclusive of a 
strong narrative that directs the future of the city and its intent, guided primarily by an 
overarching vision as opposed to a prescribed master plan. They should also be agile and 
able to respond to change, led by partners with a variety of interests, and have a set of 
devolved powers and responsibilities (Joroff et al. 2009). For Joroff et al (2009) new 
century cities are ever-evolving clusters of specific business sectors that attract highly 
skilled people in the knowledge sector who can drive its success in the global economy. 
Such cities are “…an appropriate response to the current environment of industry 
transformation, rapid change, and uncertainty” (2009: 6). Joroff and his partners 
designed a MediaCityUK plan at the request of Peel Holdings to demonstrate how the 
site could be conceptualised (see figure 21 above).   
It was this design of the potential for an entire MediaCity and its associated culture that 
is said to have been a major selling point for the BBC. This plan catalysed the move 
towards establishing the Quays as a creative city, where people live, work and socialise 
in the same space and where the entire fabric of the environment is created so that 
creativity can occur inside and outside at any point in the day. The commissioning and 
use of the design by Joroff and partners demonstrates how they directed the vision for 
this regeneration strategy. Peck (2005) argues that this ‘creative cities script’ is a 
strategy apt for cities that have tried previous regeneration attempts and are in need of 
a new solution. He argues that city leaders have uncritically accepted the idea that 
creativity can lead to growth, and have moved straight on to requiring the necessary 
‘repertoire of strategies’ that leaders can adopt to attract the creative types (2005: 766).  
For Peck, the move to urban creativity (engendered here in MediaCity) is a new round 
in the entrepreneurial form of local government strategies aimed at securing external 
sources of growth seen in previous rounds such as the cultural turn (exemplified by the 
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first intended flagship The Lowry). It works as an urban blueprint which can be mapped 
on to the cities that choose it. Those who do not, Peck argues, are criticised for not 
wanting to change, for being stagnant – a sentiment that echoes themes emerging from 
the previous chapter. Urban creativity works as a ‘mobilising discourse’ (2005: 765), 
defining both the problem and the solution, but, like the cultural turn, there is limited 
evidence of the results. It could be assumed that a MediaCityUK in Salford, with financial 
backing from the public and private sectors and the BBC as an anchor tenant, could be 
successful in economic and property value terms. It seems to make sense as a strategy 
that could incorporate the BBC and other similar digital and media organisations. 
However, the issue Peck raises about strategies based on urban creativity is that it does 
not solve the problems it is intended to. It does not necessarily create jobs for those 
who lost out through deindustrialisation and a steady withdrawal of state subsidy. The 
creation of something like a MediaCity attracts a new class of people who are not just 
skilled but highly skilled, the type of ‘skilled sophisticated employees’ promoted by 
Joroff and partners in the design for MediaCityUK (Joroff et al. 2007: 6). What occurs 
then is the hope of trickle-down redistribution rather than a clear focus on the social 
welfare benefits necessary from the development. 
As described in the previous chapter, where jobs are created for local residents, this 
urban creativity may serve to construct divisions of labour rather than any social equity. 
Salford was chosen as the site for the BBC’s relocation on the conditions that the media 
corporation would form part of a bigger MediaCity. How this was built in practice will be 
the subject of the following section, but what we have seen here is how SQ has had 
cycles of spatial reorganisation in which capital successively values and then devalues 
land under new developmental phases of accumulation (Harvey 1993). The closure of 
the docks symbolised an earlier phase of capital mobility where more profitable forms 
of production emerged elsewhere resulting in a withdrawal of capital leaving the space 
to decline. Edensor (2005) argues that in the industrial ruins created by this earlier phase 
we are presented with the opportunity to critique the notion that capitalist production 
symbolises a linear form of progression. Here he argues we can see production as “a 
circular process through which things become obsolete, are thrown away, later recycled 
or replaced in pursuit of the always new” (2005b: 316).  
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As the Quays have transformed from a derelict site to a MediaCityUK these previous 
rounds of production are visibly removed, preventing the opportunity for this critique 
of progress, the opportunity to consider the consequences of a reliance on private 
capital. The Council has entered in to a zero-sum game to attract investment away from 
other areas to develop large scale projects. These projects at first physically engender 
this logic of urban development but then continually perpetuate it via the need to be 
seen constantly as a competitive option ready to compete for the next round 
(Swyngedouw et al. 2002). For Salford then the securing of MediaCityUK is 
representative of this development logic that enacts place-making at an even greater 
scale, moving further away from the representation of its locality, as Felicity Goodey 
notes in her retelling of a conversation with Michael Joroff: 
“I said, “Do you think we could be world class?” He looked down his nose 
at me and he replied, “Well I don’t know about that, but I think you could 
be globally significant”! And that will do us. We will be globally significant” 
(Goodey, 2010, p49)        
What this section has tried to document is the way in which, since the inception of a 
redeveloped Salford docks, there has never been any clear sense of where the site will 
go in the future and what it will become. It has progressed from a car park, to a mixed 
development of housing, leisure and offices, to an international cultural destination, to 
a global MediaCityUK. Whilst there were strategies enacted along the way there was no 
masterplan. What appears to be lacking from these flexible visions is the link that 
connects the regeneration efforts to local need. Each manifestation of the vision is 
influenced by private developers or speculators or national flows of available capital, in 
short, it has been market-led. As it has been developed at various stages it has moved 
further and further away from that which is immediately relevant or beneficial to local 
residents. That is not to say that the Salford Council did not envision the developments 
that have taken place, but it is to argue that its vision is tapered to the requirements of 
investment, a strategy which may not directly benefit local residents.  
In the previous chapter I outlined how local residents were described as suffering from 
a lack of ‘relevant skills’ to benefit from the newly created job opportunities in 
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MediaCityUK. What is interesting to see then from the development of MediaCityUK as 
documented above, is that arguably this site could have just as easily been a different 
form of production had the market taken it in a different direction. Salford residents 
might have been encouraged to upskill and educate in an entirely different direction. Or 
alternatively, Salford Council could have encouraged an employment base which meets 
the existing skill set of the local residents.  
6.3 The power to govern 
6.3.1 The Salford Model 
This next section will focus on the governance arrangements around MediaCityUK. To 
begin with however will be a brief consideration of the regeneration which has taken 
place in neighbouring Manchester. Much has been made of the ‘Manchester Model’ of 
regeneration, most specifically through the work of Jamie Peck and Kevin Ward, both of 
whom have written extensively on the urban development of Manchester.  Most 
notably, their edited collection ‘The City of Revolution’ documents in detail the specifics 
of the ‘Manchester Model’, which refers to the delivery of urban regeneration.  This 
model has established Manchester as ‘the entrepreneurial city writ large’ (Ward 2003: 
125). The model Manchester employed to deliver regeneration was to establish a good 
private and public partnership in which the Council acted with an entrepreneurial 
business mind-set. The state was engaged with the development of Manchester through 
a variety of different spatial scales; through local government, through regional 
governance (the North West Development Agency), through central government and 
through the European Union (Ward 2003). This approach to regeneration began with 
the City Challenge redevelopment of Hulme, an area in Manchester. It was used most 
successfully to redevelop the city centre after the IRA bombing and was enshrined most 
formally through the New East Manchester URC (Robson 2002).  
The successful delivery of these redevelopment strategies emanated from the creation 
of a semi-autonomous body that was established to operate at an arms-length from the 
Council. The body was not an asset owner but a group who would govern the 
regeneration framework drawing on the expertise of relevant private sector partners. 
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The group itself comprised of seconded Council employees and private sector elites, 
known as the ‘Manchester Mafia’ (Peck & Ward 2002: 14).  Their role was to remove 
planning obstacles and smooth necessary bureaucracy, acting as a short cut to decision 
making. They stoked confidence amongst private investors through their commercial 
and ‘can do’ attitude (Robson 2002). Critically, Quilley (2002) argues that the success 
achieved in development terms has served to direct the agenda away from that which 
would tackle the underlying structural problems in Manchester like employment, 
transport and housing and which would marry up to local demand.   
As has been seen so far, Salford Council adopted an entrepreneurial stance early under 
the arrival of the new urban politics. Salford Council has demonstrated its ability to 
compete for government grants through programmes such as Urban renewal, Housing 
Market renewal – Pathfinders, Single Regeneration Budget, and New Deal for 
Communities and millennium funding. It has also demonstrated its ability to lever in 
private finance through for example the development of SQ. The Council established the 
Salford Central URC in 2005. Also in 2005 the Council established a partnership called 
Urban Vision, along with Capita and Galliford Try, which is a quasi-outsourced planning, 
property and maintenance company run by a mixture of public and private agents. It 
acts as the development and building control for the Council and oversees all planning 
applications and land offerings. It also provides guidance and developments for other 
councils and private organisations (Urban Vision 2012). It would appear then that 
Salford Council is willing to defer some responsibility for one of its main statutory 
controls to partnership agencies.  
MediaCityUK was able to be realised, in a large part, due to the people involved at 
different spatial scales, all working to the same ends. Much in the same way that 
Manchester had its elite ‘mafia’, Salford had its own well positioned key players whose 
interests appeared to overlap considerably. For example,  
 Peel and the North West Regional Developments agency (NWDA) who offers 
considerable backing to the MediaCityUK project, including financial, share some 
of the same executives.  
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 Peel’s Deputy Chairman Robert Hough become Chair of the NWDA in replace of 
Bryan Gray who later became chair of Peel Media and Chaired the MediaCityUK 
steering group (Harrison 2014b).  
 Robert Hough, who was once the Chair of the Manchester Shipping Canal that 
runs to Liverpool before it was purchased by Peel, is also the Chair of the 
Liverpool City Region Local Economic Partnership, of which Peel now have a 
great deal of involvement. He was also Chairman of the New East Manchester 
URC 2002-2009 (ExUrbe 2013).  
 Jane Deane who also worked for the New East Manchester URC became 
Programme Director of MediaCityUK in 2007.  
 Felicity Goodey, Chair of the Salford URC, former BBC journalist was appointed 
Chief Executive of MediaCityUK.  
 Chris Farrow was appointed Chief Executive of Salford’s URC in 2006 and had 
also previously worked for London Docklands Urban Development Corporation 
and Merseyside’s Development Corporation.  
 Barbara Spicer, who also worked at Merseyside Development Corporation, 
became chief Executive of Salford Council in 2007.  
There is a clear alliance here between the governance arrangements at the differing 
scales. What can be seen is the involvement of private sector people occupying 
overlapping and unelected senior positions and routinely being involved in local state 
urban regeneration. This reflects Swyngedouw et al’s (2002) assessment that large scale 
urban development projects often comprise small networks of powerful elites 
occupying the positions necessary to make these developments happen, something they 
call the ‘field of power’, in which others are prevented from accessing. Swyngedouw et 
al (2002) take a critical stance on these networks of power, demonstrating how they 
foreclose the ability of other non-networked people to challenge the process or to seek 
out its benefits for outside interests. We can see that for MediaCityUK there were 
certain individuals who would be able to draw on their positions and connections to 
strongly promote and lend support to the MediaCityUK development. We can also see 
these serial urban regeneration professionals moving between projects in different 
cities applying their knowledge at different sites - for example Chris Farrow who had 
worked on two previous waterfront regeneration schemes (London Docklands and 
Liverpool Docklands). It is useful to question then how much autonomy the local Council 
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is able to exert within these fields of power and how able it would be to challenge the 
process if required.     
The delivery of a MediaCityUK was to come from Peel, but the catalyst for this delivery 
was the securing of the BBC to that location, something which was led by Salford Central 
URC, namely Felicity Goodey, former BBC journalist, in conjunction with Peel. The URC 
took the lead on behalf of the Council acting as an intermediary between Peel and the 
BBC, 
“We asked [URC] to lead for us on that. Of course because it was a private 
company, although all the shareholders were public sector, it had certain 
freedoms the way they were able to talk to people and I think they were 
very trusted by the private sector because a lot of the personnel had made 
their reputations in private sector organisations.… they basically fronted 
the discussions with the BBC to make sure that the BBC came to Salford 
and act as a sort of liaison with Peel. So all the discussions really through 
that sector but you know, we had good relations”.  (1 - Elected Official). 
We see here the replacement of elected representatives with technocratic experts who 
are seen as better able to make these decisions and negotiate these deals. As 
Swyngedouw (2010) argues, this transition works by “broadening the sphere of 
governing, while narrowing, if not suspending, the space of the properly political” (2010: 
2). As more non-representative actors make the decisions and conduct the bargaining 
and negotiating with other non-representative actors over how this site should be 
developed the space for political argument over whether or not it should be developed 
in this way is reduced down.  
That said, it was recognised by Peel that Salford Council had to be involved and was 
assumed to support the development, even if it were not necessarily expected to take a 
lead role,  
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“So I spoke to [Council Executive] and said ‘we need you on side for this’. 
It was a bit of a no-brainer for Salford. A big piece of land and a developer 
who can afford to build it and do it.” (16 - Private developer).  
The Council, as Peel expected, were accommodating to the requirements of the BBC and 
the MediaCityUK vision. Its malleability and its responsiveness was something that the 
Council claimed it could provide over its bigger and more selective neighbours, 
Manchester,   
“And that was our approach to this, yes we were smaller than Manchester 
but it meant that [the BBC] could get a hold of people more quickly who 
would be more responsive to their needs and it would mean more to us 
and consequently we would be more flexible about what we needed to do” 
(2 - Elected Official). 
The above participant expressed a theme emerging from those closely involved in the 
development of MediaCityUK that this was an opportunity not to be missed in Salford. 
Because of this those involved were prepared to be flexible in their working 
arrangements and usual procedures. Swyngedouw et al (2002) suggest that large scale 
urban development projects are often conducted within a ‘framework of exceptionality’ 
(2002: 527). They state that projects become designated within an exceptionality 
framework if it involves particularly significant features (like its financial scale, its 
timescale or its profile) and that because of this exceptional status these projects are 
less democratically governed and require a non-regulatory approach to its progression. 
We can think of MediaCityUK as occurring within this framework of exceptionality. The 
Council was willing to work to what the BBC and the developer wanted and was more 
dynamic to respond to the needs of the situation. It was suggested that the Council’s 
statutory requirements for a development like this were not fully implemented in order 
to smooth the process. For example the usual requirement a developer needs to comply 
with before planning permission is given was waived in the MediaCityUK context 
because it would have delayed the early planning permission for the site which was 
reported to be a big selling point for the BBC. Planning permission at an early stage 
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would have demonstrated that the Council was supportive and that the build could 
begin immediately, 
“The traditional way of doing it is you’ve got to do everything before you 
start work on site. That’s a control for the Local Authority to make sure 
that things actually get done. Now, here, because we’d worked so closely 
and they’d been involved all the way through we didn’t need to have that 
control. Because if the BBC were not going to come, we weren’t going to 
build it so it didn’t really matter” (16 – Private developer).  
The quote demonstrates the power balance between the private developer and the 
public sector authority. Planning permission is a control that the Council ultimately hold 
even within private-public partnerships. Here however, it can be seen that Council 
control was relaxed so as not to act as a barrier to the investment. This in its self is not 
necessarily that exceptional. The requirement for planning permission is often a source 
of negotiation and the Councils partners are well versed in trying to find a route around 
them. However, what is interesting about MediaCityUK is that the Council was not 
negotiating with a developer but instead relying on the developer to secure a third party 
- the BBC. Constraining the developer who is both the land owner and the main financial 
investors would jeopardise the ultimate aim. In this scenario, the Council was 
necessitated to work with the developer, relinquishing power when it must and acting 
in a framework of exceptionality (Swyngedouw et al 2002). The role of Peel Holdings in 
the delivery of MediaCityUK and the role of the private actors in Salford’s URC highlight 
a broadening sphere of governing beyond the usual political representatives 
(Swyngedouw 2010). It also highlights the narrowing scope for democratic politics as 
controls are waived or given away in the quest to secure necessary investment.  
6.3.2 Bargaining tools 
Kantor and Savitch (1993) provide a useful way of conceptualising the power relations 
between public and private agents when working together. They suggest that the 
relationship hinges around particular bargaining advantages that may differ dependent 
on externalities like the market conditions that make a particular place more attractive 
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or less attractive to private interests. Sought after places would allow the Local Authority 
more bargaining power, whereas places that struggle to secure investment may find 
they have much less bargaining power and thus need to reduce their controls. The 
extent to which a council commits to a growth agenda will ultimately shape this 
relationship and how much the council is willing to compromise on its more social 
democratic responsibilities i.e. choosing to follow a different policy approach (ibid). It 
can be argued that Salford has committed to this growth agenda by perusing strategies 
that speak to bolstering the local economy. The Council sees its role as understanding 
what Salford need to offer to private business to be an attractive investment for 
whatever sectors are looking to invest which may serve to work against the actual needs 
of the local people,  
“[Salford Council] is demand responsive, so it’s not about bringing in 
business which matches the local skill base but business which is looking 
for a place to be” (29 - Council employee).  
Nowhere is this clearer than the SQ site where over the years of its development it has 
sought to grow through drawing in available investment which does not necessarily 
meet the needs of local residents.  
Salford Council appeared to have limited bargaining advantages over the MediaCityUK 
development. This is not to say that the Council was attempting to limit the 
development, because it was not. But it does acknowledge the inherent power 
imbalance between the partners over a development that was regarded as something 
that should benefit the local residents. The Council’s reliance on Peel limits its bargaining 
power and encourages it to relax its controls i.e. its democratic responsibilities. For 
example, the Council’s planning obligations in its construction handbook states that a 
developer must contribute to a construction partnership which helps develop local 
resident’s skills (Salford City Council 2014e). However, the Council waived the 
requirement for Peel to contribute to training costs for construction workers due to the 
number of jobs they were promising to deliver to the area (ExUrbe 2013). Neither was 
Peel required to contribute the several millions of pounds stipulated under a Section 
106 agreement (The Salford Star 2012a). They were exempt from having to designate 
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any of their newly built housing as affordable housing, rationalised due to the large 
contribution the company were already making. Nor did the Council make any 
stipulations over employing local labour or local contractors during the development, as 
the below response demonstrates in answer to that specific question, 
Well, [the Council] didn’t. And we asked them specifically not to. Because 
we didn’t want any obvious barriers in the way” (16 – Private developer).  
This is in spite of the fact that Salford Council in conjunction with the NWDA invested at 
least £61 million pounds of public funding to Peel for the development (Salford City 
Council 2011a). What can be seen here then is the Council compromising its usual 
statutory requirements in order to secure the investment and smooth the development 
process, both procedurally and financially, not creating what Peel would have seen as 
barriers. It could be assumed that were the Council to have more bargaining power, it 
could have enforced these policies rather than reducing its ability to exercise control. 
However, in not doing so it demonstrates a strong need to secure this private 
investment. It suggests that the Council see it as imperative not to jeopardise Peel’s 
involvement. It feeds in to the idea that there are no other alternatives to the neoliberal 
logic of market-intervention to deliver regeneration opportunities (Deas 2012).  
6.3.3 A long-term partnership 
As a major land owner in the region and in Salford in particular the relationship between 
the Council and Peel is a familiar one which has its ups and downs, as the below quote 
demonstrates,     
“What’s the relationship with Peel? Love/hate. Simple as that, love/hate” 
(4 - Elected Official).  
For a private organisation who owns a substantial amount of land in Salford there have 
been numerous times when they have come in to conflict over pursuing their interests, 
as demonstrated in the introductory chapter to this thesis. However, they are at times 
seen as a means to an end,   
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“Peel Holdings, you’ll hear a lot about them as you start to study this 
because some people think they’re the devil incarnate, other people just 
recognise that we have to live with them” (2 - Elected Official).  
What is reinforced here is the power that comes with being a major land owner. It was 
not only their land ownership that put Peel in such a good position but also its ability to 
complete the development to meet all the BBC requirements, something discussed with 
a hint of envy by one participant,  
“The second thing that Peel did was they said ‘well we need to set up a 
new company to manage this’, so they created Peel Media and within a 
few months of them just being a property company who knew nothing 
about new media they had recruited in to this new company some of the 
top movers and shakers on the media front from around the world, just 
headhunting people, and you had a company with all the skills and 
experience to be able to deliver exactly what the new media companies 
that moved in to the area wanted” (1 - Elected Official)  
The power that Peel heralded as a key player in this was also not lost on its 
representatives. Whilst ultimately this was considered a partnership development by 
the MediaCityUK consortium (Peel, Salford Council, Salford URC and supported by the 
NWDA), the actual ownership and physical development was delivered by Peel Media. 
This gave it a confidence over the whole project that it could project to the BBC,  
“Some of the other developers were a bit shaky, because developers are 
by nature a bit shaky. But Peel was able to say ‘we’re a multibillion pound 
company. We run this place’” (16 - Private developer)  
This confidence was also experienced by the Council, who has also been able to benefit 
from this,  
“You have to be very careful but at the same time you can lever in finances 
which are not available to you. So I had a number of meetings with [Peel] 
in which I obviously counted my fingers after I had finished with them, but 
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the great thing about Peel is that they are quite difficult to negotiate with 
but once they agree to do something they will do it” (2 - Elected Official).  
This quote speaks to an underlying theme of fatalism emergent through the interviews 
conducted, the idea that the only way to improve local conditions is through growth, 
and the only way to achieve growth is through having to bargain to differing extents 
with private investors. That is not to argue that this is always against the wants of the 
public sector or that it never involves elements of resistance, but it suggests that this 
principle has become an unquestioning normality. This speaks to the ‘invocation of 
necessity’ as described by Davidson and Iveson (2014:2), the necessity to act quickly and 
with urgency and can be seen in the quote below,     
“Now, if you’d say would I rather that you educated people in Salford and 
got them to higher standard of education before the BBC came, of course. 
But it’s like anything, you take your opportunities when they come and 
they don’t necessarily come in a nice neat order” (2 - Elected Official)  
The primary importance here is the taking of the opportunity. What is absent from this 
sentiment is a plan which is guided by local necessity. Here the local need is a bargaining 
disadvantage. In securing the investment the Council is compromising the people it 
should be making decisions on behalf of. The Council did create a separate MediaCity 
Public Sector Support Programme Partnership of only public sector agencies whose 
remit was to ensure that the local area benefit from the creation of MediaCityUK 
(Partners In Salford 2007). The Partnership was initially made up of the Council, the 
Salford URC and the NWDA. The Council now is the only partner that still exists. 
However, this partnership is interesting as it demonstrates that Peel were not expected 
to deliver the community benefits of the regeneration, instead seeing it as something to 
be retrospectively delivered by the public sector partners only.  
Tackling these problems as external to the development itself demonstrates how these 
aims were not wholly built in to the overall project objectives. Here then we can 
question how much MediaCityUK was intended to regenerate the local area as opposed 
to the specific SQ site. Featherstone (2013) argues that the use of the capitalist economy 
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to regenerate cities inevitably creates a surplus of people who are unable to engage with 
these specially developed and protected enclaves. For Slater (2014) this is again a 
fundamental feature of false choice urbanism. He argues that the compulsion to seek 
investment at all costs will neglect critical questions that challenge the purpose and 
beneficiaries of such investment. Slater draws on DeFilippis who argues that,  
“reinvestment needs to be understood through the lens of questions such 
as: What kind of investment? For whom? Controlled by whom?” (in Slater 
2014: 518).  
For Slater these questions speak to power, rather than choice. The power to decide what 
type of investment is one which is situated in the hands of a few rather than those who 
are designated as potential recipients of such investment within their spatiality. We can 
see in the regeneration of SQ how it has incrementally moved away from being directly 
beneficial to many of the local residents (as seen in the previous chapter) and more 
heavily controlled by private interests who subsequently are not responsible for 
ensuring the improvement of local structural conditions. If we consider Defilippis’ 
questions from above we can think about the kind of investment we have seen here. 
Primarily it has been market led and speculative in nature. The link to the local has come 
secondary, with strategies of upskilling and training as an additional component rather 
than a fundamental feature. It is developer-led and forms a strategic part of Peel’s 
overall Ocean Gateway project which operates on a wholly different spatial scale to 
Salford, one in which they negotiate very effectively with other powerful elites. They 
have a significant amount of bargaining power that does not necessarily allow room for 
the Council to resist. Whilst this was required by the Council for the MediaCityUK 
development, Peel’s stake and increasing power in the area means that it now wield a 
great deal of political might that might not be required by the Council in the future, but 
will be very difficult to resist.   
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6.4 Compromising the borders 
6.4.1 Legitimation through scale 
This section will now turn to consider how the SQ regeneration has been justified by 
those involved in its development. Swyngedouw et al (2002) highlight from their 
experiences of analysing large scale urban development projects across Europe that one 
of the key features is the lack of resistance from local groups to the projects. They 
determine that this is the result of particular discourses from the partners involved that 
frame the projects as legitimate and beneficial. One of the themes emerging from the 
interviews conducted during this research was the utilising of a discourse of scale to 
legitimise the project. Differing geographical scales were drawn upon to divert from the 
question of local benefits and refer instead to benefits at a Greater Manchester 
conurbation or a regional level, 
“I think it’s a difference that’s been made to the sub regional economy 
more than Salford if that makes sense. If you, obviously it’s made a real 
big difference to Salford, but you can’t think of Salford as being a self-
contained economy” (1 - Elected Official). 
To see SQ as part of a broader economy is to legitimise a contribution that may be felt 
externally to Salford i.e. to people who commute from and live in Manchester or further 
afield, and to feeder industries that are not located in Salford for example construction 
companies. Drawing on these scales allows SQ to be situated within a larger relational 
network, 
“Obviously Salford’s going to benefit from it, but the principle benefit we 
knew would be for the whole of the North West region” (2 - Elected 
Official). 
This discourse legitimises the choices made and the potential for benefits to be accrued 
by people outside of Salford primarily. But what that also does is construct ‘mental 
maps’ that define a particular space in which this regeneration occurs and where its 
beneficiaries reside. Wilson and Wouters (2003) argue that these ‘mental maps’ are 
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spatial constructions of form and meaning. These conjured up spaces can in turn assist 
in shaping the real world by determining them as a focal point of action. The geography 
of Salford as a bounded entity is capitalised on when specifically necessary, but also 
submerged within a wider regional geography when it is not. For example one 
participant described Salford as being attractive to external developers because at the 
time Salford could still benefit from having cheaper land rents than Manchester 
(something which is beginning to change) (participant 29 – Public Sector Officer). In this 
respect, being ‘Salford’ is vitally important. However, when it comes to pitching the city 
to investors the local Salford skill base is seen as a barrier. Therefore in this instance 
within the same conversation, 
‘That’s where I give [investors] the Greater Manchester figures’ (29 - 
Council employee) 
Here the discourse of scale allows Salford to be flexible and malleable, defining and 
redefining to meet the needs of the external party. The cheaper rent comes from 
Salford, the skilled employees come from the Greater Manchester conurbation. Of 
course, this is justified as pragmatism,  
“Within an economy there is what we call a “travel to work” area and you 
can’t just say Salford people will only be employed by Salford Council and 
Salford industries and Manchester people will only be employed by 
Manchester Council and Manchester industries. It just doesn’t work that 
way” (19 - Elected official).  
Here people are expressed as moving between cities within a regional spatiality. It is not 
to assert that this is wrong or specific to the Salford context, but that these scales are 
manipulated in discourse firstly to legitimise the lack of immediately local benefits and 
also to promote Salford in particular ways, ways which may favour some over others.  
6.4.2 Manchester? Salford? Manchester?  
One of the other ways in which these ‘mental maps’ are constructed is through the 
manipulating of Salford as a territorial identity. As noted in the case study chapter 
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(chapter three), Salford has formed part of many territorial boundaries at a variety of 
spatial scales since regional devolution began. Parts of Salford form the Regional Centre, 
an area of significant importance to the wider city-region (Government Office for the 
North West 2008). The Salford part of the Regional Centre can be seen in figure 22 
below. 
 
The map indicates that the Regional Centre boundary runs around the areas in Salford 
of greatest significance to the economy; SQ, the Irwell riverside and Chapel Street (other 
sites of significant financial investment and the University of Salford). It conveniently 
circumnavigates the residential areas that surround these sites, places of extreme 
deprivation like Ordsall and Langworthy. That is not to say the Regional Centre does not 
include residential buildings, as it includes the majority of the private housing and 
apartments that have been created at SQ and along the riverside. This Regional Centre 
Figure 22: Map of Salford’s spatial framework. Source - Salford City Council, 2004 
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has been ‘summoned up’ as a newly designated spatial entity and does not map on to 
existing wards or parliamentary boundaries but instead creates a new and particularly 
powerful area of concentrated competitive assets (Healey 2009). One participant 
claimed that the identification of a Regional Centre was deliberately constructed so that 
Salford did not have to incorporate reference to Manchester within its plans, 
“There used to be a big rivalry between Salford and Manchester. Salford 
would never use the word Manchester. It coined the term Regional 
Centre. So in documents it would say the Regional Centre when it meant 
Manchester because it wouldn’t use the word Manchester. They were like 
that. Now it’s more knitted together” (3 – Planning Professional)  
Now the term Manchester is used to refer to Salford where economically necessary, 
“It’s up to businesses how they describe their address and people get 
unduly anxious about this issue but the way you call a place is whatever 
will be recognised by the audience that you’re targeting so the reality is 
that Manchester is an international brand. People all over the world have 
a good idea where Manchester is and that’s why Salford city Council is a 
member of the Manchester marketing or MIDAS or the group of local 
authorities that promote the brand of Manchester” (1 - Elected Official) 
By using discourse that positions Salford as operating in an international market then it 
legitimises using the Manchester name. The business decision to identify as Manchester 
is one that Salford Council will not challenge, 
“What I won’t do is tell them you cannot have your hotel unless you 
actually say it’s in Salford because that’s a sure bet that they will stay on 
the Manchester side of the border. So I don’t go around shouting you must 
change your name but at the same time I would put gentle pressure on 
them to say acknowledge you’re in Salford” (2 - Elected Official).  
“So if Salford has to call itself Manchester to make something happen it 
will do so” (3 – Planning Professional).  
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Here again we see the ‘invocation of necessity’ (Davidson and Iveson 2014) justifying the 
lack of power to exercise control. The necessity to secure capital that may move 
elsewhere highlights the inability to enforce controls. Through the Council’s lack of 
bargaining power it compromise the identity of its residents. This was seen most 
fundamentally with the SQ and the developments within it like MediaCityUK which was 
marketed wholly as ‘MediaCityUK Manchester’. Whilst the BBC itself refers to its 
position as in Salford, the actual MediaCityUK is always branded as Manchester (see 
figure 23 below). 
 
Figure 23: Marketing flags around MediaCityUK, Manchester - Authors own photo 
Massey (1995) has argued that in an increasingly globalising world we cannot conceive 
any more of cities as particular bounded entities, as containers of urban life. Rather, we 
need to conceive of the relational interactions that move across these boundaries. 
Massey conceives places then not as territories but as articulations of a specific set of 
relations that have emerged together at that particular time. The identity of a place is 
not fixed or rooted in history but constantly changing and contested through the 
multiple relations existing at any one point in time. If we think of place as relational, 
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Massey says, we also have to think of it as fluid, as always in formation. It is not static. 
Because of this, is can be changed. However, these relations are also shaped by power. 
Some have the power to determine which history of a place is dominant, which borders 
are maintained and which future is asserted. Others are subject to those decisions and 
assertions. If we think relationally then we can see how other regeneration programmes 
have appeared in Salford after having come from somewhere else. The identity of 
Salford has been directed by regeneration in places like Baltimore and Bilbao and shared 
through relations with people involved in these different projects as they move around 
the networks of regeneration practitioners. The creation of MediaCityUK in Salford has 
emerged through a relational politics between several key agencies, as a culmination of 
power being asserted in uneven ways.  
Salford’s transformation, its ‘journey’, is being shaped by relations that are beyond the 
place of Salford. It is being set on a trajectory that identifies a particular future, one 
which may negatively impact on some Salford residents. Different boundaries are being 
drawn or reinforced due to these uneven power relations. Healey argues that the 
reimaginings of place, like city-regions, are conceptualised and fed back through these 
relational webs, having real material effects. These concepts, she argues, “…are selective 
in their focus of attention. Some relations and integrations are emphasized, while others 
slip out of the limelight” (Healey 2009: 833). We can see in the discourses of scale 
employed by participants how some concepts are enforced and called upon at the 
expense of others e.g. the region over the local, the Regional Centre over local 
neigbourhoods. The region is enforced as a spatial reality in order to justify the successes 
achieved at MediaCityUK.  
The power to shape these spatial identities is located within the relations between the 
private investors and the public sector agents involved in the regeneration effort. If we 
consider the regeneration of SQ through this relational lens then SQ was not so much a 
site waiting to receive investment, necessarily accepting what it could, but instead a 
deliberate articulation of the politics played out through these power relations. These 
decisions determine the direction of a particularly selected space in time and how it will 
change the course of that space for those involved. However, as we have seen, the 
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decision making powers are increasingly being handed over to non-representative 
actors who may have their own interests in mind over that of the local community. We 
may see Peel claiming and defining SQ as an element of their overall Ocean Gateway 
project rather than as a site for delivering local regeneration benefits to Salford 
residents.  
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to follow on from the previous chapter in order to try to 
understand, from the perspective of the decision makers involved, how SQ came to 
embody a materiality that is disconnected from the local residents it was intended to 
benefit. Through focusing on the stages of inception from the beginning of its 
development up to its most recent stage as a MediaCityUK it has been argued that the 
site itself never had a clear overarching vision as to what it would become. Whilst it was 
always recognised that it could become ‘something’, and there were strategies in place 
to make this happen, it was not pushed in any particular direction. Instead, it was left to 
the market to determine its form. This relied on the market to have a social objective in 
order for it to benefit local residents. However, it has been argued that this social 
objective only minimally materialised. It is not to say that there are no Salford residents 
who benefit from SQ or that they all feel excluded, but that this connection is partial. As 
the site developed it became something that was further and further away from that 
which local residents could easily benefit from. The social objectives of the regeneration 
were to be delivered as an add-on to this development through a public sector 
partnership, indicating that the site itself was unlikely to deliver direct benefits.  
The Council has acted in an increasingly entrepreneurial manner through the 
development of the Quays. It has demonstrated its ability and wants to engage with 
private developers in order to fund a successful regeneration programme. However, 
through doing this it has been argued that many of the democratic controls that the 
Council has to ensure democratic accountability have been relinquished in order not to 
hinder its development. The development was treated in a ‘framework of exceptionality’ 
(Swyngedouw et al 2002). By treating the site as exceptional, it less democratically 
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governed and requires a non-regulatory approach to its development. In effect, this 
sought to reduce the responsibility of the Council for its delivery, instead turning to 
private developers to do so. Through this process we see the space in which to politically 
engage reduced to a widening sphere of non-representative private governance 
(Swyngedouw 2010). 
The call to exceptionality in which political engagement is reduced speaks to a fatalism 
over the necessity to secure private investment as the only option for regeneration and 
development. The notion that investment may move elsewhere if not immediately 
secured feeds in to a ‘no alternative’ neoliberal logic (Deas 2013). It creates a ‘constant 
invocation of necessity’ in which quick action is necessitated over the consequence of 
losing out (Davidson & Iveson 2014). In acting quick to avoid being subject to failure 
restricts the Council’s ability to exercise democratic decision making. It adds a sense of 
urgency in which the logic is to act rather than take time out for political debate. In doing 
this the democratic institutions legitimacy is challenged through its articulation of its 
impotence; it must act as its only option. For Salford Council this necessary action 
reduces its bargaining power over how the site should look. It conjures up a consensual 
approach in line with the views of the private developers and private actors involved.  
In order to legitimate and justify the increasing disconnect between SQ and the social 
benefits it should deliver, the Council has adopted a discourse which essentially 
compromises the geographical boarders of Salford. It claims a position within a much 
wider regional economy through which to situate itself. By drawing on wider spatial 
scales beyond the Salford jurisdiction the Council can claim that the development is 
benefited and successful. By widening the pool of users and targeted beneficiaries the 
Council can avoid having to focus solely on the lack of benefits for the local residents. By 
summoning up new spatialities in Salford based on assets rather than areas there is a 
lesser immediate connection between the developments and its respective residents. It 
becomes part of a Regional Centre which is part of a much broader regional economy 
and regional strategy. It is bigger than Salford residents and thus is legitimised as 
servicing the needs of those external to Salford in the first instance. In the previous 
chapter the benefits to local residents were given a temporal dimension, they were to 
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be delivered in the future. In this chapter they are given a spatial dimension, they are to 
be delivered more widely, not just for local residents.  
In addition the Council is also compromising on the identity of Salford by representing it 
as Manchester as and when deemed necessary. It has been identified previously in 
chapter three how the renaming of places as Manchester has caused resistance from 
local Salfordians. It can be seen here however that this is described as a necessary 
feature of securing capital investment. It forms part of Salford as willing to act in a 
manner that is seen as best for the city, rather than for any individual or local wants. The 
statement from the Council is that in the future when Salford are able to command more 
from developers that this will change, that places will be drawn to Salford in its own 
right. Whether or not this will happen remains to be seen. It may be, as Massey (1995) 
has argued, that these newly articulated spaces like the Regional Centre may continue 
to be defined by those in power to do so. The relations between the networks of actors 
that are materially manifesting in Salford may retain Manchester as the dominant 
identity if it is the best articulation of that space for those actors. The more involved and 
instrumental private actors become in the decision making in Salford the harder it may 
become for Salford Council to exercise its democratic control, particularly over 
organisations like Peel Holdings who are acquiring more and more land through which 
to assert its dominance in the area. There are implications here for democratic 
accountability within urban development. 
The following chapter will explore this further. It will take the practices that Salford 
Council has engaged in with regards to SQ as an exceptional development project and 
demonstrate how it has become increasingly normalised as standard practices in 
delivering growth in the city. Using examples and highlighting how the urban policies 
under the coalition and subsequent conservative government have encouraged this 
method of regeneration, the chapter will demonstrate that Salford Council are 
employing increasingly risky strategies as a normal process of regeneration. It will argue 
however, that regeneration has also shifted substantially and fundamentally away from 
one which seeks redistribution and equality to one which is focused on economic growth 
in areas that are already subject to investment and regeneration strategies.      
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7. Borrowing from the future –risky strategies for growth 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter traced the decision-making process that led to the development 
of Salford Quays (SQ). In particular, it focused on how SQ materialised as something 
which was, I argued, disconnected from local residents. I argued that in being market-
led, the development was shaped around speculative development rather than local 
needs. In the quest to secure development it designated the site within a ‘framework of 
exceptionality’ (Swyngedouw et al. 2002), reducing the Council’s controls and statutory 
requirements so as not to jeopardise the investment, increasingly seen as a necessity in 
a neoliberal order. The chapter traced the increasing involvement of the private sector 
to deliver growth, with social objectives being side-lined in the process. The need to 
deliver local benefits was embedded within a wider spatial discourse in which the region 
was prioritised over the local.  
In this chapter, I want to consider these themes further. Taking in to account current 
austere conditions and a substantial change to urban policies, I am specifically interested 
in how regeneration might be delivered in Salford in the future. To do this, consideration 
will be given to the increasingly risky forms of entrepreneurial governance being 
conducted in order to secure investment to the city. It will argue that this model is 
moving away from being one where risks are conducted under exceptional 
circumstances, to one where risks form the bedrock of urban regeneration. In doing this, 
I will argue, developers are gaining not only financial incentives but secure investments, 
leaving the speculative risk to the public sector, a reverse of traditional roles. I will 
consider the implication of this for regeneration and the social benefits it is intended to 
provide.  
It will also be argued in this final empirical chapter that a post-political consensus around 
neoliberal urbanism has intensified under the Coalition government elected in 2010. 
Under New Labour, there was an explicit, although open to criticism (see Lees 2008), 
focus on exclusion, deprivation and redistribution as part of their urban regeneration 
agenda. However, it has been claimed that under the Coalition government the policies 
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around regeneration have fundamentally changed to focus specifically on delivering 
economic growth, leading Southern to claim that ‘This is the end of “regeneration” as 
we know it’ (2013: 399). It has been argued that regeneration through spatially targeted 
policies tackling particular needs has been replaced by growth initiatives that target 
areas designated as most able to deliver added value to investment (Pugalis & 
McGuinness 2013). It is a policy initiative that works on a ‘payment by results’ practice 
that rewards those councils by allowing them to financially benefit from any growth 
created (O’Brien & Pike 2015), something, it is argued, that will encourage the most risky 
investments (Waite et al. 2013). It is not to assert that generating growth and tackling 
local deprivation are in opposition to one another. Growth can indeed improve local 
circumstances for local people which addresses their needs. However, the research has 
shown that growth will not naturally ‘trickle down’ to satisfy local demands. To do so 
there needs to be a specifically explicit strategy for connecting people to not only more 
jobs, but better jobs; those that offer decent pay, job security and some future prospects 
(Stott & Campbell 2014).  
This chapter will consider these governmental urban policy changes at a national level 
and identify how they will impact Salford at a local level. Primarily it will seek to answer 
the research question identified in the methodology: In what ways can we see 
regeneration moving away from a process based on spatially targeted need towards the 
delivery of economic growth? It will outline the policy changes, in particular the 
introduction of Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) and the increasing involvement of 
private sector actors. It will identify how these partnerships challenge representative 
democracy by deferring to private actors to make policy decisions about spatial 
requirements. It will raise the issue of the government redefining once politically defined 
spatial boundaries, to boundaries based on economic configurations. The chapter will 
explore the emergence of a corporation, Peel Holdings, and its bid to create its own 
Local Enterprise Partnership to cover the non-state spatial region that it owns. This will 
raise questions about asset ownership and the challenges this poses to political 
accountability and responsibility as Peel Holdings try to establish itself in a space of 
direct political engagement (Harrison 2014b).  
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This chapter will then go on to discuss the other changes under the coalition, namely 
Tax Incremental Financing and Planning Gains, the first of which incentivises growth 
through ‘earn back’ models and the second which restricts a local council’s ability to 
raise capital through other means. This chapter will explore the outcomes of these 
changes for regeneration and the ability of Salford Council to generate socially beneficial 
gains, arguing that the result speaks to a post-political logic that forecloses the room for 
politics by instigating a ‘no alternative’ mantra (Deas 2013). This ‘no alternative’ 
response forces negotiation with private developers for investment and commits 
councils to long-term contracts that serve to ‘lock out’ politics in to the future (Raco 
2014). At the same time, it normalises the Councils’ ‘everyday entrepreneurialisms’ 
(Peck 2014) which see it taking increasing risks to ensure economic returns. 
The chapter will then explore some of the risk-taking behaviour that Salford Council is 
undertaking to continue its urban development projects under ‘austerity urbanism’ 
(Peck 2012). This includes increased levels of unsupported financial borrowing in order 
to underwrite development projects. This financialisation, it will be argued, exposes the 
Council to more risk and absorbs that which would traditionally be taken by the private 
sector. Using Zizek’s (2009) concept of ‘borrowing from the future’, I identify how the 
crisis inherent in capitalism which keeps it continually expanding so as not to reach its 
logical endpoint, forces ‘borrowing from the future; by way of escaping in to the future’ 
(Zizek 1997: xv). I explore how the Council is taking on the responsibility for managing 
financial crisis by ‘borrowing from the future’, making financial commitments to private 
developers in the present that must inevitably be paid for by future generations, 
increasing the risks as it goes along. This further removes the scope for political 
engagement. 
Finally, this chapter will discuss the potential outcome of a regeneration agenda that is 
focused on economic growth by revisiting some of the sites in Salford where growth is 
not being encouraged, where development has stalled by the loss of capital which now 
bear the scars of ‘gentrification interrupted’ (Wallace 2015). It will highlight the spaces 
where investment is not going and where the Council is not taking financial risks to 
develop them. These are what Bauman (2000) calls ‘empty spaces’, spaces that are 
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considered meaningless to those who see no economic value in them. It will highlight 
the impact of investment promises that are based on speculation rather than the needs 
of the local area.  Drawing on Davidson’s (2009) notion of the ‘right to dwell’ highlighted 
in the first chapter, I consider how a person’s right to dwell is challenged when they 
reside in a space of interrupted economic development, a place inscribed with the 
promise of enforced progress. These spaces, Kitchin et al (2014) argue, are the ‘new 
ruins’ of the 21st century, the result of unregulated finance and speculative development 
that are created on the expectation of future use, a borrowing from the future that fails 
to materialise. Returning to Massey’s (2001) notion of space and time in which a 
trajectory of development forces a place onto a singular linear timeline, removing the 
multiplicity within that space, I  explore where these ‘empty spaces’ might fit within 
Salford’s ‘Journey’. Analysing these spaces in Salford that have been designated as 
‘meanwhile sites’, I explore how this discourse of the meanwhile includes these spaces 
within a foreclosed spatiotemporal trajectory of development. This foreclosure again 
speaks to a wider post-politics where alternatives are locked out.  
7.2 Institutionalizing growth 
In this next section I draw mainly on Salford Council’s own documentation 
supplemented by empirical data gathered during interviews to consider how the 
changing urban policy landscape under the Coalition government and subsequent 
Conservative government has had, and continues to have, an impact on Salford. In 
particular, I want to consider how the changes to policy require a refocusing of Salford 
Council’s priorities in how development is conducted within the city.  
7.2.1 Democratic representation? 
Deas (2013) has suggested that there have been three key changes established by the 
Coalition government that relate to urban policy and will inevitably have an impact on 
Salford. The first is the introduction of the Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) which 
has been created to replace Regional Development Agencies. The second was the 
Regional Growth Fund (RGF). This is a government fund that can be bid for and that is 
intended to increase private sector job creation. The third change identified by Deas was 
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the ability for local authorities to retain some of the business rates that they earn. All of 
these mechanisms encourage a commitment to incentivising growth through use of 
public sector money. They also encourage a focus on those sites with growth potential, 
and not necessarily with high levels of social need, which challenges the social function 
of regeneration initiatives.  
The LEPs were first set out under the Coalition government’s white paper ‘Local Growth: 
Realising Every Place’s Potential’ in 2010. The paper focuses on entrepreneurial forms 
of growth and innovative methods of economic recovery, defining the problem as an 
overreliance on the public sector and centralised decision-making. The solution is 
incentivising growth, reducing barriers to growth, and supporting the private sector to 
deliver growth. The LEPs are a partnership of business and civic leaders responsible for 
strategising how to deliver reform and drive private sector led growth in their areas. 
LEPs would be able to bid directly to the government for funding and would set their 
own geographical boundaries, meaning they would not have to conform to pre-existing 
jurisdictions but could create new geographies of ‘natural economic areas’ (Department 
for Business 2010: 12). For Harrison (2014a), LEPs were the Coalition government’s 
attempt at ‘neoliberal state spatial restructuring’ in which governance moves away from 
political jurisdiction towards economic spatial scales. The then government’s preferred 
version of sub-regional economic development was full partnership working between 
private and public sectors, with a private sector lead.    
In Salford’s case, the LEP sits over the 10 Local Authorities in Greater Manchester and 
thus follows the usual political administrations rather than any novel economic 
spatiality. The Greater Manchester LEP (GMLEP) is accountable to the Greater 
Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA). However, the GMLEP is intended to offer 
guidance and business leadership to the GMCA and is empowered to ‘set the strategic 
course, determine local economic priorities and drive growth and job creation within 
the city region’ (Greater Manchester Local Enterprise Partnership 2015: 3). There is a 
clear focus, then, on growth decided by private interests for the benefit of the local. The 
GMLEP can apply for different pots of money but has been awarded just under £500 
million of Growth Deal funding from central government to enable them to achieve local 
 215 
 
growth through the delivery of certain identified projects across Greater Manchester, 
including in Salford (ibid).  
The idea behind LEPs is that they are able to deliver growth at a local level and are seen 
as the best place to identify need and make local decisions, rather than being centrally 
directed. There is, therefore, an element of devolution here. For Greater Manchester, 
the priority within the Growth Deal is to enable economic growth and service reform to 
allow people to live independently from a reliance on public services and to increase the 
conurbation’s own revenue for public spending, ultimately creating a self-sufficient 
conurbation. In its Plan for Growth the GMCA states:  
Greater Manchester is currently a “cost centre” for the UK, requiring over 
£22 billion of public spending but only generating £17.8 billion in taxes. 
The cost of providing public sector services is becoming increasingly 
unsustainable, with a greater proportion spent on the costs of dependency 
and less on opportunities to increase growth and reduce the demand for 
reactive services (Association of Greater Manchester Authorities 2014: 7). 
This above demonstrates, through an encouragement of devolved responsibility for 
growth, the desire to move away from redistribution at a national level. Under the 
GMLEP, the idea is to promote enough competitiveness and growth not to rely on 
central government, signaling a clear narrative shift away from equity through 
redistribution. The LEPs can be seen as a move away from representational democracy, 
with the lead on decision making being taken by non-elected private executives for local 
spending of public funds. Whilst the GMLEP is accountable to the GMCA, which is a 
representative body, personal correspondence by the researcher indicates that 
politicians on the GMCA and GMLEP boards put their ‘political and ideological 
differences aside’ in order to make necessary technocratic decisions. This speaks to 
Swyngedouw’s (2010) assessment that new forms of governmentality have arisen in 
which more actors are involved in the governing process, but there is less room for 
engaging in discussions that would be considered properly political. For Levi-Faur (2011) 
this represents a transformation from representative democracy to indirect 
representative democracy, wherein ‘citizens elect representatives who control and 
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supervise experts who formulate and administer policies in an autonomous fashion from 
their regulatory bastions’ (in Raco 2015b: 32).   
The RGF was established by the coalition government to be competed for primarily by 
LEPs but also other public-private partnerships. However, importantly, during the last 
two bidding rounds only private organisations were able to submit a bid, restricting 
government funding purely to the private sector (Department for Business 2014). The 
intention of the fund is to assist projects that are able to generate economic growth and 
in particular create private sector jobs in areas that rely predominantly on public sector 
employment (Deas 2012). The RGF works as a support to unlock investment or loans for 
businesses that require additional funding. What is interesting about the RGF is that it is 
about strengthening the private sector to provide employment so as not to be reliant 
on the public sector, but through a publicly funded mechanism which enables the 
private sector to offer this. It has been stated by Lord Heseltine, the Chair of the RGF 
Independent Advisory Panel, that the “Regional Growth Fund is not about regeneration” 
(in Communities and Local Government Committee 2011: 14). It is not about 
regeneration in the sense of reversing decline but in the sense of targeting an area that 
will be adversely affected by government cuts through generating private sector growth 
(Deas 2013).  
For Salford Council there has been RGF money available through the GMLEP which 
successfully bid for and pooled some resources to distribute out in line with the Greater 
Manchester Programme of development. In addition to this, in the RGF’s second round, 
Salford Council secured £15 million to help finance one of Peel Holdings’ developments 
within their Atlantic Gateway (previously the Ocean Gateway), a space explored earlier 
in chapter 6. The development in question was for the infrastructure necessary to 
support the building of Peel’s ‘Port Salford’, an inland port facility and distribution centre 
in Salford. As part of the development, Salford Council applied for RGF funding which 
they provided to Peel for the development. The Council also provided Peel with a £4 
million grant and an additional £11 million loan, both to be funded by the Council 
through unsupported borrowing (Salford City Council 2012c). What we can see here is 
the Council using the RGF as a mechanism to support development by a private company 
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which implies a continuation of the move away from redistribution based around social 
needs to one where funding goes to those areas spatially identified as areas with 
potential to grow. The implication of this is that there will be more uneven development 
as those sites that demonstrate economic opportunity will be selected for funding over 
those which do not. This signals a fundamental move away from the social benefits of 
regeneration. For Pugalis, policies like the RGF which are geared towards ‘buying jobs’ 
instigate genuine concern that ‘regeneration has been abandoned – for the next few 
years at least’ (2011: 7). Of course targeting sites of economic growth potential is not in 
and of itself a problematic strategy. It is a response to identified sites of potential shaped 
by local circumstances. However, the implication of this is that sites that suffer from 
deprivation and low demand - the types of sites targeted through earlier national 
regeneration funding like New deal for Communities and the Housing Market Renewal - 
will no longer be able to lever in the investment that would be necessary to improve 
social conditions. This is because the investment would be less likely to generate 
economic returns. Generating growth as an economic strategy does not necessarily 
mean that it will be redistributed across other parts of the city; growth is not naturally 
inclusive (Stott & Campbell 2014).  
7.2.2 New state players? 
The challenge to representative democracy create by the LEPs was perhaps best 
exemplified when Peel Holdings prepared a bid to central government to be designated 
as a private sector-led special purpose LEP. Their proposal identified their Atlantic 
Gateway project mentioned in chapter 6 as a ‘natural economic area’ as requested by 
the Coalition white paper (The Peel Group 2010). Peel saw an opportunity within the 
proposals for the LEPs to secure more autonomy over their development by way of 
fitting ‘with the grain of new thinking and new arrangements’ (ibid: 3) opened up 
through the changing governance landscape. Whilst Peel’s proposal did include the 
potential for future partnership with local authorities, the purpose of applying for LEP 
status was to allow more autonomy and a more direct working arrangement between 
the project and the local authorities. One of Peel’s strengths was in its largescale 
landownership of huge swatches of land in the region and its ownership of most of the 
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region’s strategic assets, making the corporation an already significant political voice 
(Harrison 2014a). A key desire of the bid was to gain access to funding streams that could 
be sought directly by the Atlantic Gateway LEP rather than having to go through other 
local authorities, like the example of Salford Council loaning Peel RGF funds (The Peel 
Group 2010: 10).  
Designating the project as an LEP would, it is claimed, signal to the wider investment 
market that this development is more established and more secure. This would allow 
Peel to lever in more investment than if each project were delivered individually, subject 
to planning approvals. The support of the state would give the project credibility as a 
coherent programme and would alleviate some of the risks that would otherwise be 
associated with it. With the LEP proposal, Peel sought to create a space in which it could 
secure decision making powers and a platform from which to directly politically engage. 
It also challenges the idea of politically bounded territories which are democratically 
represented by continuing the government’s request for geographical boundaries which 
are economically shaped (Deas et al. 2015).  
Peel’s proposed LEP, which would include parts of the Liverpool and Manchester city-
regions and sections of Cheshire, was reportedly a surprise to the other LEPs. As 
Dembski (2015) notes, it was under pressure from these other LEPs that Peel ultimately 
withdrew its proposal. The LEPs in question feared not that Peel’s bid was a threat to 
democracy but that it would challenge these other LEPs in delivery of their growth 
targets. However, whilst Peel did not continue with this proposal, it did negotiate an 
Atlantic Gateway Partnership Board which is private sector-led and includes 
representatives from each of the three respective LEPs. The role of the board is to work 
“on issues which have cross-LEP significance and which add value to what the LEPs do 
individually” and ensure the Atlantic gateway plans feature as significant projects within 
the respective LEP strategies (Atlantic Gateway n.d.). The LEP proposal by Peel is 
important to consider because it casts light on the new heights to which the private 
sector is being elevated within the decision-making forums of contemporary urban 
development. Rather than purely as partnerships or coalitions there is recognized scope 
for the private sector to lead on securing investment and making regional placed-based 
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decisions. Whilst decision making is still ultimately up to democratically elected groups, 
Harrison (2014b) asks how long this can be sustained as private investment becomes 
more necessary and local government power is undermined under austerity? 
Harrison, drawing on Cox, makes a useful conceptual distinction between spaces of 
engagement and spaces of dependence. Spaces of dependence are those sites of local 
relations that offer placed-based resources and necessities for our day-to-day lives. The 
way in which those spaces of dependence are constructed or shaped is decided through 
the broader relationships of social power in the spaces of engagement, such as sites of 
politics or media outlets. For Cox, the space of engagement is ‘the space in which the 
politics of securing a space of dependence unfolds’ (in Harrison 2014a: 2323). By 
Harrison’s reckoning, Peel had its space of dependence (the Atlantic Gateway) and was 
attempting, thorough the establishment of an LEP, to solidify its space of engagement. 
What is important here is in how the governance of the landscape is changing and may 
change further as private entities increasingly own large sites of significance. It opens up 
questions over the imaginings of new spatial entities and how these might be governed 
in the future. It also highlights how moving towards regions based on economic 
importance opens up room for non-democratically elected representatives to engage in 
its governance. As new sites are created and potentially bounded based on their 
economic value, it forces us to consider how these sites will be treated as a priority over 
others that sit outside of these boundaries. 
7.2.3 Depletion of Assets 
As noted above, asset ownership is crucially important to the restructuring of state 
spaces and to the power to engage in how they are controlled. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, Peel Holdings holds such a large range of property and land assets in 
Salford that it is crucial to the development of SQ. However, Peel is not the only land 
owner in Salford. One of the ways that the Council often engages with developers is that 
it offers up either land or building stock for developers to buy or lease generating money 
for the Council to be used elsewhere. This transferal of assets into private hands has 
been ongoing for some time but has been encouraged even more so under the Coalition 
government. In 2011, the then Communities Secretary Eric Pickles promoted the sale of 
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assets as a means for local councils to save money under austerity whilst simultaneously 
offering up more land for development opportunities (Levitas 2012). The issue of land 
ownership emerged as a theme throughout the interviews conducted as a potential 
future problem. As one participant stated, 
“The problem we may have in the future is that the Council owned all of 
this. It’s now sold it either to [developer] who’ve sold it to owner occupiers 
or to housing associations. So the Council now has no asset value or no 
asset here. So if this community nosedived again as it has done before we 
can’t go back and do it. We could do what we did because we owned it all 
but now we don’t own it… So if it were to go down the spiral again we 
couldn’t do what we’ve done again without going in and buying everything 
which would cost an absolute fortune. So the importance of asset 
ownership is key in regeneration. If you own it you can do something with 
it. If you don’t own it you can’t.” (3 – Planning professional).  
A compounding problem is that developers will often sell their development on to other 
developers or management companies who then may sell it on elsewhere. A developer 
who was originally working with the Council may offload the property onto other 
developers and that chain of contact can break down. This can cause a problem with 
regards to the maintenance of land and buildings, and the management of sites, as the 
below quote demonstrates,  
“…different organisations and agencies own the land and it’s really 
complicated… So it’s a right mess, when you need something doing its very 
difficult to find whose responsible for stuff sometimes um, which means 
the Quays isn’t really managed as one entity by anybody, it’s all over the 
place, it’s a right mess… finding the owner of a bit of private land isn’t all 
that hard. Landowners usually respond if there is a problem you can 
usually get some sense out of them. There’s so many of them on the Quays, 
and sometimes you might contact a landowner and they’ll dispute 
ownership or they say we are just acting as an agent on behalf of such and 
such a company in Belgium, it’s just, its hard work really over there so we 
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just have to improvise and work around things as best we can” (22 – 
Council employee)    
These problems highlight the issue of making decisions at a point when opportunities 
arise that ultimately have to be dealt with at a future point, most likely by someone else. 
There is a risk being taken that have, along with a financial pay off, extended and 
substantial consequences. This is particularly important in the case of asset sale and 
ownership.  
However, rather than just being a financial or management issue, the issue of asset sales 
for one participant is an issue for democracy, 
“The important point for me is the shift of ownership from local 
government, from democratically controlled land and building to non-
democratically controlled organisations…The Council many years ago 
bought lots of that land and brought it into public ownership and 
democratically controlled. That’s shifting back now from public ownership 
to private ownership in one form or another. Non-public ownership. And I 
think that that is depleting the resources of local government, let’s put it 
that way without being too critical… So the squeeze in public sector when 
it comes to local government is forcing the offloading of land and holdings 
and so on, which means that our successors will have less property 
resources than when we took over” (19 – Elected official)  
The sale of assets here, then, represents two problems. The first is that these 
fragmented spaces of ownership are difficult for the Council to manage and control. The 
second is that it depletes public sector assets for future generations of people and places 
them into private ownership for private profit. Raco has argued that since the 1990s, 
privatization has changed to include not only contracted-out service provision of public 
services but also the ‘ownership, construction, and management of public sector assets 
and their conversion into investment opportunities’ (2013: 49). In the case of welfare 
services, these privatised developments are then increasingly being leased back to 
public sectors for public use. The most obvious example Raco uses for this is the Private 
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Finance Initiative (PFI), which began under John Major’s Conservative government but 
was utilised more widely under New Labour. PFI operates by having a developer build 
the facilities necessary to deliver public services (health care facilities, transport 
infrastructure, schools and housing, for example) and then leasing them back to the 
public sector at a cost over a period of around 30 years.  
In Salford, the Council entered in to a major PFI contract for housing granted under the 
Coalition government with a private developer to provide refurbishment works to over 
1000 Council-owned properties which the developer will then manage for 30 years. The 
whole project has a value of £400 million. The same developer is also building an 
additional 1,600 homes within the refurbished area, capitalising on its regeneration to 
sell private housing. A PFI contract should demonstrate that the public sector will 
achieve value for money. It should also account for all possible risks which should be 
assumed by the private sector developer (Froud 2003). The long-term contract of the 
PFI raises the issue of what Raco has termed ‘post-political rigidity’ (2015b: 35). Raco 
uses this term to describe the increasing prominence of contractual governance, in 
which government departments and local authorities enter into long term contracts 
with private sector partners to deliver services. The nature of these contracts results in 
the public sector being unable to change policies or divert from the course of action 
already set. It is a process which serves to ‘lock out’ politics for the duration of its 
lifecycle (ibid: 35).  
The notion of post-politics was alluded to in the previous chapter with regards to the 
‘no alternative’ neoliberal logic (Deas 2013). Post-politics is about reducing the room for 
political engagement that challenges a neoliberal orthodoxy which offers market 
solutions to social problems. Instead, a space is created in which decision making is 
reduced to the administration of pragmatism and consensus. As Allmendinger and 
Houghton state, “the post-political condition is held to be one where contestation and 
conflict is supplanted by consensus-based politics in ways that foreclose all but narrow 
debate and contestation around a neoliberal growth agenda” (2012: 91). The previous 
chapter also raised Davidson and Iveson’s argument that democratic decision was being 
reduced to the ‘constant invocation of necessity’ (2014: 1). Acting out of necessity, 
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which restricts the ability to exercise considered democratic decision making, was a 
post-political feature of what Ranciere called the articulation of a state’s impotence. This 
‘no alternative’ logic can be seen in the justification for the use of PFI in Salford:    
There was no other game in town, to be honest. Because [the PFI area] got 
so many Council properties and so many high-rise blocks you would not be 
able to bid anywhere else to get monies to bring all those properties up to 
Decent Home standard. So the only way we could get monies to be 
invested was through PFI (4 – Elected official). 
What we can see above is a post-political logic in which long-term contracts are made 
with private investors, the consequence of which is to further ‘lock out’ politics for a 
foreseeable future period. The knock on effects of the depletion of assets and reduction 
in the ability to engage politically for future generations could be considerable.    
7.2.4 Decentralising responsibility 
The other main development under the Coalition is for local authorities to be able to 
retain a greater sum of the business rates that they generate. This is intended to devolve 
greater responsibilities to local authorities and to encourage a greater growth agenda. 
According to the Coalition government, the previous business rate system in which all 
rates are returned to the centre to be redistributed back out to authorities is a system 
which encourages dependency and discourages enterprise, 
“We have ended the complex and unfair system which redistributed the 
proceeds of local growth which meant Councils had no incentive to support 
local businesses, and which encouraged a “begging bowl” mentality that 
kept them dependent on central government” (Department for 
Communities and Local Government 2013a: 3) 
This statement highlights the shift from redistribution based on needs to encouraging 
entrepreneurial governance, blaming this ‘dependency’ on government distributed 
funds for a lack of growth. The implication here is that redistribution stifles enterprise. 
We can see the same dependency discourse applied here to local authorities that were 
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previously applied under New Labour to remove welfare from those people who were 
seen as dependent on it. There, the provision of welfare was blamed for a lack of 
individual productivity or aspiration (Raco 2009). The changes under the new system 
reward those authorities that deliver growth by allowing authorities to keep half of any 
increases they generate locally. There will be measures in place to redistribute from 
councils who begin in a stronger position to councils who do not, recognising the existing 
unevenness within authorities. This will be done through the identification of funding 
levels for each authority, with growth going considerably above these levels being 
redistributed to those where growth is considerably below them (Department for 
Communities and Local Government 2012a). 
The Department for Communities and Local Government’s changes also open up new 
streams for raising additional levels of income by encouraging local authorities to fuel 
business growth. For Salford Council,   
“…it is apparent that the scheme does provide the Council with an 
opportunity to stimulate economic growth whilst at the same time directly 
increasing its business rates revenue. This… will provide the Council with 
the opportunity to find innovative ways of attracting businesses into the 
area. This could be in the form of financial incentives linked to business 
rates designed to help establish business projects in Salford with the aim 
of providing long term sustainable revenues” (Salford City Council 2013c: 
10) 
What the business rate retention system does is further responsibilise authorities for 
generating their own resources to be more self-sustaining. However, this will emerge 
through the commitment to using local public funding to lever in additional private 
investment. This encourages riskier business strategies which may or may not prove to 
be successful. As Bailey et al argue, ‘While it means a share in the returns for success, it 
also means exposure to the risks of failure’ (2015: 576). Exposure to the risks of failure 
for local authorities means a potential impact on delivering the necessary services it 
must provide to local citizens. It also forces a continuation of providing support for those 
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investments that are most likely to generate returns, rewarding areas already deemed 
successful. As one participant noted, 
“Developers willing to take the risk in the current housing market are few 
and far between so they cherry pick the projects that are going to bring 
the quickest and most reliable return” (22 – Council employee)  
The question this method raises is how much the Council will seek to encourage the 
development of the sites that deliver greatest return as it will be these sites that increase 
business rates. Where is the incentive in this policy to divert investment to areas that 
are less likely to deliver? 
This system of tax retention is also occurring through the Coalition’s system of Tax 
Increment Financing (TIF), which allows authorities to invest in infrastructure projects 
through borrowing money to invest initially against the future projected increase in tax 
raised by said infrastructural investments (Sandford 2014). This method of financing 
infrastructure is negotiated between a Local Authority and central government under 
the Coalition’s ‘City Deals’ which were intended to devolve more responsibility over 
some policy areas like regeneration and transport and create new financial strategies 
for cities to unlock growth for infrastructure investment (Waite et al 2013). Greater 
Manchester negotiated a City Deal in 2011 with a TIF measure called an ‘Earn Back’ 
mechanism. This unique form of TIF works by generating £1.2 billion in investment from 
the local authorities in the Greater Manchester conurbation from which up to £30 
million per year can be earned back for the next 30 years from central government in 
tax receipts if they are able to deliver a set level of Gross Value Added (GVA) growth. 
This is what O’Brien and Pike refer to as a ‘payment by results’ investment approach 
(2015: 6). According to the GMCA who is responsible for the city deal,          
“This programme is unique in two respects: investment is prioritised on the 
basis of net GVA impacts at the GM level; and most of the £1.2bn 
programme finance is being provided locally through Prudential 
Borrowing against revenues and a levy on the local authorities, pro-rated 
to population” (2012: 8) 
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Here we can see that the ‘Earn Back’ model is initially predicated on £1.2 billion pounds 
of prudential borrowing by Local Authorities. The ability to generate is entirely subject 
to this initial investment being able to deliver enough growth to meet the government-
agreed baseline of GVA. This then means that local authorities are taking a financial risk 
to fund those Greater Manchester-located projects that are most able to return the 
initial investment, potentially creating more uneven development. Strickland (2013) 
argues that the TIF and earn-back models of financial investment are inherently risky 
and speculative because they rely on debt in the present to generate potential but non-
guaranteed returns in the future. It is a speculative risk strategy that has implications for 
future finances. These risks will be most significant for areas that do not financially 
perform as well as others. He argues that within the current funding system created by 
central government, Local Authorities have to operate within this financialised model 
due to limited realistic alternatives, again reflecting this post-political consensus. This 
model then incentivizes growth by rewarding those who manage to deliver it.  
However, rather than incentivising growth, argue Waite et al, what may actually be 
occurring is a model that incentivizes the most risky entrepreunerial forms of 
governance or authorities ‘with the largest risk appetites’ (2013: 776). Authorities 
prepared to take the chance on an investment will be most likely to generate returns, 
but may also be likely to over-commit public resources that, if the development does 
not succeed, will have to be paid back by future revenue. What this model also 
encourages is constant reinvestment in those areas that are proving to generate growth 
and drive up value, as is the case with Greater Manchester’s ‘Earn Back’ model (Greater 
Manchester Combined Authority 2012),      
This revolving fund will be channeled back into projects that can generate additional 
growth, with the potential for reinvesting into spaces already identified as successes 
rather than those that are more in need and less financially valuable. This could serve to 
create greater spatial unevenness. This financial incentive to encourage innovative 
methods of growth on a ‘payment by results’ basis speaks to Peck’s (2014) argument 
that urban policy has reached a ‘saturation stage’ of urban entrepreneurialism.  By this, 
Peck is suggesting that innovative entrepreneurial forms of urban governance that were 
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once enacted to increase the competitiveness of a city are now business as usual forms 
of governance. They are, as he calls it, ‘“everyday” entrepreneurialisms’ (2014: 387). 
Risk has become a systemic feature of urbanism in which the public sector is taking on 
risk in order to secure economic growth.  
7.2.5 Negotiating gains 
At the same time as the councils are being encouraged to take more risks as government 
funding is being constrained, the usual channels through which the public sector would 
deliver development is also being curtailed. One important feature of this is the Town 
Planning Act 1990s Section 106 Planning Gains that has been undermined in the 
Coalition’s National Planning Policy Framework (2012b). Not only do the changes to the 
Planning Gains reduce the amount of funding any council can raise, it also reduces the 
control local councils can have over the development. The problem of planning gains is 
not a new issue created under the Coalition government. It has been an issue since the 
1990s (Christophers 2014). However, the problem has increased under the changes 
made to the relevant policies.   
The Local Authority is the body responsible for granting planning permission for 
developments to go ahead and, as such, it has statutory control to stipulate the planning 
obligations developers have to satisfy in order for a development to proceed. Introduced 
under the Town Planning Act 1990 these planning obligations are known as Section 106 
agreements. They are contributions from the developer to the local council to go 
towards local necessities, for example affordable housing or infrastructure (Crook & 
Monk 2011). Section 106 agreements enable a redistribution of the economic gains a 
private developer may make on developing land to the rest of the local area and 
provides contributions towards amenities to accommodate incoming groups of people 
(residents or workers). It is a method of making developments beneficial to the local 
council by incentivising the planning permission through financial contributions 
(Mulliner & Maliene 2013). The Section 106 agreement is also one of the main ways 
through which a council can deliver social provisions like affordable housing. However, 
if payment of these section 106 obligations jeopardises the ability of the developer to 
deliver the scheme and make a satisfactory profit, then it may be exempt from having 
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to pay it. If the developer can claim, through a viability assessment, that it makes the 
scheme ‘unviable’ then it may be exempt.  The ability to submit viability assessments 
has been incorporated within policy documents since the mid 2000s (Christophers 2014) 
but the issue was reinforced through the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) in 
2012 in which it was stated, 
“Plans should be deliverable. Therefore, the sites and the scale of 
development identified in the plan should not be subject to such a scale of 
obligations and policy burdens that their ability to be developed viably is 
threatened” (Department for Communities and Local Government 2012b: 
41). 
The Growth and Infrastructure Act 2013 introduced the ability of developers to 
renegotiate or appeal previously determined Section 106 agreements if they felt it made 
their scheme unviable. The Coalition government has also removed the need for Section 
106 agreements on developments of less than ten units (Brownill et al. 2015). All these 
changes have made it more difficult for Local Authorities to command Section106 
contributions on developments and thus challenge the ability of councils to deliver, 
amongst other infrastructure, affordable housing. It has also challenged the power of 
councils to enforce statutory controls over developers, as the below quote 
demonstrates:     
“Well the problem with section 106 is that it is a defense- defense is the 
wrong word. If you can argue that if you had to pay that section 106 that 
makes your scheme financially unviable, then that’s a loophole out. 
Obviously housing schemes now don’t have the profit attached to them 
certainly not in the North West they used to have, so it’s harder to push 
for that because the developer will turn around and say ‘well what profits, 
you know, I can’t use my profit, I’m not making any profit, I’m only just 
making profit’” (5 – Council employee).  
What is interesting about Section 106 is not just that it demonstrates the power play 
between the private developer and the Council, with the developer seemingly having 
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the upper hand, but that there is an agreed level of profit that makes a development 
acceptable, as the below quote demonstrates:         
“…as an authority and as officers we have to acknowledge at the end of 
the day the private sector aren’t going to do anything for free unless 
there’s a profit in there and this evil word profit does exist and they’ve got 
to make a profit and you’ve got to accept that the bare minimum is 
probably 15%. Once you start to drive down below that they will not be 
interested” (11 – Council employee).  
Two things are important to note here. Firstly, this interviewee from Salford Council   
acknowledges that, by enforcing contributions, the Council risks the withdrawal of 
investment. To prevent withdrawal, the Council must smooth the way for investors even 
if there is no direct contribution to the local infrastructure. This issue was raised in the 
previous chapter in relation to MediaCityUK. Here we saw the Council operate within a 
‘framework of exceptionality’ (Swyngendouw et al 2002) where by the Council 
legitimised compromising on its statutory requirements and democratic responsibilities 
to secure the development. However, whilst it may be feasible to conceive of 
MediaCityUK as exceptional in development terms, we can see in the quotes above that 
this framework is also extended to other developments, where contributions are 
necessarily waived to secure investor interest. Secondly, it is important to consider the 
requirement of the developer to make a certain level of profit that is, to an extent, 
enabled by the Council through viability claims. The NPPF acted in favour of developers 
by stating that Section 106 contributions, which are set by local councils, should not be 
so high as to hinder the development of schemes or prevent “competitive returns to a 
willing land owner and willing developer” (2012: 41). 
Here, it is interesting to see the unquestioned inscription of a competitive profit into the 
planning framework. Christopher (2014) has analysed the emergence of companies who 
specialise in producing economic viability assessments on behalf of private developers. 
He traced the emergence of the economic viability model to London-based company 
Three Dragons which, in 2001, produced a toolkit enabling developers to validate their 
developments. The toolkit stipulated that a development should include a 15% profit as 
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a minimum. This figure has since been incorporated arbitrarily as a baseline figure which 
can be increased during times of economic difficulty. As seen in the previous quotes, 
that 15% is taken as an industry standard and has emerged as a non-negotiable and 
accepted figure. The concept of an accepted 15% profit for all development, Christopher 
argues, contradicts the notion of entrepreneurial investment. By guaranteeing profit the 
level of risk usually associated with speculative or entrepreneurial forms of private 
development is reduced or negated. There is no risk if profit is guaranteed (Christophers 
2014).  
The only negotiable element in the development, then, is the Section 106 and the 
necessary social contributions of a development. This is the outcome, Christophers 
argues, of a neoliberal ideology which naturalizes the market as the provider of solutions 
to social problems. If the ‘market’ cannot naturally produce affordable housing or 
necessary infrastructure without damaging its economic value, then it does not get 
produced. This is the logic we can see working through the viability assessments that 
inscribe a 15% minimum profit. By enshrining viability within the National Planning 
Policy, the government is arguably endorsing this position of managing risk on a 
developer’s behalf, reducing social burdens that would encroach upon this. So what 
effect does this have in Salford and how able is the Council to exercise its planning gains 
in light of this? 
Salford Council in its most recent Assessment of Residential Viability (2015) outlines a 
bench mark profit of 17.5% of gross development value to be considered as reasonable 
for a developer to make. It acknowledges, however, that a higher level of profit will be 
considered as acceptable where schemes are of higher risk (Salford City Council 2015d)). 
Again, here the Council is not only acknowledging but accommodating a higher risk 
investment and rewarding riskier developments with higher profit thresholds. 
Presumably this is to encourage development in those areas of lower residential value. 
We can see here how the abstract 15% profit figure established by Three Dragons has 
been absorbed into the wider planning framework. The figure identified by Salford 
Council of 17.5% is slightly lower than in 2013 when the Housing Viability Assessment 
stated that ‘Having regard to current market conditions where levels of risk are high’, a 
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figure of 20% profit was the most appropriate benchmark (Salford City Council 2015d: 
18). So there has been a decrease in expected profit by taking account of market 
volatility. The higher threshold of profit may seek to encourage investors at less secure 
economic times. Interestingly here we can see the reversal of traditional forms of 
competitive tendering like that of the PFI scheme where developers had to demonstrate 
value for money to the council. In this instance it is the Council having to offer value to 
the developer and secure investment by making its own competitive pitch. This reversal 
perhaps speaks to the broader depletion of local council power that regeneration policy 
has established. 
What we can see occurring here, then, is an expectation from central government that, 
within its planning controls, Local Authorities must consider reducing risk along with the 
statutory requirements for developers to contribute to local housing and infrastructure. 
This reinforces a discourse of necessity and dependence on private investment to deliver 
growth, with a potential for accrual of social benefits only private economic benefits 
have been accounted for. The Salford Star, Salford Council’s most public critic, 
conducted an assessment of all Salford planning applications in a 12 month period and 
calculated3 that on account of viability issues, the Council waived approximately £19 
million and over 800 affordable homes (The Salford Star 2015). These viability 
assessments produced by developers are unavailable for viewing by members of the 
public and are not included amongst the Council’s other published planning documents, 
raising the issue of transparency and accountability to the public. To give an example of 
the negotiation between the Council and a developer it is useful to look at one of these 
planning applications in a little more detail.  
                                                     
3 These calculations are approximate and based on the council viability assessment equation but 
conducted by Salford Star. Thus, there may be differences between the Salford Star’s calculations and the 
developer’s calculations.  
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Figure 24: Middle wood locks plan. Source - Scarborough Group 2014 
Middlewood Locks is a development proposed by the Scarborough Group, a global real 
estate investor, on currently unused land in Ordsall, Central Salford on the border of 
Manchester (see figure 24 above). Planning permission was first sought in 2007 but the 
development never progressed due to financial difficulties. Planning permission was 
extended in 2014 and the Scarborough Group proposed to develop a large mixed-use 
scheme of housing and commercial properties. In its pitch, the Scarborough Group 
proposes to sell the site to a high-end consumer market as being ‘…close to the many 
bars, galleries, theatres, delis, museums and shops such as Mulberry, Harvey Nichols and 
Selfridges’ in a space that is considered to be premium value land (The Scarborough 
Group 2014). It is reported that the £700 million development will include over 2000 
new homes, office space and commercial space such as restaurants, bars and hotels 
(Jupp 2014).  
For its extension of application submitted to Salford Council in 2014 the Salford Council 
Officer Report stated that for a scheme of this size and value that there should be a total 
of £8,361,884 in planning contributions paid by the developer. However, in the report 
the developer directed the Council to the requirements of the NPPF in which the Council 
may ‘take a flexible approach in seeking levels of planning obligations and other 
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contributions to ensure that the combined total impact does not make a site unviable’ 
(Salford City Council 2014d). The developer also commented that the economic 
challenges developers face post-2007 mean that any increase in planning obligations 
challenges the cost of delivery. Because of this the Council agreed to contributions of 
£1,951,897. In this application, the developer approached the issue of planning 
contribution from the position of negotiation. Other applications also express the same 
rhetoric, outlining the position of the NPPF in acknowledging Section 106 from a starting 
point of negotiation rather than as an assumed and expected requirement.4 These 
negotiations also have to take account of the level of risk a developer will claim to be 
taking, ensuring that the Council can accommodate a predefined level of profit and 
eroding social contributions.   
Whilst viability assessments are considered somewhat of a loophole for private 
developers, Salford Council has instigated a model whereby it may be able to reclaim 
some of the contributions that have been waived if a scheme subsequently becomes 
viable over the course of development, for example, if the scheme makes more profit 
than was originally proposed. This coverage is called a ‘clawback’ mechanism and works 
by having particular ‘trigger points’ during the development where the developers will 
submit updated viability assessments to the Council (Rowlands et al. 2006). This 
mechanism has been written into the Council’s ‘Planning Obligation – Supplementary 
Planning Document’ (2015e). This allows the Council some powers to benefit from 
future gains made by the developer, something that was quite heavily resisted by 
developers during the documents consultation (ibid). However, it will remain to be seen 
how this actually operates in practice, with the onus on the developer to produce the 
                                                     
4 For an example see application reference 14/64851/FUL ‘Affordable Housing Statement’ for the Wilburn 
Street development of approximately 500 homes which begins by stating the national planning policy and 
then comments that whilst the scale of development will mean affordable housing is sought by the 
council, ‘it is clear from the above national and local planning policy guidance that there are exceptions 
where a non/reduced provision of affordable housing (or equivalent contribution) and planning 
obligations may be appropriate’ (p6).   
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reappraisals of viability as the development progresses. It will also be difficult to utilise 
the clawback mechanism given the changes to the Growth and Infrastructure Act 2013 
allowing developers to renegotiate or appeal Section 106 agreements. 
What can be seen emerging in the above is this normalization of what Swyngedouw et 
al (2002) call exceptionality measures usually reserved for specific exceptional 
development projects. In the previous chapter, this was seen occurring in relation to SQ 
as an exceptional project. However, what was applied to a specific project is beginning 
to take place as a regular feature of development. In reducing the ability of the Council 
to demand planning gains through the NPPF, the Council loses its statutory regulations 
and conventional planning tools. Instead, it takes a position in which it reduces the 
enacting of an urban politics which hinders development. This is legitimized under the 
belief that this is a necessary response to the need to act competitively (Davidson and 
Iveson 2014). The reduction of democratic decision making is argued here to be no 
longer constrained to exceptional developments but has become a normal function of 
all urban development in Salford. It is instead, as I want to explore in more depth now, 
what can be understood as a framework of normality in which the need for growth 
forecloses the need to enforce democratic decision making and statutory rights.  
So far in this chapter, I have sought to demonstrate how the changes in urban policy 
under the Coalition and subsequent Conservative governments are fundamentally 
changing regeneration. This change sees regeneration move away from targeting spaces 
based on local social need to those which are prime contenders for economic growth. It 
is argued that this will see the continual redevelopment and investment in spaces that 
are already subject to growth and thus are less likely to be sites of social need. 
Embedded within this change are policies that encourage the rebounding of spaces to 
ones that map onto economic terrain rather preexisting political boundaries. We have 
seen this on a small scale in the previous chapter through the creation of the Greater 
Manchester Regional Centre, however it is being encouraged at a greater geographical 
level through the develop of the Greater Manchester LEP. In doing this there is an 
opening for non-state spaces to be created alongside the LEPs that are led by private 
actors, as was the case with Peel Holdings.   
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Broadly speaking, the increasing inclusion of non-representaive actors taking the lead 
on planning and economic decision making is a key feature of a post-political logic that 
seeks to foreclose the possibility of a proper politics. Instead, a consensual growth 
agenda is favoured. The ‘rigidity’ discussed by Raco (2014) also forecloses the possibility 
of politics into the future, by contracting out services to the private sector for long-time 
periods and by locking out the ability to negotiate with developers over planning gains. 
This creates a position wherein decisions made now are restricting politics for future 
generations. Through this growth agenda, the public sector is increasingly taking on a 
role historically reserved for the private sector by acting more entrepreneurially and 
absorbing increasing risks that smooth the way for nervous capital. I have already 
demonstrated how it is adopting a ‘payment by results’ method in line with government 
policy and waiving its statutory controls over development. However, it is also important 
to analyse as part of this story, how the Council is navigating a curtailed budget in order 
to deliver capital projects under the conditions of ‘austerity urbanism’.  
7.3 Framework of normality 
The previous chapter identified SQ as operating within this ‘framework of 
exceptionality’, reducing the requirement for political decision making in favour of 
immediate action. However, the current chapter has highlighted these same elements 
as systemic under the changing conditions of urban development. I have argued that 
these exceptional measures have become a normal feature of urban development in 
Salford, operating instead as a ‘framework of normality’ in the quest to secure 
investment. This section will highlight those exceptional measures that are consistently 
being normalised under a period of austerity, using the examples of increasing risk 
taking and unsupported financial borrowing.  
7.3.1 Taking a risk 
Under the current conditions of what Peck (2012) terms ‘austerity urbanism’, strict 
government spending and imposed government cuts aims to reassure cautious investors 
and bring confidence back to the wary markets to encourage economic growth. Under 
austerity urbanism budget cuts are imposed on the local state. Local states, then, have 
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begun a process of crisis managing their budgets, as funding streams are cut. What 
occurs here is devolution of risk onto the local state. This, for Peck, is a ‘staple neoliberal 
maneuver’ of pushing the crisis back on to the state to solve (2012: 631). Salford Council 
can be seen to be embodying this neoliberal austerity logic by continuing to deliver 
capital projects and encourage growth. The Council’s method for doing this within a 
reduced funding environment is to provide financial guarantees to private 
developments, acting as a safety net of sorts for the projects. One of the ways in which 
the Council is taking these risks is by committing a level of financial investment to a 
private development over a contracted period to ensure the development goes ahead. 
Unlike the contractual PFI mentioned above, in some instances these developments are 
not directly delivering social welfare but are purely about delivering economic gains. 
An example of this is the Council’s lease of a building from a developer in 2014 to secure 
a £56 million pound development essential to a regeneration project. The development, 
called the Embankment Development, comprises two office blocks and a carpark, and 
sits within the Greengate regeneration area. Greengate is an identified key site in the 
Regional Centre which sits directly on the border between Salford and Manchester and 
is intended to improve linkages between the two cities. The Greengate regeneration is 
intended to unlock £400 million of private investment to deliver a new ‘corporate 
centre’ of offices and residential units. It is tasked with contributing to 
“…the successful delivery of the Manchester City Centre Strategic Plan, 
which aims to promote the growth of the Regional Centre” (Salford City 
Council 2014b: 10).   
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Figure 25: The Embankment Development design. Source – Ask Developer image, 2014 
The development is a joint venture between Ask Real Estate and Carillion PLC. However, 
in order for these developers to secure enough external funding to complete the 
development, Salford Council committed to an 8 year pre-lease agreement for one of 
the two tower blocks to be developed. This agreement by the Council, called a ‘wrapper 
lease’, was enough to secure the investor Tristan Capital to contribute the required 
additional finance to deliver the build (Ask Properties 2014). Tristan Capital commented 
that,  
“Salford City Council’s vision in providing an innovative ‘wrapper lease’ has 
been instrumental in unlocking the potential for this part of Greengate, 
given its ideal location within walking distance of the heart of Manchester. 
The lease from Salford … has enabled the joint venture to secure 
construction finance to kick-start this exciting development opportunity” 
(Jupp 2014) 
Here, we see the Council acting as an enabler to secure private investment and facilitate 
development. The Council is demonstrating that the development is secure by 
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committing to paying rent over an eight year period. At the time, the lease agreement 
was framed as urgent, something necessary to secure fleetingly mobile capital,  
“The development of the Greengate Embankment is a one-off opportunity 
to attract premium office development into the Salford part of the 
Regional Centre. In agreeing to vary the Agreement for Lease, it will allow 
the Council’s development partner, ASK to secure the development finance 
needed to deliver the first phase, Building 101” (Salford City Council 
2011a).  
We can see emerging here a discourse of urgency and necessity which potentially 
overshadows some of the more democratic considerations of risk, with the commitment 
to future payments being made from the revenue budget. We can also see the Council 
acting as a guarantee that funding will be secured for at least 8 years to absorb much of 
the speculative risk. The public sector supporting the private sector is not a new 
phenomenon but a well-documented feature of neoliberal urbanism that has been 
occurring for many years. As Brenner and Theodore (2002) argued, the ideology of 
neoliberalism emphasises unregulated market laws free from control or constraints 
operating to its own market logic. However, in reality, these processes are always 
embedded within and subject to the regulations and institutions within which they 
occur. Thus we cannot think about neoliberalism operating in its purest ideological form. 
Instead we should think of its various incarnations as ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ 
(2002: 351).  
What is also important to mention is that the Greengate Embankment development also 
formed part of another, broader development agreement in which this was a milestone 
to be achieved. The risk of not developing the Embankment would have put the Council 
in a position where it would have been required to repay funds committed in an earlier 
project (Salford City Council 2011a). The Council had to deliver this scheme or risk 
defaulting on the commitments made in a previous scheme. A domino-like pattern then 
begins to emerge wherein this becomes a normalized way of providing and securing 
investment through decisions that at one point may have been seen as legitimate but 
starts to become more risky as further commitments are made because of it along the 
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way. To stop behaving in this once-exceptional way places the entire agenda at peril, 
with one crisis being averted by entering into another risky situation, pushing potential 
economic problems further into the future. Zizek (2009) calls this ‘borrowing from the 
future’, a fundamental feature of capitalist progression, 
“…the very dynamic of capitalism blurs the frontier between “legitimate” 
investment and “wild” speculation, because capitalist investment is, at its 
very core, a risky wager that a scheme will turn out to be profitable, an act 
of borrowing from the future” (2009: 36).  
For Zizek, the risk of crisis inherent in capital investment is what keeps it continuously 
expanding. Without this accelerated continuation of self-revolutionising, the system 
would reach its endpoint. In order to avoid this crisis which is internalized within 
capitalism, Zizek argues, it pushes further into the future the requirement for it to settle 
its debts, to reach its conclusion. The ever-present prospect of this crisis forces it to 
reproduce by ‘borrowing from the future; by way of escaping in to the future’ (1997: xv). 
The dangerous outcome of this risk taking, for Zizek, is the ‘fetishistic denial’ on the part 
of those who are doing it. There is an awareness of the potentially unsustainable nature 
of this behavior, but it continues to happen through blind irrationality. As Zizek puts it, 
‘I know very well the risks I am courting, even the inevitability of the final collapse, but 
nonetheless… I can put off the collapse a little bit longer, take on a little bit more risk, 
and so on indefinitely’ (2009: 37).  
Parallels can be drawn between Zizek’s logic of expanding capitalism and the actions of 
Salford Council in securing developer interests. The economic crisis here is being 
managed by the Council as it attempts to smooth the way for capital. It commits now to 
something which will have to be repaid in time to come, borrowing from the future in 
order to alleviate the limits it currently faces. In doing so, the risks incurred have had 
knock-on effects (having to meet additional milestones for other projects) which have 
forced the Council to make more commitments that await to be addressed in the future, 
adopting a ‘fetishistic denial’ about the risks this entails, as can be seen below: 
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“So what we’re having to consider is how do we de-risk the financial 
position? What we’re looking at in this and in many other cases is to 
actually use what’s called the covenants strength of the public sector. So 
the Council is seen as a good bet. The Council won’t go bump. So if the 
Council says ‘we’ll take the building’ the man with the money will lend the 
money. He says, ‘great, I’ve got the Council. Yeah, done, no problem. 
Because they’ll pay me the money forever. No problem’. But the Council 
then have to let the building on the open market so the Council is then in 
the throes of taking a letting risk, which Councils shouldn’t really do. 
Councils shouldn’t be doing this kind of thing. But if you want the economic 
activity, maybe we have to” (3 – Planning professional).  
The question of whether or not councils should be doing this is more ideological than 
practical. Practically, as we have seen, it is being encouraged, even rewarded for acting 
in this manner. The broader question of whether or not councils should be doing this is 
absent from the documentation analysed. This absence suggests a consensus over 
decision making that forecloses alternative options or questions of politics by adopting 
a framework of normality in which this method of regeneration necessarily becomes the 
norm. Deas (2012) argues that this is a feature of a post-political urban environment, 
where questions of how to deliver growth foreclose questions of if we should deliver 
growth. Expansion becomes the unquestioned ideology. For Deas, this kind of technical 
rather than political form of decision making ‘restricts the room for open debate or 
meaningful forms of dissent through discursive promotion of neo-liberal strategies to 
which (in Margaret Thatcher’s maxim) “there is no alternative”’ (ibid: 11). The interview 
quote above exemplifies this fatalism of a ‘no alternative’ discourse in positing that if 
the Council wants this investment, it may have to operate in this manner.  
7.3.2 Is it prudent? 
The above section has posited the argument that the Council is normalizing the process 
of taking on increasing risks in order to deliver growth. In this section I want to consider 
the form that these risks are taking and the impact this has on the Council’s ability to 
continue its regeneration efforts. This requires a brief overview of how Local Authority 
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economic governance operates in practice. All Local Authorities have two sources of 
expenditure: capital and revenue. They are kept as separate budgets for financial 
management purposes but both budget streams are funded through mechanisms such 
as government grants. The capital expenditure relates to spending on fixed assets, 
infrastructure and developments, often over a long term. Any receipts from sales of 
Local Authority assets go back in to this account. Revenue expenditure relates to 
providing services and is funded through income from rent, taxes and other government 
streams. Whilst capital expenditure should not be used to support revenue, revenue 
budgets can be used to finance capital projects (Sandford 2014).  
Capital expenditure has for a long time been funded through government grants, capital 
receipts from the sale of land and assets and also in part through borrowing money 
(through the Public Works Load Board or by issuing municipal bonds) which was tightly 
controlled through the 1980s and 1990s by central government. This control was 
mitigated to some extent by the introduction of the Public-Private Partnership and the 
Private Finance Initiative during the 1990s but was relaxed considerably by the 
introduction of the Prudential Borrowing Framework (PBF) in the Local Government Act 
2003 (Hood et al. 2007). The PBF gives greater control to Local Authorities for their 
borrowing arrangements and removes the necessity to have approval from central 
government when doing so. Local Authorities can determine their own level of 
borrowing so long as it complies with a Prudential Code which encourages borrowing 
limits that are prudent for the specific authority. The Prudential Code was created by 
the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountability (CIPFA) and allows the Local 
Authority, in accordance of the code, to determine and self-regulate their financial 
borrowing (Bailey et al. 2012). This form of borrowing is unsupported, in that the 
repayments are not supported by government grants. Instead, the repayments are 
made by the Local Authority either through ‘invest to save’ (where investing now will be 
paid for through savings that will be made because of this initial investment) or through 
the revenue budget. The limits that are set are created by taking in to account finances 
and interest rates over the subsequent three years.  
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The Department for Communities and Local Government (2013) has stated that Local 
Authorities have increased the amount of unsupported borrowing they are utilizing 
since austerity began. In 2008-09, the borrowing debt figure stood at £55.1 billion. By, 
2012-13 the same figure stood at £83.8 billion, an increase of just over 50% (Department 
for Communities and Local Government 2013b). This has increased due to grant cuts 
from the government and to enable Councils to continue to deliver their capital 
expenditures (ibid).  This debt figure was forecast to stand at £90.0 billion by the end of 
2015-16 (Department for Communities and Local Government 2015). Salford Council 
has also been using large amounts of unsupported borrowing to enable it to continue 
with its capital programmers. Prior to 2008, this borrowing was done purely on the 
‘invest-to-save’ basis. However, after 2008 it began to be used more for the general 
delivery of the capital programme (Salford City Council 2013f). The Council has identified 
that investments funded through capital receipts from the sale of assets is less likely at 
this time as asset values are low. For Salford Council, then, borrowing has become a 
more accessible source of funding development, but with a view to this being a 
temporary solution: 
“The Council’s strategy has been to use prudential borrowing to fill the 
funding gap left by the reduction in capital receipts in the recession, with 
a view to using capital receipts to repay debt (rather than finance new 
expenditure) as soon as they become available. Levels of unsupported 
borrowing are therefore higher than they might have been in a non-
recession economy, but this can be seen as a temporary situation that will 
be restored once capital receipts start to flow” (ibid) 
Here, the Council expresses that it will use capital receipts where they become available 
not to reinvest into other capital projects as would have been done previously, but to 
service accrued finance debt. The risk here, then, is that where capital receipts do not 
materialize the majority of the repayment will have to come from the revenue budget. 
It may also create a cycle where by borrowing occurs in the first instance with repayment 
coming from the potential of capital receipts, rather than capital receipts funding 
expenditure in the first instance. Whilst this method was purported to be used as an 
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interim measure, it has continued and is projected to continue as the primary means of 
funding capital expenditure. According to the latest available Council budget,    
“Over the 3 years to 2014/15 some £100m of general support from 
unsupported borrowing will have been used to support the capital 
programme that needs to be funded from the revenue budget, and a 
further £26m is planned for use in 2015/16” (Salford City Council 2015a).   
The risks of unsupported borrowing is managed through the Prudential Code. However, 
as previously mentioned, this only accounts for risks for up to three financial years 
ahead. So what happens when the council financially commit over a longer term period 
than three years? And how much borrowing can be withstood by the local council? 
Bailey et al (2010) argue that the Prudential Code enforces a very narrow and purely 
financial focus on public borrowing, which is arguably a much broader socially and 
politically important. Hood et al (2007) have argued that the code does not allow for the 
consideration of long-term impacts of this borrowing, which appears as an oversight 
given the usual long-term nature of the assets delivered. They also argue that this form 
of financing pushes more risk and responsibility onto local rather than central 
government. Whereas other methods of financing capital projects such as the PFI 
involve long-term commitments in which government funding is guaranteed, all 
financing under the PBF is financed by the local council. This type of financing of capital 
projects, Hood et al (2007) argue, 
“…reduces the overall responsibility of central government for local capital 
investment programmes and effectively transfers this responsibility with 
all associated risks to local government” (2007: 2007). 
This borrowing is posited as a strategy in the short term as austerity continues to play 
out. However, this strategy relies on the assumption that conditions will return to 
‘normal’ or pre-economic downturn levels. But, as Levitas (2012) has argued, if austerity 
is a ‘neoliberal shock doctrine’ used to justify a reduction in public spending and the 
greater involvement of private actors into public service provision, then there are no 
guarantees that there will be any kind of return (2012: 322). Again we see here the 
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future become a source from which to enable current development by borrowing funds 
that will need to be repaid but by pushing this repayment to a future date. It is a strategy 
that incorporates a level of risk which is not fully accounted for and commits now to 
something to be continually dealt with into the future. In doing so, the Council restricts 
its future movements because it has to account for these decisions taken now. These 
decisions are reduced to financial necessities in a period of economic stagnation which 
fail to account for political and social impacts.  
What has been described in the sections above can also be thought of through this frame 
of a ‘post-political rigidity’ (Raco 2015b). Salford Council does engage in these long-term 
contracts with private sector companies through for example the Private Finance 
Initiatives. It also engages in financial deals, investment and borrowing strategies that 
also commit the Council to a future trajectory for a particular time period. These 
commitments often feed into other strategic plans which compound the risks associated 
with them, increasing the necessity to contribute more. These decisions are being made 
now but ultimately exceed beyond now into the future where they may have to be 
continued or resolved by other actors. This process of entrenched exposure to risk and 
the need to manage these risks leads to what Peck has termed ‘“defensive” 
entrepreneurialism’ (2012: 400).       
7.4 An uneven spatiality        
So far, then, I have been interested in what the turn in regeneration away from public 
need to economic growth has facilitated. I have considered the actions, interests and 
policies that have underwritten this change. It makes sense in this next and final section 
of the chapter to consider the implications of all these factors for those spaces across 
Central Salford that are not currently designated as spaces of growth. In particular, I 
want to consider those spaces that were once sites of regeneration or that once formed 
part of a developmental plan that has failed to materialised, has stopped or has stalled. 
What happens, under the new growth agenda, to spaces that are not growth 
generators? When considering this I want to revisit chapter five, drawing on Massey’s 
(2001) notion of space-time, discussed the journey that Salford was taking and the 
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residents that were intended on taking it. However, in this section I want us to consider 
how we conceptualise the ‘journey’ from the perspective of those spaces that are 
unlikely to be subject to investment under the new growth initiative described above. 
These are spaces with no designated ‘future’, in the sense that they are not being 
regenerated and may be unlikely to do so in the imminent future. The spaces that I am 
referring to here are the sites that remain derelict, empty or closed down due to 
discontinued regeneration and redevelopment projects. As Tonkiss (2013) argues,  
“Given downturns in speculative investment on the one hand, and the 
turning screws of government austerity on the other, many cities are 
bearing the physical scars of disinvestment, disuse and decline; in vacant 
and abandoned spaces of private rescission and public retreat” (2013: 
321).  
There are numerous sites across Salford that bear these scars of disinvestment, but 
more importantly they are symbolic of spaces that were once investment opportunities. 
They are sites that were subject to promise of a particular, unmaterialised future. Some 
of these spaces are born out of government-sponsored regeneration projects like HMR 
or NDC. Some are spaces that were regeneration projects with private developers that 
have not been completed and are not yet subject to any completion timescales. Others 
are development projects implemented by private developers that have now stalled 
since the economic recession. These sites can be seen across Central Salford in close 
proximity to spaces of continual investment like SQ. Generally, they represent stalled 
attempts at renewal, and are the byproduct of a regeneration effort which sees some 
places develop at a greater speed than others, even after they have been designated as 
redundant within the new vision.  
These sites were mentioned during the interviews conducted as a source of contention 
for local residents and unsettling for the local residents who live near them, as the below 
quotes demonstrates, 
“There are some different priorities that I’m certainly picking up. They are 
about heritage and development and open space and the community are 
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very, very keen and it’s very important for them to see that those open 
spaces or vacant sites are developed” (6 – Council employee) 
“Very, very destabilising for a local community. They don’t like empty sites 
that are uncared for on their doorstep. Nobody does. You don’t. We don’t. 
If it’s a nice open piece of land equally and it’s cared for to some degree, 
they like that” (19 – Elected official).  
There are many sites like this in Central Salford that are not currently intended for 
development. One particular site is an estate that was due to be redeveloped under NDC 
but has since remained in a suspended state of closure (see figure 26, 27 and 28 below).   
 
Figure 26: New Deal for Communities – Author’s own photo 
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Figure 28: New Deal for Communities – Author’s own photo 
 
Figure 27: New Deal for Communities – Author’s own photo 
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Many people in social housing were moved from this estate to facilitate its demolition 
over a decade ago in 2004 (Wallace 2015). After people were moved from the area 
(which included some compulsory purchase orders), NDC money ran out. Whilst some 
houses were built across the other side of the river which includes some affordable 
housing (see figure 29 above), this estate remains in a state of liminality. Some houses 
still contain residents who continue to live within this estate. The area fenced off in 
figure 27 separates the estate from the river. It contains much of the earth that was 
removed from the development sites where NDC houses were built which has been 
placed within this fenced off location. As can be seen in the photos, it is overgrown and 
closed off to use. This estate represents what Bauman (2000), borrowing the term from 
Kociatkiewicz and Kostera, calls ‘empty space’. Within ‘empty space’ there is no meaning 
which is not to say that they are meaningless to those who may live in them, but that 
they are not designated with meaning in relation to current progression. They are the 
Figure 29: New Deal for Communities – Author’s own photo 
 249 
 
‘left over’ sites that are of no current value. ‘Emptiness,’ Bauman argues, ‘is in the eye 
of the beholder’’ (2000: 104). In this instance, emptiness is seen by the Council and the 
developers who have evacuated from this space by virtue of its now economic 
meaninglessness. They are the places that are left out of the newly designed mental 
maps which weave around the areas main assets carving out the less prosperous place. 
As Bauman (2000) says ‘Cutting out such places allows the rest to shine and bristle with 
meaning (2000: 104).   These empty spaces are notable because of their lack of 
maintenance of the external space, something which is a source of frustration for local 
residents, as one participant stated, 
“It really pisses me off the fact that this has just been left and [NDC] don’t 
give a fuck. They haven’t got a plan. There not bothered. They just say ‘oh 
the housing markets burst there is nothing we can do’. It’s not good 
enough… The difference between here and [new NDC houses] if you go up 
there there’s lights every 10m it’s absolutely gorgeous. The ground; there’s 
no grass growing out of the floor. It’s well maintained, it’s a total 
difference to what we live with... Salford Quays is like that. You won’t find 
this, look at the rubbish on the roads; you will not find that on Salford 
Quays. You won’t find unkempt trees. You won’t find lights that aren’t 
working all that in Salford Quays. There’s a hell of a lot of investment that 
goes on up there because it is the BBC” (17 - Community representative). 
Edensor argues, 
“Work goes into the sustenance of an object over time. It is cared for, 
cleaned and polished, to bestow upon it an illusion of permanence, to keep 
at bay the spectres of waste and decay” (2005b: 317).  
However, on this estate, as there are questions of its permanency, maintenance has 
slipped and the spectres of waste and decay have begun to emerge. Grass is growing 
through cracks in the road that would not ordinarily be there, trees overhang and debris 
has begun to accumulate. This is at odds with the other NDC development pictured 
above in which the space is well maintained. Similarly spaces like SQ are also 
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meticulously maintained by a dedicated landscaping company that ensure the site is well 
manicured throughout the year (The Landscape Group 2015) and to signal this illusion 
of permanence. What some participants identified is the differential treatment between 
these spaces - one which has investment and another which does not, an issue 
acknowledged by decision makers also: 
“And also it’s down to the Council, to be quite frank, to actually sweep the 
streets, and repair the potholes. All too often Councils have had reduced 
maintenance and areas have got neglected... footpaths and things that 
Council had are full of weeds, potholes, broken fences, broken lamp 
columns. They’ve just given up” (3 – Planning Professional).   
For the above areas of ‘empty space,’ they are experiencing what Wallace (2015) refers 
to as ‘gentrification interrupted’, the lived reality of a stalled regeneration project that 
is not likely to be reconsidered within a growth agenda at any point currently. It sits 
waiting, unacknowledged and unmaintained. However, the notion of gentrification 
interrupted still signals and demarcates these sites as ‘in progress’. They have stalled, 
but temporarily, until capital is bought back in to this space. When a space is designated 
according to an economic logic then a person’s right simply to dwell, outside of the 
notion of value, is challenged. What can be seen in the photos of the estate above is that 
it has been inscribed by an aesthetic of capitalist value in waiting. It is tainted by its 
partial closure. What is visible in the estate is the interruption of the journey towards 
economic value. To reside in that space is to be constantly reminded of this interrupted 
process. It limits the right to dwell (Davidson 2009).  
The HMR also cleared many sites in Salford that were never rebuilt. Many of these 
spaces are no longer subject to a regeneration programme and are again left in a 
position of suspension between what they were and what they were intended to be (see 
figures 30 and 31 below). 
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Figure 30: Housing Market Renewal clearance site – Author’s own photo 
 
Figure 31: Housing Market Renewal clearance site – Author’s own photo 
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As the above pictures demonstrate, there are large vacant swathes of land that were 
once the site of housing and public engagement. These sites exist across other cities in 
the North that were subject to HMR which ceased in 2011 under the Coalition. According 
to one participant who was involved in the HMR he was,  
“…completely disappointed. I mean, it was a 15 year programme where 
the money got turned off at year 8. And the way it was often perceived 
was it was a clearance demolition programme and it was something 
where that was in the media. That was in the mindset.” (20 – Council 
employee) 
In parts of Central Salford, these sites remain empty without any current plans for 
reinvestment. Within the same ward only streets away is a housing development in 
partnership with Salford Council that has built over 1000 houses (see figures 32 and 33 
below). The development achieved strong success before the recession, transforming a 
large residential next to the river. According to the developers,  
“Located less than a mile from the city centre of Manchester, and within 
the Salford Crescent Corridor investment area, New Broughton Village has 
rapidly become one of the most sought after areas for all sorts of people – 
bringing together a genuine community of everyone from young 
professionals to growing families, with home styles and sizes to suit them 
all” (Countryside Properties n.d.). 
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Figure 32: New Broughton Village. Source – Countryside photo 
 
Figure 33: New Broughton Riverside, Aerial view. Source – Countryside properties 
The ‘Riverside’ housing is Countryside’s latest development, and makes use of its 
riverside location. One of their selling points, as can be seen above, is that these 
developments are within Salford’s ‘investment area’. This housing is being sold for 
upwards of £200,000. Within the same vicinity, then, there exist side by side these 
different land use developments. Some are being invested and maintained and, others 
which are vacant and undeveloped. 
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The same redevelopment area houses another site suffering a similar fate. The Mocha 
Parade is a small shopping area that serviced the needs of local residents. It is a small 
parade of local shops with housing above. The Council had planned to redevelop the 
shopping area. Within the plans to develop a new shopping centre the housing above 
the shops were closed and the people who resided within them were forcibly moved 
out (see figure 34 below). Since that time there has been little development but it has 
been reported that the shops beneath have suffered from loss of trade (see The Salford 
Star 2012b). 
 
Figure 34: Mocha Parade shops – Author’s own photo 
According to the Salford Council website, last updated in 2011,  
“The Council and Countryside Properties are extremely confident that the 
original ambitious aspirations for the scheme will be achieved, despite 
difficult economic conditions. It may take longer than originally 
anticipated to complete the redevelopment, but our next priority will be to 
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secure redevelopment of the area around and including Mocha 
Parade”(Salford City Council 2011b) 
That the parade is to be included in a future redevelopment scheme could be seen as a 
positive. However, there are no time scales. Again we can see a space in which promises 
have not materialised and which, in the interim, are left in a mid-way point with people 
experiencing a lived reality of regeneration failure. For Kitchin et al (2014) these 
unfinished estates represent the ‘new ruins’ of the 21st century. Unlike traditional ruins 
where capital has exceeded its use and then moved onto a new spatial fix, ‘new ruins’ 
represent evaporation of intended capital before value has been extracted from the 
space. These sites are not in a process of ruin because they are not necessary or no 
longer in use, but because they were packaged up for a speculative future than has failed 
to materialise. They represent a failed future promise. Kitchin et al were speaking 
specifically about housing developments in Ireland that began development before the 
economic crash but were never completed. Whilst there are sites like this in Salford (see 
figure 35 photo) the above examples are sites where people did live. They are sites 
where people were moved from or kept from or remain surrounded by.  
 
Figure 35: Unfinished Salford development – Author’s own photo 
 256 
 
In Kitchin et al’s (2014) analysis, these unfinished developments represented the 
culmination of unregulated finance, neoliberal housing policies and speculative 
development gambled on the expectation of future use rather than current need. The 
same assessment can be applied to Salford. However, in Salford these spaces were most 
often already in use. Thus, people in these areas were told that they would be subject 
to change and that it was based on their needs, regardless of whether or not it was 
based on their choice, making us question who the development was actually for, as one 
developer put it, 
“We got a lot of grief [from the residents] and it was all about ‘we just 
want somewhere nice to live’. They didn’t want the world they just wanted 
somewhere nice to live.” (3 – Planning Professional) 
There is an opportunity within these spaces to expose the fragile notion of linear 
capitalist progress and to highlight its cycle of destruction and production. In its 
suspension it allows room to ‘multiply the readings of the city’ as Lebfevre requested (in 
Edensor 2005a: 4). These ruins offer an opportunity for engaging in a progressive urban 
politics. However, as will be seen below, these spaces are still inscribed within a linear 
progressive temporality, even if they are currently in limbo. For some cleared spaces 
there has been some investment to improve its current state. These are areas that are 
labelled ‘meanwhile sites’, sites that are currently derelict and waiting for investment 
and in the ‘meanwhile’ will be subject to improvement (Salford City Council 2015c). 
Many of these sites are within the currently developing PFI housing regeneration area 
called Pendleton. As the Council states, these meanwhile sites are being maintained to 
improve their aesthetics and their usability by local residents until a time determined in 
which they will be subject to development, as the below participant suggests, 
“They’ve come up with a scheme of “meanwhile areas”. This is housing 
talk. And their idea is it will be built on eventually but in the “meanwhile” 
they’re going to beautify it. Make a park, make a natural garden, pasture 
or something, you know, so it’s more acceptable, so it doesn’t stick out like 
a sore thumb” (18 – Community representative).  
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The idea of a ‘meanwhile site’ comes from a social movement in which an unused space 
or building is taken over by local people in order to make it productive again, in an 
alternative not-for-profit way. Organisations like The Meanwhile Foundation, a national 
charity originally set up by Brent Council in London, support interest groups in setting 
up temporary projects in the gaps that open up within the process of neoliberal capital 
development (The Meanwhile Foundation 2015). Meanwhile projects focus on art 
installations, charities, gardening groups and the like. The government has produced 
guidance which sets out a range of leasing options over town centre units for a 
temporary time period by non-commercial groups (Department for Communities and 
Local Government 2009). Whilst this guidance relates to city centre shopping units, the 
concept has been equally applied to outdoor spaces of dereliction. The idea is to make 
use of empty sites that are seen to blight the landscape. However, it has also become a 
form of urban activism, the reclamation of space for communitarian uses in the 
interstices of longterm profit seeking development (Tonkiss 2013).  
The form that ‘meanwhile sites’ have taken in Salford has been in improving these 
cleared sites and creating spaces where local residents can plant and grow food. In 
partnership with a charity called Newground, the sites designated as ‘meanwhile’ within 
the Pendleton development have been improved (see figure 36 below). The planting 
pots are designed to be moved as and when the site gets developed. One meanwhile 
site that had been created has already had to move its residents on due to development 
of that site coming to fruition (Newground 2015). 
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Figure 36: Salford ‘meanwhile site’. Source – Newground photo 
Tonkiss (2013) argues that these temporary uses indicate a ‘makeshift urbanism’ in 
which delays in development can be utilized to create spaces of hope, of commonality 
amongst local groups who can benefit from this reuse of space in socially desirable ways. 
It creates a space which is free of economic valuations, a space where people can dwell. 
However, Tonkiss argues, these meanwhile sites, whilst socially beneficial, may serve to 
‘keep sites warm’ for profit-seeking development (2013: 318). They could serve to lay 
the foundations for developers or, ironically, attract previously uninterested developers 
which would run counter to their activism ideology. More broadly, the very notion of a 
‘meanwhile site’ serves to include these spaces within a foreclosed trajectory of 
development. Whilst it momentarily opens up these spaces to a multiplicity of use, this 
occurs on a larger timescale of development where its future is already set. Any more 
multiple or dynamic use of this space is only temporary until funds can be mobilized to 
continue its linear journey. The potential for something different is fleeting because 
alternative uses can only exist, by their very purpose, in the meanwhile. 
7.5 Conclusion 
In the introduction to this chapter I proffered a stark warning from Southern that ‘This 
is the end of ‘regeneration’ as we know it’ (2013: 399). For Southern, regeneration was 
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changing as a response to, but not necessarily because of, austerity. Austerity, Southern 
argued, was a banner under which to enact more fundamental changes in ideology that 
accompanied the Coalition government’s focus on a reduced state and neoliberal 
growth. It is, as Levitas (2012) has argued, a ‘neoliberal shock doctrine’ used to justify 
cuts to public spending and local state power. In exploring this change this chapter has 
highlighted some of the relevant changes to planning and urban policy that the Coalition 
made after coming into power. In particular it raises the issue of increased private sector 
involvement through LEPs and an attempt to shift political jurisdictions by initiating the 
creation of new economic spatial scales. Whilst in Salford the LEP operates over 
traditional Greater Manchester geographical boundaries, we saw the attempts by Peel 
Holdings to form its own LEP in the gap of potential that these changes opened up.  
Peel Holdings was not successful in the attempts to create its own LEP. However, this 
does raise important questions regarding the possibility of new non-state spaces of 
important private sector assets governed by non-representative actors engaged in the 
politics of planning. It forces us to consider the implication of an increasing number of 
private actors driving economic growth when economic growth takes precedence over 
other forms of urban change. How long will local authorities be able to withstand 
challenges from private institutions when their own powers are being increasingly 
curtailed? Peel Holdings is a unique example in this context as it is one of the biggest 
landowners in the region. But under the Coalition and Conservative governments, the 
disposal of land and assets is being heavily encouraged, leaving more scope for either 
the monopolizing of an organization like Peel, or the increasing power of other private 
organisations.  
The reduction in the power of the local state is being compounded by other policy 
changes at a national level that are encouraging  what I have argued can be understood 
as a framework of normality. Under this framework, local councils are expected to 
bypass statutory requirements and democratic controls over developments. I have 
demonstrated how, in the Salford context, reducing the ability of the Council to enforce 
controls over developers serves to usher in a notion of necessity, a fatalistic response to 
capital in which it must be secured at all costs. This ‘invocation of necessity’ results in 
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the loss of democratic decision making as it stands in the way of immediate action, 
jeopardizing scarce investment opportunities (Davidson and Iveson 2014). What we see 
occurring here can be equated to a ‘post-political consensus’ which in effect creates the 
very conditions it is proposed to resolve (Swyngedouw 2010). They are not responses to 
global neoliberalism but further entrenchments of it, further enforcing a post-political 
commitment to a neoliberal growth agenda (Allmendinger and Houghton 2012). 
This is reinforced through the necessity to engage in long-term contracts with private 
developers as the only source of available funding to deliver development in the area. 
This can be seen through contracts like the Private Finance Initiative. The result of this 
is the inclusion of private developers as providing social necessities, with the public 
sector transferring large sums of money and assets into private hands. This, as it has 
been argued, is a challenge to democratic accountability now and into the future. The 
depletion of assets may be a problem for future generations, restricting their ability to 
make changes. It also, as Raco (2014) has argued, locks out the ability to engage in 
politics for the duration of the contract. However, in Salford, not only are these contracts 
being entered into for social rewards, but also to stimulate private development, as was 
the case with the Greengate example. Here, then, we see the Council shifting its 
priorities by focusing on delivery of economic rewards through unsupported borrowing. 
This results in risk-taking associated normally with the market in order to offer security 
to private developers, reversing the traditional model of private entrepreuneurialism. 
Here the Council is acting as a risk taker, normalizing ‘everyday entrepreuneurialisms’ 
(Peck 2014). The Council here takes on responsibility for the eventual crisis associated 
with capitalist development (Zizek 2009). To escape its inevitable endpoint, argues, 
Zizek, capitalism must forever push its limits further in to the future, borrowing from it 
and escaping into it. In the actions of Salford Council we see it pushing its endpoint in to 
the future, borrowing now and committing now to something that will have to be paid 
off later. Any risks associated are pushed forward, renegotiating and recommitting as 
and when they need to, locking out the possibility of making changes as it goes along.  
This ‘commit now, pay later’ form of capital financing is further being reinforced through 
a ‘payment by results’ style of government funding. This arrangement rewards those 
 261 
 
councils with the biggest ‘risk appetite’ (Waite et al. 2013) by making funding conditional 
on GVA growth. The ability through growth to generate their own income is to 
encourage self-sufficiency and remove dependency on the centre for redistributed 
grants. This discourse moves government further away from any notion of redistribution 
based on need to self-sufficiency based on growth. The implication is that local 
regeneration strategies will be continually focused on those areas with the most growth 
potential, drawing crucial finance away from places of deprivation to those places that 
already display signs of economic success. There is a potential then that this will further 
increase spatial inequality, contributing to the very thing that urban regeneration 
intended to ameliorate. It is through this that we see these changes to regeneration as 
a social practice becoming reduced to purely economic gains. 
Whilst the Council is taking financial risks to ensure development continues in the most 
economically important areas, there are signs emerging that this is creating spatial 
inequalities amongst those areas that Bauman (2000) calls ‘empty spaces’. These are the 
sites that allow us to see the impact of speculative development based on potential 
future gains over identified local needs. These spaces of interrupted gentrification bare 
the marks of failed promises and are the ‘new ruins’ of the 21st century, waiting in limbo 
for investment (Kitchin et al. 2014). They exemplify the false choice urbanism that Slater 
(2014) identified where capital is both the cause and the solution to the problem. It is in 
spaces like these that we can consider the fragmented and disjointed temporalities that 
have been set in motion. In these spaces we can consider the multiple readings of the 
city as something other than of economic value and modernist progress. We can 
consider it as a place to dwell, as a site of dynamism and multiplicity (Massey, 2001). 
However, in the labelling of these as ‘meanwhile sites’ they are entered in to a 
foreclosed trajectory of development in which the future has been designated, but until 
the time that they are again given meaning, they wait suspended in the trajectory of 
speculative neoliberal urban development.     
 
 
 262 
 
8. Conclusion 
I began this thesis setting out the view of several research participants that highlighted 
the scale of change that parts of Salford have undertaken. Here, Salford was referred to 
as schizophrenic, a metaphor to indicate the polarisation between parts of the city; the 
modern architectural spectacle of SQ and MediaCityUK versus the abandoned ground 
of clearance sites and boarded up estates. It was this polarisation, both of which have 
been created as a consequence of the same regeneration initiatives enacted since the 
1980’s, which this thesis has attempted to understand. Arguably, a simplified but central 
tenant of the thesis was the fundamental question of ‘how did this unevenness occur’? 
Of course this polarisation is much more nuanced than the above sentence suggests. In 
between and surrounding these spaces are areas neither as shiny nor as empty. Some 
of these places have been redeveloped completely as new build housing estates; others 
have not been changed at all. Some of the areas have been redesigned as mixed use 
development spaces including offices and apartments; others have been left as high rise 
residential blocks either in their original form or with newly added cladding. Some 
people will have experienced no change. Others will have experienced it absolutely. And 
others still will have experienced it to varying degrees. Ultimately what I want to avoid 
is the assertion that this polarisation has occurred fundamentally with residents now 
either on one side of the divide or the other. 
However, it is vitally important that these differences between places are considered. 
These differences allow us to understand and reflect upon the changes that are taking 
place regionally, nationally and even globally. What we see in Salford is an articulation 
of these wider relations and interactions that are taking place. It is a story which 
manifests because of significant local specificity, but also one that can speak to the 
changes that are occurring across a range of cities not only in the UK but across the 
globe. It is a good example of the pattern of urban development that is seen occurring 
elsewhere. And it is important because although Salford is not a World city or a global 
city, it is a city that is hugely uneven within a concentrated localised geographical 
context. If we can think of Salford as a fairly typical northern post-industrial city, the fact 
that it exhibits such spatial difference as a result of the same regenerating epoch is 
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consequential. And that is the point to remember throughout this narrative of change; 
that regeneration in one concentrated area could have such divergent outcomes. 
Across the entirety of Salford exists unevenness and inequality. The Western part of the 
city has always been, since its inclusion within the city’s boundaries, a much more 
privileged space with greater wealth and health. It was noted in the chapter three how 
the life expectancy of wards in the west was 10 years higher than certain wards in the 
east of the city. However, the reason that the majority of this thesis focused on the east 
of the city, Central Salford, was because this whole area was subject to a programme of 
regeneration to even out some of these inequalities, as a result of which, new and even 
more proximate uneven disparities have been created. What I intend to do in this 
chapter is draw together the themes that have emerged from the three empirical 
chapters that proceed it to think more broadly about their consequences. It is a synthesis 
of the key arguments made throughout to attempt to consider what the implications 
are for Central Salford in the future and for urban regeneration in general. 
Fundamentally this chapter raises questions of the foreclosure of Salford and its 
intended future.  
This foreclosure is manifest in several ways; firstly the linear trajectory of future 
development narrows the scope of possible futures, forcing all on to a singular trajectory 
of which some people/areas will inevitable fall outside of; secondly the commitment in 
the present to financial and contractual commitments in the future forecloses the 
possibility of the Council to divert from this course of action, locking the Council in and 
locking out future democratic decision making and political engagement; thirdly, the 
changes to local government funding streams compounds these foreclosures by 
reducing the scope for alternative action as devolution over financial responsibility 
increasingly means local authorities must fund their own futures through locally 
generated economic gains.  
This discussion chapter will aim to unpack these claims, drawing from the empirical data 
already discussed to highlight these points. But what I also want to explore in this 
chapter is the changing role of the Local Authority, not just in Salford but elsewhere in 
the UK, to understand how local authorities are taking an enhanced role in the 
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expansion of financial capital under conditions of austerity. I will consider how Local 
Authorities are acting as a source for receiving market debt, acting as a necessary outlet 
for financial capital. This debt is then used speculatively to generate economic gains 
through capital development, compounding the risks already taken whilst ensuring 
financial returns for private developers. The outcome of this, I will argue, will be high 
levels of Local Authority market debt and an increase in uneven spatialities both within 
and between cities, as the most lucrative of land developments are prioritised over 
others.  
8.1 Foreclosed future 
In this section I want to highlight the way in which Salford both spatially and temporally 
is being foreclosed, narrowed and flattened, leaving little room for those who do not 
fulfil the cities new vision to engage in. The first empirical chapter, chapter five, was 
framed as a journey, a journey that the city had been set on course to take in which it 
will be transformed in to a ‘modern, global city’. The reason for this framing was twofold. 
Firstly it was a direct appropriation of the language Salford Council was using in their 
visionary prospectus, ‘Salford 2025: A Modern Global City’. In this document Salford’s 
end goal was set out by Salford Council, as was its transformational agenda of how it 
intends to get there. It was a journey that every Salford resident was incorporated within 
and expected to make. But the notion of a journey also highlighted a broader conceptual 
theme, one of ‘progress’. The language used to describe Salford by the research 
participants evoked this discourse of progression and of temporality, a linear movement 
from past to present to future. It was a language that incorporated movement forwards 
but also backwards. The problem Salford had faced was identified as a spiral of 
deindustrialised decline. In this regression the wheels of industry slowed to a halt and 
then began to reverse, as the benefits that had been accrued and the working and 
affluent residents, participants argued, left the city. To reverse this decline required the 
mobalisation of residents that were conceptualised as stagnant, immobile and living in 
the past. There was a considered attempt to change the traditional image that ‘old 
Salford’ conjured up. One policy maker interviewed commented that external 
representations of Salford created an imagery of a “working class theme park”, a 
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romanticised notion of working class tradition that “nobody wanted to live in” 
(participant 2 – Elected official). 
The picture of Salford painted by the research participants is of course one articulation 
of Salford’s past. It is one telling of the story of Salford that necessarily points us to a 
particular understanding of the present and indeed the future. As the story starts from 
a period of decline then it logically follows that it moves within a temporal narrative 
towards growth and progress. Of course there are other narratives of this story, one I 
have alluded to as a story of identity, the loss of culture or a narrative of displacement. 
Again though, this is just another articulation of the history of Salford. A full audit of the 
perceptions of the residents in Central Salford would likely expose a range of reactions 
to the changes that have taken place, some positive and some negative; because, cities 
by their very nature, are not homogenous entities. They are sites of difference and 
contain a myriad of otherness; different people experiencing the city in different ways 
(Amin & Thrift 2002) and what I do not want to do in this thesis is overlook that 
complexity. However, what I do want to argue is that in the re-envisioning of Salford by 
the planning decision makers there is being created a very narrow articulation of Salford, 
a very specific reading of the city, in which people are expected to exist within. What I 
mean by this is that in the redesigning of the city there is less room for a myriad of 
otherness. 
I take the term articulation here from Massey (1994). For Massey, space is constructed 
through an intricate network of relations that exist within it, across it, beyond it and 
even before it, in to the past. The form that Salford takes has occurred because of the 
influences and decisions that have been made within a wider structure. Places are thus 
not bounded or enclosed, insulated and made from within, but are a ‘subset of the 
interactions which constitute space, a local articulation within the wider whole’ (ibid: 
115). Space is an articulation of a place at that particular moment within that wider 
network. If we think of places as articulations then they are always in progress, open to 
the possibility that they will change as new relations and influences emerge. It is in this 
openness that there exists politics, as Massey argues,  
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“There are always relations which are still to be made, or unmade, or re-
made. In this sense, space is a product of our on-going world. And in this 
sense it is also always open to the future. And, in consequence, it is always 
open also to the political. The production of space is a social and political 
task. If it is conceptualised in this manner, the dimension of space enters, 
necessarily, into the political (for if the future were not open there would 
be no possibility of changing it and thus no possibility of politics)” 
(Massey 2009: p17, emphasis added). 
It is within this possibility of politics that the identity or meaning of a place becomes the 
dominant articulation. It is through this negotiation that one view of a place becomes 
hegemonic over others.  
For Massey, space is a dimension in which there is the simultaneous coexistence of 
multiple things and thus space is inherently social. In this sense, as mentioned above, 
the making of space is a social task but also therefore a political task. It is in this 
multiplicity of space in which we encounter others that we are forced, Massey argued, 
to ask the most fundamental of socio-political questions; “how are we going to live 
together” (2009: 18). However, of course the answer to this question is tied in to power 
and politics, or more importantly the power to do politics which again has a spatial 
element to it. For Massey, a truly democratic politics is the ability of all voices to engage 
and be recognised and legitimised as equal within these power-relations. It is an equal 
distribution of power-relations that allows for and takes account of the multiplicity 
within spaces. The final point that I want to highlight from Massey which I have 
mentioned in previous chapters is that when we think of space as time, i.e. developing 
or progressing in one particular direction, we reduce difference and multiplicity by 
forcing in on to a single linear path; a path which is singular in its future and in its retelling 
of the past (2001).  
I draw on Massey here to make two key arguments about the regeneration of Salford 
that emerge from chapter five. The first is that in the re-envisioning of Salford and the 
articulation of Salford that this is producing, there is a narrowing of the multiplicity of 
difference in the city. The city as a site of simultaneity, of otherness, is reduced. As the 
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city is redesigned to attract capital and incoming middle class residents, the scope to 
engage in the new forms of economy and cultural products is being curtailed for 
residents who are unable to exist within those spaces (Fuller 2012). This leads on to a 
second and related argument. In conflating space with time, in placing Salford on a 
journey, the future or Salford is also narrowed. There is one main trajectory that is 
prioritised over any other around which the city is being geared towards. People in 
Salford are considered in relation to this trajectory and whether or not they are able to 
be part of it. What I am suggesting here is that Salford, both spatially and temporally, is 
being foreclosed. In defining one version of the city as dominant, there is an ‘ontological 
flattening’ of its diverse meanings (Lauermann 2015: 1). So how do we see this occurring 
in Salford? 
We saw in chapter five the regeneration of Central Salford in a quest to be a competitive 
city, ‘a city of choice’, and a city where everybody benefits. Redesigning and reordering 
areas that would be conceived of as spaces of decline formed a necessary part of this. 
Bringing back a market for housing, through for example the housing market renewal 
and diversifying the economic base of the city were key components of this 
regeneration. However, we also saw that local residents were not necessarily benefitting 
from these regeneration initiatives and that many felt excluded from it. But instead of 
engaging in the production of that space in a way that opened up the future to varied 
possibilities, the response to this from the participants interviewed sought to close 
down this resistance. Local residents were seen as stagnant and resisting change, 
parochial and living in the past. The implication was that these residents’ views did not 
sit well within the new vision for Salford.  
Demonstration of actual resistance to the changes were closed down by discursively 
reducing them to a misunderstanding of what was going to happen and that they would 
understand at some point in the future once they had seen the outcome. What is 
happening when resistance is being reduced in this way is that they are being 
delegitimised or not recognised as valid voices. Allen (2008) argues that practitioners 
symbolically dominate those who resist the process, as practitioners are the ones who 
have been designated with a legitimate voice in the process. Any resistance is 
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invalidated by those who have the power to impose meaning; this being a form of 
symbolic violence in Allen’s terms. We see here then the literal foreclosure of open 
politics, the reduction of dissenting voices. Another response from participants was that 
many local residents did not have the necessary education or skills to obtain the new 
forms of work. People, the participant’s state, will get jobs in the future. They will be 
upskilled in the future. They will have these opportunities in the future. This, Raco et al 
(2008) call the ‘politics of space-time’. Here decisions are made over who benefits first 
and who benefits last. The power to make these decisions is bound up in politics. Those 
with less power and less ability to engage in decision making are most likely to see their 
benefits deprioritised in favour of others. So for these people they are still enforced in 
to this future trajectory, they are not able to change or follow another route.  
All of the above responses explain the dislocation between local residents and the 
regenerated spaces in ways that consistently frame the discussions in relation to the 
new vision for Salford. The residents are understood by policy makers in relation to this 
transition that is taking place. But they are understood in ways that see them as outside 
of this notion of Salford and what Salford is becoming. It is up to them as residents to 
merge on to this path. If they do not have the skills to work in the newly emerging 
professional and financial services economy or in the new media city then they need to 
upskill. If they feel out of place in spaces like MediaCityUK or the Lowry then they need 
to be exposed to it. By pathologising an individual’s inability to succeed as a form of 
individual failure, the ability to challenge it is again restricted. An individual’s failure or 
success is still viewed through this narrow temporal lens of change; they succeed or fail 
in relation to this future image. The dominant articulation of the future is unchanging 
and not open to the possibility of politics in any meaningful sense (Massey 2009). 
Temporally, the future is closed.  
But spatially it is also closed, or at least narrowed down symbolically. I have argued that 
symbolic boundaries are created within the redesigning of space (Coleman 2003). It is 
through these boundaries that define legitimate and illegitimate behaviour that 
difference is no longer tolerated. Through the erecting of these boundaries there is a 
symbolic narrowing of space as it restricts behaviours to that which fall within the 
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designation of acceptability in that space. These behaviours, it has been argued, have a 
cultural and economic form. It is the reimagining of space for a middle-class audience 
(Atkinson 2003a). I drew on Davidsons (2009) notion of the ‘right to dwell’ to 
conceptualise this idea. The right to dwell is about more than just the right to be in a 
space, or the right not to be physically displaced from it; it is about the right to shape 
and produce the space in which one dwells. It is the right to experience and live in a 
place outside the notion of it as a commodity, outside of its economic and competitive 
valuation. It is the right to be engaged with that space as a place to live even as the fabric 
of the area is being changed around you. The right to dwell here represents a dislocation 
of people from place as that place is regenerated in ways that erects boundaries 
(Davidson 2009).  
If we recall Massey’s (2009) most fundamental of socio-political questions; “how are we 
going to live together?”, we can see that this question is not really open to suggestions 
or debate. The answer has already been given. We can reflect here on the symmetry of 
the discussion raised during the methodology chapter (chapter four) when I described 
how the Council was restricting access to data and employees. I discussed the 
temporality of political sensitivity which may serve to hinder access for research (see 
Desmond 2004). But what this represents more importantly is the general foreclosure 
of the ability to engage in Salford’s decision making process or the awareness of its 
outcomes. Access to Council information is being restricted at an increased level with 
certain committees (including the regeneration briefing) having a closed session within 
every committee meeting. The Information Commissioners Office in March 2015 placed 
Salford Council, along with two other authorities, on a Freedom of Information Request 
monitoring list due to its failure to respond to information requests by members of the 
public (Information Comissioners Office 2015). There is a parallel here between the 
foreclosures of Salford spatially and temporally but also politically. There is a narrowing 
of the available information and transparency of the Council. This represents what 
Allmendinger and Houghton (2012) call a post-political planning condition, a system 
which is “focused on carefully stage-managed processes with subtly but clearly defined 
parameters of what is open for debate” (2012: 90).  
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What we have here is a process of inscribing Salford with a new image, a new vision and 
a new future. This inscription however, narrows the space for some Salford residents to 
engage within in, which is crucially important if this is the future trajectory for Salford. 
It creates a divergence between the ‘new’ Salford and any residents who are unable to 
follow that path. Local residents who cannot engage are in many ways dis-embedded 
and decontextualized from Salford’s future; emptying it of their needs. If what we see 
occurring here is the outcome of the regeneration strategy, what we see below is how 
it was created. These are the strategies, narrow in scope that added to the divergence 
of space. What I want to argue in the below section is how these strategies have 
developed in a way that seeks opportunities for investment over local needs, creating 
this divergence. These opportunities require exceptional measure that once utilised, 
become a normative process. If we think of the above section as the narrowing of Salford 
in a way that restricts its use from local residents, we can think of the below as the 
narrowing of Salford which restricts its use from the Council itself. In regenerating 
Salford the Council lock itself in to a future trajectory which is then maintained but also 
compounded via additional contractual agreements. I shall explain what I mean by this 
in the section below.  
8.2 Foreclosing entrepreneurs 
Through exploring the creation of SQ I tried to demonstrate how the space could be 
seen as a palimpsest of global urban regeneration strategies that act as a blueprint for 
the various cities that apply them: mixed use development, waterfront development, 
the cultural turn, creative cities (Quilley 2002). The space itself is an indicator of the 
regeneration ‘repertoire of strategies’ that Peck (2005) identifies as a feature of urban 
regeneration. We also saw how Salford Council came to behave more and more 
entrepreneurially, engaging more so with private developers and seeking to secure 
investment. In was during this chapter than I began to demonstrate ways in which the 
Council was reducing its statutory powers of control in order to remove barriers to 
development. Here I drew on Swyngedouw et al’s (2002) concept of a ‘framework of 
exceptionality’. The purpose of using this term was to allow me to draw parallels with 
the measures that were being taken by Salford Council to develop SQ but more 
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specifically MediaCityUK. The exceptional measures used here were the designation of 
a privately led Urban Regeneration Company to lead on the BBC bid in conjunction with 
Peel Holdings. This was taking the lead on behalf on the Council under the assumption 
that it would be better placed to make these negotiations. Peel Holdings were not forced 
to meet the usual requirements to secure planning permission. They were exempt from 
having to provide affordable housing and from having to pay any Section 106 planning 
gains. Nor did they have to provide training costs or enter in to a labour contract. There 
was a resignation on behalf of the participants that this was a necessary occurrence in 
order to secure the development; it was as Davidson and Iveson (2014) argue an 
‘invocation of necessity’. The exercising of considered democratic decision making is 
supplanted by the urgency to act quickly.  
It is this urgent action that we can see taking place throughout the development of SQ; 
each stage of development attempting to reach a critical point that would competitively 
position Salford city against other cities. This fatalism over securing investment, Slater 
(2014) argued is a ‘false choice urbanism’. Here, investment is posited as the opposite 
to disinvestment, it is what is needed to solve the problems of disinvestment. What this 
false choice does is negate the political issue of capital flows and the way that capital 
accumulation creates uneven development as necessary to its continuation. Investment 
and disinvestment are not opposites but both fundamental features of capital which 
serves to first value, devalue, then revalue land again. If we were to take our story of 
Salford, not from the point of decline, but prior to that, from the height of economic 
productivity, then perhaps the solution to the problem may appear differently. It may 
offer a warning not to follow the same path, not to rely on an economic growth agenda 
that may produce the same outcome of obsolescence. When the destructive result of 
capitalism is visible in space its presence allows for an engagement and critique of this 
process. However, when these spaces are rebuilt in a manner that removes these signs 
of decline, the past can be easily forgotten.  
What I want to posit here is that the creation of MediaCityUK was in many ways 
serendipitous. It was a confluence of factors that came together and took shape within 
SQ for reasons that were outside of the control of Salford Council. But why is this 
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serendipity important for our understanding? I propose that this is important because it 
demonstrates the necessity to secure the opportunity. It was not a long term plan of 
Salford Council to become a Media City and in it being presented as an opportunity to 
grasp; the development became more exceptional, of more magnitude, in which Council 
compromises needed to be made. Additional benefits for local residents were worked 
out at a later date retrospectively. The unforeseen opportunity of securing the 
relocation of the BBC also highlights the zero-sum game of inter-urban competition 
cities take part in (Peck and Tickell 2002). In ‘winning’ the BBC Salford Council is taking 
part in the very process of capital circulation that placed it in its position of decline in 
the first place. It also compounds the fate of other cities equally competing for 
investment. If Salford has won, then someone else has lost. We could immediately think 
here that the losing city was Manchester, but of course the BBCs northern relocation 
could have effectively gone to any other northern city. As Peck and Tickell (2002) 
commented, “In selling themselves, cities are therefore actively facilitating and 
subsidizing the very geographic mobility that first rendered them vulnerable, while also 
validating and reproducing the extralocal rule systems to which they are (increasingly) 
subjected” (2002: 393). 
But more importantly this ‘opportunity’ was about attracting a substantial investment 
to the city. The BBC was the anchor point around which Peel Holdings and Salford 
Council were to create an entire Media City. Creating a Media City rather than just a BBC 
building was a selling point that Peel in conjunction with the Salford URC was able to 
offer. And in creating a whole Media City around one anchor tenant means generating 
demand. This then requires a speculative risk, creating something much bigger than the 
guaranteed financial commitment of the BBC. This speculation on potential future 
demand is a process of making what Moreno (2014) calls “financial claims on the 
future”, building something in anticipation of a return (p264). With this being the 
catalyst, rather than an obvious exhibition of market demand or a surplus labour force, 
there is an increased necessity on behalf of the developers to generate business interest. 
In the case of Media City, this involved amongst other things, additional financial output 
from the Council in terms of loans, the commitment to renting buildings and the 
sponsoring of the philharmonic orchestra; exceptional measures for an exceptional 
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development. The commitment made to the developing of MediaCityUK by the Council 
locks it on to a course that must be maintained by further investment and speculation. 
It makes it difficult to allow the site to fail. So when for example the North West 
Development Agency was closed by the Coalition government, Salford Council had to 
take over its commitments to MediaCityUK so as not to incur any associated risks, which 
included additional financial contributions (Salford City Council 2015b). But is locking on 
to a particular course of action a problem in itself? What I am suggesting here is that 
actions are problematic when they are speculative to an extent and are based on 
opportunity rather than local demand.  
8.3 ‘No alternative’? 
So how can we understand the commitment to this ‘opportunity’ if it was knowingly not 
obviously going to deliver immediate local benefits? It can be assumed from this that 
the potential for polarisation within the city was foreseen. So why, we can ponder, 
would the Council commit so heavily to securing the BBC? Harvey (1989) argued that 
faced with such necessity to secure investment,  
“…it is by no means clear that even the most progressive urban 
government can resist such an outcome when embedded in the logic of 
capitalist spatial development in which competition seems to operate 
not as a beneficial hidden hand, but as an external coercive law forcing 
the lowest common denominator of social responsibility and welfare 
provision within a competitively organised urban system” (1989: 12).  
Harvey made this observation over 25 years ago, but the description seems just, if not 
more apt now than it did then. Salford Council sought out this development even when 
faced with the knowledge of its possibly polarising associated risks. The question that 
this raises here is whether the Council should have resisted securing the BBC and its 
associated MediaCityUK in the absence of other alternatives? Just imagine for a moment 
a situation in which Salford Council had said ‘no’. It would appear entirely against logic 
for the investment to be rejected even knowing it may not directly benefit local people. 
This is exactly the ‘false-choice’ that Slater (2014) wrote of: secure the investment and 
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manage the results whatever they may be. But what would have been the outcome if 
the Council had rejected the deal as unsuitable for the area? Or alternatively enforced 
its statutory controls and fully embedded some social provisions for local people? (Or 
perhaps this is still operating within the false-choice logic?) Of course we cannot know 
the answer to this question but it bears some consideration.  
This question is particularly pertinent under the changing conditions of urbanisation and 
welfare provision rendered by austerity since the economic crisis. How far have the 
possibilities for acting outside of this ubiquitous ideology been curtailed? How much can 
it be argued that cities like Salford are operating within a post-political condition? In 
chapter seven I argued that the exceptional measures mentioned above had become 
normalised amongst Salford Council. Moving from a framework of exceptionality we 
begin to see emerge a framework of normality. Exceptional measures are now being 
applied to routine developments, and in doing so are no longer, I argue, considered 
exceptional measures. The borrowing of unsupported sums of finance to lever in private 
investment is one example of this. The lack of assertion in securing planning gains over 
developments is another. The direct leasing of private development buildings (for 
example the ‘wrapper lease’) that tie the Council in to contracted financial agreements 
is another. The deprioritising of local benefits in favour of developer returns is yet 
another. These are behaviours that are depicted by the Council as necessary to continue 
a committed capital programme of development. This represents, as Peck (2014) 
argued, a ‘saturation stage’ of urban entrepreneurialism wherein “’everyday 
entrepreneurialisms” have become a normalised, unremarkable and routinized feature 
of urban policy (2014: 397). But just because these are normalised features of urban 
policy does not mean that they are not also hugely important to our conceptualisation 
of notions of equality and democracy. In fact, in becoming normalised we should be 
even more concerned with what this may imply for our cities in the future.  
So what are the implications of a framework of normality for the local Council and urban 
regeneration? What has to be acknowledged is that this normalisation process has been 
happening over the course of time but has happened at the same time as other 
consolidating factors that compound these issues. Firstly there is the issue of the 
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absence of any regeneration grants under the Coalition and now Conservative 
government that are targeted at sites of deprivation. Or that are at least based on social 
need (Southern 2013). The whole funding landscape has changed in a way so as to 
enable growth, but more specifically to reward growth. All the growth funds from the 
government have to be awarded based on the Local Authority’s ability, in conjunction 
with the private sector, to deliver growth (Deas 2012). This is being made easier through 
the requirements of areas to establish Local Economic Partnerships where decisions are 
taken by private actors. Simultaneously, the taxation of local councils has changed also 
to allow local councils to keep a higher rate of return on their business rates. Business 
rate retention is one method of this. The council then necessarily has to generate gains 
in order to continue to fund public services and urban regeneration (Muldoon-Smith & 
Greenhalgh 2015). In addition to this are post-crash conditions of austerity where the 
capital financiers are hesitant to lend and developers are hesitant to speculate (Peck 
2012). Under these combined conditions are a unique set of circumstances which 
solidify this normalisation process. What we see coming out of this are local authorities 
acting in a heightened position of financialisation and risk taking. This signifies an 
enhanced role for local authorities to act as a linchpin for financial capital. I shall unpack 
this in more detail below. 
8.4 Facilitating finance 
When I began this thesis my thoughts were that urban regeneration was being 
conducted in a manner that bypassed Local Authorities. My initial analysis of the 
situation occurring in Salford was that they were being sidelined by both the central 
government via a reduction in funding and by private actors through their increased 
involvement and prominence in decision making and leading on development and also 
in the privatisation of public assets. In the introduction to this thesis I narrated a 
situation that occurred between Salford Council and Peel Holdings in which the Council’s 
core strategy was challenged to the point of removal. I initially took this as a sign that 
the Council was becoming obsolete, losing its power to private sector developers in 
favour of the national commitment to private economic growth. It felt like a story of 
shrinkage, a reduction in power, legitimacy and ability. Whilst there are elements to this 
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narrative that I still believe to be occurring, particularly on the point of the shifting 
power relations to private actors, I see that the role of the Council is not diminishing but 
actually becoming central to the private growth agenda under conditions of austerity. It 
is not to say that the local government was not previously important to the expansion 
of capital in to urbanisation (Harvey 1989, Peck and Tickell 2002). But this process is 
being compounded in new ways under austerity.  
Peck (2012) has argued that austerity urbanism has become a new urban condition, “a 
state of normalcy at the very cusp of crisis” (2012: 651). In particular Peck identifies, 
using the US as his analytical ground, but which is applicable to UK cities also, that there 
would be devolved responsibility to the local state for economic growth and social 
development but without the associated financial capabilities to deliver, seeking market 
alternatives instead. In response to this local services will have to be reduced, impacting 
hardest on those already most disadvantaged. Because of this reduction in financing, 
entrepreneurial governance will become a fiscal necessity.  And of course all these 
features will emerge unevenly across cities affected (Peck 2012). Many of these features 
have been described as emerging in Salford and undoubtedly across other UK cities. But 
what I want to highlight here is the role of the Council as an arbiter of financial capital, 
but one which also acts in a way which absorbs risk in the process.  
I have previously mentioned how Salford is engaging in increased forms of unsupported 
financial borrowing from the private market and that this has increased substantially 
since the economic crash. It is being compounded by a lack of asset valuation from which 
to generate capital. But even if this ability returns, an eventual lack of assets to sell due 
to large scale privatisation may mean this form of financing becomes the norm. At any 
rate, as the data have demonstrated, borrowing capital to be repaid through sale of 
assets may inevitably have already consolidated this as the standard chain of events. 
This form of borrowing is not only true of Salford Council but of other councils across 
the UK (Sandford 2014). What we can see occurring here is the Council acting as a 
reliable resource for financial capital to use as an outlet in the wake of the economic 
crash. As the research participants demonstrated, the Council is seen as a reliable source 
for finance. Of course, this process of financialisation comes with increasing risk, risks 
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that are not mitigated with corresponding financial controls, opening up a potential 
future problem (Bailey et al 2010). Unlike the PFI that contracted the public sector to 
long term payments but that also attempted (though some may say unsuccessfully) to 
mitigate for risks over the course of the contract, the Prudential Code that manages 
unsupported borrowing only mitigates for three years ahead. This is the case even when 
the loans themselves are long-term.  The latest information publicly available in 2009 
states that the Council’s market debt (approximately £300 million) matures between 
2050 and 2080 (Salford City Council 2009b). This means financial borrowing that will be 
paid back over the coming 40 years and subject to any market fluctuations that may 
occur over this time.  
The outcome of this financial borrowing, certainly for Salford Council, is that it is then 
using these sums to loan or underwrite private development. We have seen examples 
of this within the thesis, for example the ‘wrapper lease’ for the Greengate 
Embankment. This is just one example of many. So what we see is the Council acting as 
a borrower of debt which enables the continuation of market lending and is seen as a 
safer option under austerity conditions than lending directly to private developers. 
However, the Council then passes this money on to the private developer, once many 
of the risks have been removed, to enable the continuation of development. Here it is 
acting as borrower and a lender at the same time. It is a crucial linchpin in the financing 
process keeping capital projects going. But of course this compounds the risks the 
Council is taking. The initial borrowing of the money is one risk. It is then used to invest 
in another speculative development, which is a further risk. Embedded within this of 
course is a level of profit guaranteed for the developer but not the Council. If the 
development forms part of a larger regeneration initiative then there is a chance, as with 
the Greengate Embankment, that not developing will create knock on effects to other 
projects. The Council then acts as an intermediary keeping the process going. It borrows 
the capital, filters out the risks to be borne by itself, and then passes the capital on with 
protected profit.  
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8.5 Decentralised risk and responsibility 
This process of financialisation is being compounded by the changing financial landscape 
for all local authorities as they are being given more power to generate its own economic 
gains through the Business Rate Retention Scheme, which includes the ‘earn back’ 
model of taxation that Salford is covered by which involves a form of Tax Incremental 
Financing (TIF) that many other local authorities are also engaging in (Strickland 2013). 
The TIF works by the authority borrowing money to invest initially against the future 
projected increase in tax raised. This is literally borrowing from future revenues 
(Strickland 2013). This represents a fundamental change in how local authorities are 
funded, replacing central redistribution with locally generated finance. It means entirely 
providing public services through local economic rates of return and the ability to 
generate such returns (Pugalis & Bentley 2013). These changes come from attempts to 
decentralise state finance in favour of local control, encouraging local authorities to 
increase its business rates through development (Muldoon-Smith & Greenhalgh 2015). 
But they also usher in increasing unevenness as additional tax is only generated by 
economic gains. There is very little incentive, or finance, in this model, to be able to 
develop areas that are unlikely to increase the business rates of an area. The best way 
to increase business rates is by developing floor space to then be built on. This is more 
lucrative than improving existing stock. Therefore the most likely developments are in 
those spaces where floor space is at a premium (Muldoon-Smith and Greenhalgh 2015). 
It is in these areas that will then be encouraged or promoted to developers. It is through 
these methods that cities will be reliant on tapping in to and generating money from 
land values in order to fund their regeneration and public services in the absence of any 
other government economic investment. It is thus crucial for us to consider what may 
be the consequence of this financial change. 
It may be the case that whilst city leaders will be encouraged to develop already 
premium areas increasing the unevenness within cities, there may also be unevenness 
increasing between cities, as those with the strongest economies will generate greater 
growth. It may also serve to increase the rate of borrowing seen above to encourage 
this growth (Strickland 2013). We can see how this change in income generation may 
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encourage even riskier forms of market borrowing which is then used to propel urban 
development and the delivering of public services. More research needs to be 
conducted to determine the outcome of these significant changes to local government 
financing (Muldoon-Smith and Greenhalgh 2015) but it appears that there is a significant 
shift occurring in the role of the Council, its ability to deliver services and a regeneration 
agenda and its increasing involvement in financial practices that may instigate significant 
risks. Regeneration now can only be delivered through these mechanisms, removing the 
ability to channel necessary funds to areas of deprivation; a challenge that will be faced 
by local authorities across England and Wales.  We can deduce then that regeneration, 
if it is still to retain that label, has broken away from its earlier conception as something 
which intends as its primary purpose to alleviate social problems. These changes, 
Southern (2013) argues, signals the death of the ‘regeneration’ metaphor. The concept 
of renewal, revival or regrowth can no longer be applied to what has appeared in place 
of regeneration. The aim now seems to be growth, regardless of what preceded it.    
8.6 Post-political, empty futures 
These measures represent the post-political condition mentioned throughout the thesis. 
This commitment to growth is fully entrenched through the changing financial landscape 
which leaves local councils with few viable alternatives to generate income. I have 
demonstrated examples throughout this thesis of a fatalistic attitude to growth, one in 
which democratic decision making is relinquished in favour of immediate action often 
undertaken by technocratic practitioners. A feature of this post-political logic is a 
foreclosure of politics by instigating a ‘no alternative’ mantra under conditions of 
urgency (Deas 2013).  Decisions that are made now under this condition serves to ‘lock 
out’ politics in the future (Raco 2014). This is particularly so in making long-term 
contracts that will inevitably have to dealt with by future generations. I have argued that 
this ‘borrowing from the future’ is a necessary logic of capitalism, which seeks continual 
expansion so as to never reach its end points (Zizek 2009). Crisis, an inherent feature of 
capitalism, is averted by the constant escape in to the future, always pushing its end 
point so as to never reach it, for example never having to repay in full all the debts 
incurred necessarily accumulated for its continuance (Zizek 1997). With the Council 
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increasingly having to turn to the market to fund its own future, it also has to borrow 
from the future, locking out politics along the way. We can see how Salford Council, 
amongst other councils, is carrying long term debt to fund current infrastructure. We 
can also see how they are locked in to contracts with private sector providers for public 
services. In 20 years’ time for example that Council will still be repaying the debts from 
now, managing the risks that have already been taken and taking on new risk to mitigate 
any that were realised. All of these features foreclose the ability of the Council to make 
changes, exercise democratic rights or prioritise local need (Swyngedouw 2010).  
The Council is tapping in to the future and using it as a resource to fulfil immediate 
wants. In this sense the future is seen an open to be filled, colonised and consumed. It 
is, as Adam and Groves (2007) define it, an ‘empty future’, one which has been 
abstracted from its embeddedness in the present social, political and environmental 
conditions. They argue,  
“Once emptied, the future can be filled with anything, with unlimited 
interests, desires, projections, values, beliefs, ethical concerns, business 
ventures, political ambitions…. It becomes a free-for-all, unbounded, 
unlimited and thus fundamentally and irreducibly indeterminate. In 
contrast to the context-bound future, the empty future of contemporary 
economic and political exchange is fundamentally uncertain and 
unknowable. At the same time, however, it appears wide open to 
colonisation and traversal” (ibid: 13). 
In emptying the future of immediate needs, local requirements and obligations it can be 
used as an open resource to be filled with debt and political restrictions, the implication 
of which can be concealed under the banner of a future trajectory of progress and a city 
vision of development.  Adam and Groves (2007) argue that we need to re-embed the 
future into our current decision making in order to be fully responsible for the outcomes 
of what we choose to do now. It is a renewed call for sustainability. In the introduction 
to this thesis I highlighted the coalition government’s agenda for sustainable 
development in the National Planning Policy Framework as one of positive economic 
growth. What I have demonstrated throughout this thesis however enables us to 
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challenge the terms sustainability and growth together wherein growth inherently relies 
on the utilisation of the future as a resource. As Salford Council hurriedly accelerate in 
to the future to reach their end destination, the view of the present is foreclosed, like 
being on a fast train, unable to focus on anything external to what immediately 
surrounds you,    
“…by extending the present to the furthest reaches of the empty future, 
the future loses much of its open character: the passage to it becomes 
ever narrower when much of the future is already used, disposed of, 
borrowed or spoken for” (Adam & Groves 2007: 77).  
However, rather than committing to growth in a way that conflates the spatial with the 
temporal, creating a foreclosed future trajectory, perhaps instead we should stop and 
focus on the multiplicity of the spatial and what is emerging across this uneven terrain. 
I highlighted a quote from Davidson and Iveson (2014) earlier that characterised the 
post-political condition of “‘we don’t need political debating, we need action!’” (p4). But 
if instead we take heed of Zizek (2012) it may be necessary to do the exact opposite; to 
not act but to think. Post-politics is based on the mantra of ‘there is no alternative’. It is 
imperative to consider then, under the changing conditions of austerity urbanism, 
exactly which other alternatives there are to choose from.  What would happen if a Local 
Authority resisted the neoliberal growth agenda? What scope is there for a city to 
engage in a progressive resistance politics? This question cannot be answered here, but 
it demands thorough consideration. It is particularly necessary to begin to identify 
alternative solutions for the ‘new ruins’ and ‘empty spaces’ that currently remain in 
limbo in Salford, outside of Salford’s foreclosed future.  
8.7 Economic futures 
Whilst this thesis is a case study of Salford, it also explores broader questions concerning 
the development of urban politics and urban economic development beyond Salford. 
The outcomes that are occurring within Salford are also occurring throughout cities in 
the UK.  Of course there will always be variation. SQ is at once both locally specific and 
nationally generic. The ‘repertoire of strategies’ that Peck (2005) has identified as a 
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feature of most regeneration projects (the waterfront regeneration, the creative cities 
label, the consumption centres, the mega-events) can be seen to drive the regeneration 
of Salford, especially SQ. We can see how the city planners sought inspiration from 
regeneration developments in other cities across the UK and internationally. Many of 
these features will be applicable to other regeneration projects across the UK and the 
process will illuminate similar processes.  
We can learn from this thesis about the general model of regeneration, how it creates 
uneven distribution of benefits and how it is changing under current conditions. It is that 
aspect of the thesis that is applicable to all cities in the UK. The changing form of 
regeneration and the changing financial landscape for local councils will affect all. It is a 
fundamental break from previous redistribution processes and specially targeted funds 
that has far reaching implications beyond just urban regeneration but to all public policy 
delivery. Likewise the risky financial practices being undertaken by Salford Council is not 
just applicable to Salford, but is occurring across the UK. In fact, other cities are engaging 
in this practice at a much higher level of risk than Salford (Debt Resistance 2015). The 
implications of this are unknown at this stage but require considered attention.     
This thesis also raises important questions regarding the urban economic development 
taking place within Northern cities, in particular the developments aimed at creating the 
Northern Powerhouse. The recent policy statements announced by the Conservative 
government around the Northern Powerhouse opens up the possibility for an increased 
commitment to economic growth but also a more democratically representative form 
of local governance. In 2014 George Osborne announced the proposal for a ‘Northern 
Powerhouse’; which is comprised of a devolution of powers away from central 
Westminster towards northern city-regions. These devolved responsibilities will be 
granted on the condition of a locally elected mayor to preside over the area in question. 
Essentially this was a deepening of the City Deals already established in 2011 as 
described previously in the thesis (Nurse 2015). The expressed aim of the Northern 
Powerhouse is to “…transform Northern growth, rebalance the country’s economy and 
establish the North as a global powerhouse” (Department for Transport 2015: 2). Whilst 
all northern cities are intended to collaborate to establish the Norther Powerhouse, 
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putting their previous competitive strategies aside, it is Greater Manchester which has 
been designated as the focal point in which to begin the ‘devolution revolution’ (Bovis 
2015). The devolution deal will see the Greater Manchester Combined Authority have 
responsibility for over £1 billion in public expenditure (including housing, planning, 
transport and welfare) and over £1.5 billion for healthcare spending that was previously 
the responsibility of the NHS but will now be the responsibility of a Greater Manchester 
health body (Kenealy 2015). 
This devolution represents a fundamental shift in power away from central government 
and could potentially signify a more balanced form of democratic accountability that 
takes account of local necessities. In the Manchester context the newly elected mayor 
will sit above a cabinet of 10 Council representatives, one from each Local Authority 
within Greater Manchester. The mayor can be outvoted by a two-thirds majority of this 
cabinet, presenting some form of external control (Kenealy 2015). It is expected that the 
devolution to a locally elected mayor will have the power to make decisions and shape 
policy agendas like spatial planning that are more in line and supportive of local need. It 
should serve the local people by having someone locally elected that they can hold to 
account much closer to their local areas, improving political trust (Lyall et al. 2015). 
However, this thesis raises important questions in relation to the potential of the 
Northern Powerhouse for re-establishing increased levels of democratic engagement 
and a rebalancing of the economy. 
Arguably the Northern Powerhouse is primarily an economic argument to generate 
additional levels of growth, rather than something with the expressed aim of 
rebalancing the economy. We could see this as a political strategy in which policies that 
affect the north can be ‘branded’ under the Norther Powerhouse label, appealing to 
northern votes who are traditionally more Labour supportive than Conservative (Lee 
2016). It is also in many ways a political positioning which may narrow rather than 
embolden democracy. The appointing of an elected mayor is the necessary 
‘compromise’ for devolution. It is a compromise given that in 2012 the Manchester 
voters rejected David Cameron’s then call for a city mayor by voting ‘no’ in a 
democratically held referendum. As mentioned above, the mayor is intended to increase 
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democratic accountability and representation at the local level. This could have the 
outcome of strengthening local needs by handing some decision making responsibility 
back to locally elected officials, which some argue will help to combat some of the 
political foreclosure that this thesis has been documenting. As Raco (2015) argues,  
“…more democratic systems of accountability and control would be more 
efficient in planning and democratic terms. If policy-makers and 
communities are given enhanced decision-making responsibilities then 
resources could be better targeted at those areas of welfare spending 
where needs are emerging, rather than the imagined needs drawn-up by 
contract lawyers and risk management experts. There is no better system 
than democratic accountability for producing outcomes that meet local 
welfare needs” (167).  
However, as this thesis has shown, more democratic representation does not 
necessarily mean a greater democratic service. It is likely that a concentration of power 
within the hands of an elected mayor whose power is conditional on delivering 
economic growth will continue a growth agenda. This thesis has shown how there is a 
commitment to deliver economic gains encouraged by an incentivised funding 
landscape amongst public policy officials. Thus a democratically elected mayor with 
‘enhanced decision-making responsibilities’ as Raco states, will not necessarily result in 
targeting resources where local needs demand them if their enhanced responsibilities 
come with a growth mandate. The Northern Powerhouse is less a strategic plan for 
rebalancing the economy and delivering enhanced representation and more a political 
and economic argument for growth (Lee 2016).   
The Northern Powerhouse may also increase the spatial disparities across Greater 
Manchester. The mayor will be responsible for the creation of the Statutory Spatial 
Strategy which will take precedence over other locally devised plans. As Nurse (2015) 
argues, these strategies have been adopted in London since 2000 and it is the strategic 
planning which causes the most tension amongst the related districts. The strategy 
raises questions over how the resources will be distributed, which areas will benefit 
from development and which areas are less likely to be the targeted sites for growth. 
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The unequal distribution of investment that is taking place across Salford may be 
replicated at a Greater Manchester scale with even less scope for democratic leaders to 
challenge the development plans.  
The power devolved to the Greater Manchester city-region can be revoked and the 
funding under the City Deal can be withheld if the Treasury is not satisfied that the 
investments are contributing to economic growth (HM Treasury 2014). This conditional 
devolution inherently compromises democratic institutions. Devolution may represent 
a further narrowing of democratic abilities to exercise political authority to debate 
alternative options other than economic growth.  For Lyall et al (2015) this is deal-
making rather than policy-making and creates opaque and restrictive policies in which 
there is very little room for non-economic outcomes. Given the already committed and 
fatalistic attitude of policy makers evidenced within this thesis, it seems likely that the 
Northern Powerhouse will consolidate a post-political growth agenda, rather than 
ameliorate it.  
8.8 Future directions for exploration 
In this section I want to set out some future considerations generated by this thesis. 
There are several important questions that this thesis has raised that require more 
detailed research in order to help explain or understand them. The first point I want to 
raise is that of the post-political mantra that there is ‘no alternative’. I want to explore 
where this pessimism leaves us for the future and how we might seek to offer genuine 
progressive alternatives. The second question raised is that of the increasing 
indebtedness of local councils in trying to deliver growth under a devolved financial 
system. This has potentially severe ramifications and has received little attention to 
date. The third question is that of the changing regeneration landscape and its 
implications for growing unevenness. It requires considered attention to see from this 
point in time, how a city is able to fund development and where that development is 
focused.  
Earlier in this chapter I posited the question of whether or not there really is ‘no 
alternative’. This is a difficult question to answer and given the theme of this thesis it 
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seems ill-conceived to speculate. However, it is important, under a potentially post-
political landscape to actually uncover where alternatives are being used and how they 
are being employed. This would add to the current literature that takes a political 
philosophy view point in attempting to identify the space in which the logic of the police 
(in Ranciere’s terms) meets with the logic of equality to reveal a genuine space of 
democratic politics (see for example Ranciere 1999, Swyngedouw 2010, Dikeç 2006). It 
would also add to the literature that seeks out elements of resistance politics through 
resistance movements and protest groups that form a dissensus against the political 
order and reclaim democratic public space (see Springer 2011, Swyngedouw 2011, May 
2010). Lees (2014) has argued for researchers not to ‘succumb to dystopian narratives’ 
but rather highlight resistance to them. She does this through an exploration of 
regeneration in Aylesbury of a housing estate in which conflict and dissent was ‘alive 
and well’ (2014: 922). There has also been some focus on urban planning within a post-
political context and the potential for a more progressive and collaborative form of 
planning (see Davidson 2009 and Allmendinger and Houghton 2012).  
However, little attention has been paid to the actual occurrence of when alternative 
planning and political decision making at the policy level has been or is being made. It 
seems pertinent to focus explicitly on how and in what ways local councils can choose 
an alternative in such a constrained financial landscape. It is necessary for future 
research to plot out such options and to attempt to ascertain what happens to those 
cities that opt out of this growth agenda. It would be beneficial at this juncture to be 
able to expose the urgency of a ‘no alternative’ politics with a progressive set of 
alternatives. 
The second question that this thesis raises for future research is the changing way that 
local councils are being funded and the increasing levels of debt that councils are now 
carrying. This is a potentially problematic occurrence that has yet to receive detailed 
attention. Authors Bailey, Hood and Asenova are the main contributors to the literature 
on the Prudential Borrowing Framework. Strickland (2013) has provided a case study of 
Tax Incremental Financing in Newcastle and Muldoon-Smith and Greenhalgh (2015) 
have written about the Business Rate Retention Scheme. But otherwise this topic is 
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under researched. Such a significant change to the funding of local authorities requires 
much more of a theoretical focus to identify the potential ramifications of such a 
significant change.  
The increasing financialisation and rising debt levels of local councils needs to be 
analysed, accounting for these other financial changes in order to assess the potential 
risks that this may be generating. It would appear that local councils are facilitating both 
the reduction of a national debt but also the continuing flow of financial capital via 
increasing Local Authority debt. The large increase in local council debt since the 
recession is testimony to this. Whilst it may be apposite to imply the result of this 
process, given the economic crisis that it is a result of, it would be too simplistic to posit 
a fatal economic end point. Instead what is required is a thorough analysis of this 
financial process, taking account of all the changes that are yet to be felt fully. There 
needs to be a full consideration of these new financial models and the way in which they 
are implicated in the private market economy.      
This leads on to the third important question that this thesis raises. That is how these 
financial changes will take form across the terrain of Salford and cities like it. Importantly 
we need to consider how the change to local councils and the funding for policies like 
regeneration will reduce the ability to target sites of deprivation and social and 
economic need. In the absence of any regeneration funding aimed at local spatial scales, 
what will be the future for the sites identified in this thesis as sites of interrupted 
gentrification (Wallace 2014) and ‘new ruins’ of the 21st century (Kitchen et al 2014)? If 
regeneration as the alleviation of social inequalities has given way to the generation of 
economic growth through targeting sites of premium value, then what will happen to 
the sites that are not of premium value? How will unevenness grow under these 
conditions and in what ways, if any, will funding be directed to sites of non-economic 
growth? This will require a close focus on regeneration initiatives that are occurring 
using these funding mechanisms to see in what ways they develop and what shape they 
take.   
 288 
 
8.9 Conclusion 
This thesis has explored urban regeneration in Central Salford since the early 1980’s. My 
central argument has been one of foreclosure. I have argued that the city, as it 
regenerates and commits to a future of ‘progress’ and growth has narrowed in both 
spatial, temporal and political terms. It has become harder for local residents who do 
not conform to the new vision of Salford to benefit from the changes and engage within 
the new spaces created for a middle class audience. In the commitment of Salford 
Council to deliver this vision it has necessarily sought the financial options available. But 
through this process the Council is constrained on to a course of action which locks the 
Council in to private contracts, financial borrowing and underwriting developments that 
constrain the ability of the Council to make changes or select alternative future 
trajectories. Thus the potential for politics and democratic engagement in the future is 
foreclosed.        
This thesis has raised questions around the way local councils are able to deliver 
regeneration in the future and the changing financial landscape in which to do it. This 
has thrown up new lines of enquiry for future research around the role of local 
authorities and their increasing commitment to economic growth through market debt 
and speculative risk taking. It appears that we are seeing the end of an urban 
regeneration intended to ameliorate social inequalities alongside economic renewal. In 
its place we can trace the emergence of a new urban generation. Our task now is to 
understand what this means for our cities, both the places themselves and those who 
live in them.    
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Appendices 
Appendix A – Informed Consent Form 
Consent form 
This informed consent form is for Professionals involved in the development, 
regeneration and crime prevention in Salford City selected as part of a University of York 
PhD research project looking at the significant development and transformation of 
Salford over recent years. 
Name of Principle Investigator: Alex Black 
Name of Organization: The University of York 
 
This Informed Consent Form has two parts:  
• Information Sheet (to share information about the study with you)  
• Certificate of Consent (for signatures if you choose to participate)  
You will be given a copy of the full Informed Consent Form  
 
Part I: Information Sheet  
Introduction  
I am a doctoral researcher on this project and I hope to conduct interviews with people 
that have views and experiences relevant to this research. You may talk to anyone you 
feel comfortable talking with about the research and you can take time to reflect on 
whether you want to participate or not. If you do not understand some of the words or 
concepts, I will take time to explain them as we go along and you can ask questions at 
any time.  
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Purpose of the research  
Salford is an area which has seen substantial regeneration and investment over the last 
few decades and which appears to have much more to come. Salford’s heritage and its 
geographical location make it prime for urban development and an expanding 
population. However, there are also existing social problems in some areas, which must 
demand considerable attention from those responsible for building a strong local 
economy. The aim of this research is to generate information allowing me to understand 
what the problems are that Salford is facing, in what way urban development is tackling 
those problems, the impact of crime, how the balance of existing and incoming 
community members is achieved and what the future of Salford is to look like. I am keen 
to get professionals who have the knowledge/are involved in regeneration and crime 
prevention in this area to allow me to find out more about these issues. 
Type of Research  
This research will involve your participation in a short interview that will take about 
thirty minutes to one hour. 
Participant Selection  
I would like to invite you to take part in this research because I feel that your experience 
in the regeneration/development or crime prevention in this area will contribute to my 
understanding and knowledge of the changes which have and will take place.  
Voluntary Participation  
Your participation in this research is entirely voluntary.  
Procedures  
The interview involves questions relating to: your experience of regeneration in Salford, 
what the purpose of these developments are and how their success is measured, what 
the barriers to development are, what the problems that development aims to address 
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are, how existing communities are consulted, how effective partnership working is, how 
social mixing is achieved and how the issues of safety and crime are tackled.  
We will not ask you to share personal beliefs and you do not have to share any 
knowledge that you are not comfortable sharing.  
No one else but myself will be present during the interview. The entire discussion will 
be tape-recorded, but no-one will be identified by name on the tape. The recording will 
be kept securely and your name will never be used in the analysis of the data or any 
output from the research.  
The information recorded is confidential, and no one else except myself will have access 
to the recordings.  
Duration  
The research is taking place over two years (until the end of 2014).  
Benefits  
There may be no direct benefit to you, but your participation will help me find out more 
about regeneration from the point of view of the professionals involved. 
Confidentiality  
The research being done may draw attention but your participation will remain 
confidential. I will not be sharing information about you to anyone. The information 
collected from this research project will be kept private. Any information about you will 
be given a pseudonym instead of your name. Only I will know your real name and all of 
our data will be kept in password protected folders. 
 
The research will identify Salford by name and therefore there is a risk that, whilst you 
personally will not be named, you may be referred to as, for example, an employee of 
Salford Council or an employee of a private developer in the area. This would allow a 
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narrowing down of possible respondents. However, I would like to reiterate that no 
names will be used or any other details of your profession which would allow for specific 
identification.  
Sharing the Results  
Nothing that you tell me today will be shared with anybody else, and nothing will be 
attributed to you by name. A summary of the results will be available to all participants. 
Following the research I hope to publish the results so that other interested people may 
learn from the research. 
Right to Refuse or Withdraw  
You do not have to take part in this research if you do not wish to do so. You may stop 
participating in the interview at any time that you wish. 
 Who to Contact 
If you have any questions, you can ask them now or later. If you wish to ask questions 
later, you may contact me at the following: Alex Black, 07845644408 or 
acb528@york.ac.uk  
The ethical aspects of this research have been reviewed and approved by the University 
of York ethics committee whose task it is to make sure that research participants are 
protected from harm. If you wish to find about more about this please contact:  elmps-
ethics-group@york.ac.uk 
You can ask me any more questions about any part of the research study, if you wish to. 
Do you have any questions?   
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Certificate of Consent  
 
I have read the foregoing information, or it has been read to me. I have had the 
opportunity to ask questions about it and any questions I have been asked have been 
answered to my satisfaction. I consent voluntarily to be a participant in this study  
 
Print Name of Participant__________________  
    
Signature of Participant ___________________ 
 
Date ___________________________ 
 Day/month/year    
 
I have witnessed the accurate reading of the consent form to the potential participant, 
and the individual has had the opportunity to ask questions. I confirm that the individual 
has given consent freely.  
 
Signature of Researcher /person taking the consent__________________________ 
Date ___________________________    
                 Day/month/year 
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Appendix B – Interview schedule 
Interview Schedule – Public/Third sector 
What is your position? 
How are you involved/in what ways are you involved with regeneration (or a specific 
project)? 
What are the reasons for regeneration in the area? 
What are the perceived benefits of regeneration (including), 
 Contribution to local economy 
 Jobs 
 Growth 
 Competition 
Who are the perceived beneficiaries of regeneration (including), 
 Target groups 
 Outcomes for the groups 
How is success measured? 
Are there any potential negative outcomes? 
What is the impact on or involvement with the indigenous community (including), 
 Changing community structure 
 Community consultation/involvement 
 Community response 
 Community use of regenerated spaces (MediaCity) 
 Community cohesion 
 Community mixing 
How is the economic environment changing (including), 
 Benefitting local people  
 Skills and employment 
 Organisational sector 
What types of projects are intended for development? 
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 Housing 
 Commercial 
What are the flagship projects in the area and what is their proposed function? 
How is investment secured (including),  
 Types of investment 
 Growth 
 Promoting Salford  
How is the image of Salford changing?  
 To external viewers 
 To internal viewers 
Partnership working 
 Main partners 
 Development of partnerships 
 Issues 
 Working in practice 
 Ownership of regeneration developments 
 Labour contracts – apprenticeships 
 Planning gains 
 Planning and design 
What are the perceived barriers (if any) to realising regeneration benefits? 
What has been the impact of the success of MediaCity/SQ? 
What is the vision and future plans for Salford? 
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Interview Schedule – Private developer 
What is your position? 
How is your company involved/in what ways are you involved with development in this 
area (or a specific project)? 
What types of projects is your company involved in? 
 Housing 
 Commercial 
Why Salford? 
What are the reasons for your company’s involvement in regeneration in the area? 
What was the perceived need? 
Are you or have you been involved in other regeneration schemes? 
Who are the intended users of your development? 
What are the perceived benefits of regeneration (including), 
 Contribution to local economy 
 Jobs 
 Growth 
 Competition 
What are the challenges that you face? 
Who are your main partners in the area? 
What is your working relationship with the Council? 
How are decisions made? 
How are priorities decided upon? 
How is the vision/direction for the development decided upon? (in conjunction with 
partners) 
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What is the process of development? 
 Land acquisition 
 Development Framework 
 Planning approval 
 Democratic processes 
 Planning Gains 
How are you involved with community members? 
 Community consultation/involvement 
 Community response 
 Community use of regenerated spaces (MediaCity) 
 Community cohesion 
Who are your perceived beneficiaries/target groups? 
 Social impact 
What are the perceived barriers (if any) to realising development benefits? 
What are your future plans for the area if any? 
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Interview Schedule – Community representative 
How long have you been a resident in the area? 
How are you involved/in what ways are you involved with regeneration (or a specific 
project)? 
What are your reasons for involvement? 
What are your experiences of this involvement? 
What do you perceive the benefits to be? 
How has regeneration (specific scheme) changed the area you live in? 
 Changing community 
 Changing culture 
 Changing image 
 Changing spaces 
How is information about regeneration (specific scheme) communicated? 
 Effectiveness of communication 
 Responses to communication 
 Who is communicating 
In what ways are you engaged with the decision making processes? 
 Developers 
 Other residents 
 Forums 
 Council engagement 
 Initial project approval 
How is the community consulted on regeneration (specific scheme)? 
Is there any perceived resistance to regeneration (specific scheme)? 
How is the image of Salford changing?  
 To external viewers 
 To internal viewers 
What are the perceived barriers (if any) to realising regeneration benefits? 
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What has been the impact of MediaCity/SQ? 
What is the vision and future plans for Salford? 
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Abbreviations 
 
AGMA   Association of Greater Manchester Authorities  
ALMO   Arms-Length Management Organisations  
ASB  ` Anti-Social Behaviour  
CIPFA   Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountability  
EZ   Enterprise Zones  
GMCA   Greater Manchester Combined Authority  
GMLEP  Greater Manchester LEP  
GVA   Gross Value Added  
HMR   Housing Market Renewal  
LEP   Local Enterprise Partnerships  
NDC   New Deal for Communities  
NPPF   National Planning Policy Framework  
NSNR   National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal  
NW   North West  
NWDA  North West Regional Developments agency  
PBF   Prudential Borrowing Framework  
PFI   Private Finance Initiative  
RGF   Regional Growth Fund  
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SEU   Social Exclusion Unit  
SRB   Single Regeneration Budget  
SQ   Salford Quays 
TIF   Tax Increment Financing  
UDC  Urban Development Corporations  
URC   Urban Regeneration Company 
UTF   Urban Task Force  
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